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Abstract 
Songdo is a city built within Korea’s first Free Economic Zone (FEZ). The city has 
become imbued with three distinct yet interrelated fantasies – a grand state project 
envisioned to guide the country towards modernity; a blank slate onto which an 
organized and efficient utopian community can be built; and an urban node in a 
frictionless world. In this thesis, I present an anthropology of and in the city by exploring 
the relations between the urban imagination of Songdo and particular groups in the city. I 
argue that Songdo’s fantasies shape the behaviors, perceptions, and material practices of 
people working and living in the city, who in turn interpret and act upon Songdo’s 
physical and symbolic spaces. I attempt to demonstrate that while Songdo’s mythologies 
and their concomitant practices link to global trends, the production and experiences of 
the city reflect a situated and locally embedded urban form.  
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CHAPTER 1 Approaching a ‘Zone City’: Urban 
Imagination of and in Songdo 
1.1  Crossing into Songdo 
Visiting Songdo from downtown Incheon is fairly straightforward. A subway ride on the 
city’s recently extended line will get you there. This line, the only one serving Incheon 
proper, opened its extension from Dongmak Station into Songdo in 2009, the same year 
the city ‘opened for business’. Riding the subway, as I did almost daily during my four 
months of fieldwork in Songdo,1 takes one through almost a dozen stations in Incheon 
before the train crosses into Songdo. The train circulates deep underground and traverses 
the narrow passage of water separating the two places without passengers ever knowing 
it. There are other indicators to mark a threshold however. The last six stations of the 
Incheon line have curious names, all in English. After leaving Dongmak Station in 
Incheon, passengers arrive at Campus Town. As the train pulls up to the station, the 
overhead video monitors installed in each car display images of Songdo Global 
University Campus (SGUC) accompanied by lively music and an assertive voice 
informing passengers of the world-class foreign universities at this location. 
The subsequent stations, also with English names, perform in similar fashion. The 
next station is Technopark, a research cluster for private enterprises researching and 
developing today’s most cutting edge technologies. The following station is Bio-
Information Technology Zone (BIT Zone), another research cluster for scientific 
entrepreneurship, where Samsung BioLogics and Celltrion are developing the latest 
                                                
1 I lived in Incheon over the course of my fieldwork because Songdo apartment rates were too steep for my 
research budget. 
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biosimilars2 to compete with the world’s most heavily consumed drugs once their patents 
have expired. Next is Incheon National University Station, recently moved into Songdo 
to take advantage of the city’s prestigious status.3 Following this is Central Park Station. 
Named after and inspired by New York City’s own, Central Park is Songdo’s flagship 
green space, with docile deer, a rabbit island, and a Venice-inspired river that runs 
through it. The last station is the International Business District, intended to house 
multinational companies that engage in frictionless trade across East Asia and the world. 
The train’s exterior offers no indication that one has crossed a boundary, but from the 
inside of the cars, it is evident that one has entered into a different place. 
 
Figure 1.1 – Songdo subway stations (Kim 2012). Songdo International Business District Station follows 
Central Park Station. Note: I-Tower was changed to G-Tower (G for ‘green’) in 2013 when the Green 
Climate Fund (GCF) came to Songdo. 
The train stations across the line and the cars’ interiors are sporadically lined with 
advertisements about Songdo. A prominent one exhibited in large characters, “외국에	
                                                
2 A biosimilar is a pharmaceutical product that is a copy of the original from another company. Biosimilars 
are approved for sale once the patent of the original product expires (see samsungbiologics.com and 
celltrion.com). 
3 Park (2011) reveals the consequences of Incheon National University’s relocation to Songdo. The 
university has taken with it the student population onto which the neighborhood where it was formerly 
housed relied for its economic sustenance. Since the university moved, the neighborhood has lost most of 
its residents as they have been forced to relocate in search of a source of income elsewhere. 
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산다?	송도에	산다!” [“Live abroad? Live in Songdo!”].4 Concurrently, while walking 
outside in Songdo, one cannot avoid the obnoxiously large and unexpectedly small 
“Incheon Free Economic Zone” (IFEZ) logos nearly suffusing one’s field of vision. IFEZ 
banners temporarily line the walls of construction sites, the medians of roads, the edges 
of sidewalks, the entrances of parks, and they are also durably inscribed on the city’s 
drainage covers and park benches, light poles and sidewalk interlocks, and other oddly 
mundane surfaces. One is incessantly – almost forcefully – induced to imagine that one 
has somehow stepped outside of Korea and into a transnational zone, a global place. 
 
Figure 1.2 – IFEZ insignia peppered throughout the city. Photographed by author (28 June 2014). 
The sensory experience of Songdo also feels dislocated and dislocating. The city 
juxtaposes multiple landscapes of time and space: glistening new buildings next to dusty 
construction sites, recently completed infrastructures already covered by dirt and 
wildflowers; many sections of the city remain quiet, completely absent from human 
voices and footsteps, while one is never far from the humming and banging of machines 
                                                
4 This advertisement seems intentionally vague, at once engaging in conversation with the observer in 
second person – “Do you want to live abroad? Come live in Songdo!” – while also allowing the observer to 
imagine themselves as the first person speaker – “Do you think I live abroad? I live in Songdo!” 
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busily assembling the city; some areas conjure urban futurescapes, a tranquil park, or a 
barren wasteland. Songdo is a city in formation with manifold and shifting sites, such that 
one never feels in place, as though the city is perpetually elsewhere.  
The most stable and powerful signifiers of Songdo’s orientation are its 
postmodern architectural panoramas and attendant promotional materials, conjuring 
dramatic urban fantasies that hover over its landscape, like a “foggy geography of 
meanings” suspended above (see de Certeau 1984, cf. Hansen and Verkaaik 2009, 6). 
The symbolic presence that hangs over the city also seeps into its spaces and inhabitants, 
suffusing Songdo’s urban landscape with a ‘soul’ or a mythology5 that oversaturates with 
exceptional significance the sensory experience of the city. While Songdo may in many 
ways look like a “ghost town” – as Incheonites would often say,6 the city aims to evoke 
an urban form on track towards redefining urbanism for humanity’s future. 
 
Figure 1.3 – View of the city from Central Park (myphotodump.com). 
                                                
5 See Hansen and Verkaaik (2009) who describe cities as “living props” with souls, spirits, mythologies, 
and fantasmic presence. 
6 Evidently, Songdo’s mythologies resonate with some but not with all. Cities are always multiple sites that 
afford multiple readings (Hansen and Verkaaik 2009; Harms 2011), but the groups I follow in this thesis 
have intimate relationships with the ‘soul’ of Songdo I describe here. 
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Figure 1.4 – Promotional image of Songdo (galeintl.com). 
 
Figure 1.5 – Songdo nightscape (galeintl.com). 
1.2 Approaching Songdo 
Export zones, loosely defined as enclosed areas within national territories that offer lower 
regulations and tariffs to private companies in order to facilitate the circulation of capital, 
goods and people, are powerfully conjured as a universal means of gaining allure, wealth, 
and ascension into the global order for the host nation (Orenstein 2011, 39). Over the last 
few decades, zones have rapidly surged in number, from a small handful in the 1960s to 
over 5000 in many parts of the world today (Bach 2011a, 98-100). Most recently, a new 
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zone breed has evolved from the export zone. A ‘new zone paradigm’ has emerged from 
“a pragmatic space for the production of exports” into a stable urban form, “a place, 
imagined and lived” (Bach 2011a, 99; see also Easterling 2014). The watershed moment 
came when ‘zone’ and ‘city’ congealed into one, out of which have arisen unique urban 
imaginations. Jonathan Bach (2011a) writes that while the dramatic expansion of export 
zones has elicited a flurry of scholarship attentive to economic and political dimensions, 
little has been explored about the cultural logics of the new zone form, the ‘zone city’. 
Bach (2011a) outlines a loose continuum between the export zone and the zone 
city: at one end, zones can be temporarily and superficially embedded spaces specifically 
and narrowly designated for export processing with low-wage, low-skill labor that have 
little integration with their host state, while at the other end, a zone can be a city that 
resembles any other city in form and integration with the host territory, thus dissolving its 
zone status. The zone form that tends towards the latter polarity – the ‘zone city’, with a 
permanently integrated and comprehensive urban repertoire of residential, commercial, 
business and cultural amenities – has come to shape situated urban fantasies of the future. 
The zone city is an “exhibition city”, made to display and continuously reach for 
modernity: the future of how humanity is imagined to live (Bach 2011a, 110). In this 
thesis, I approach Songdo as a zone city with its own particular urban fantasies.7 
Songdo presents three central urban fantasies. First, Songdo is a grand national 
project envisioned to transform the entire country; second, the city is a completely blank 
slate onto which an organized and efficient utopic urban form can be erected; third, 
Songdo exists in a frictionless and singularly unified world, positioned to support the 
                                                
7 Inspired by Bach (2011a) and Easterling (2014), I employ the term ‘fantasy’ to characterize the urban 
imagination of Songdo in order to highlight that the city is imagined in dramatic and sensational terms. 
  7 
seamless and continuous circulation of capital, goods, and people. In practice however, 
Songdo is not entirely distinct from any other city in Korea. Recent scholarship on the 
city reveals that Songdo is much closer to a wealthy suburb built to serve the country’s 
elite (see Kim and Ahn 2011; Shin, forthcoming; Shwayri 2013). Yet Songdo is so 
heavily imbued with powerful fantasies that it is these founding narratives that come to 
determine the experience of the city itself (see Hansen and Verkaaik 2009), as planners 
and residents of Songdo persistently define it as a unique transnational urban formation. 
In the present thesis, I attempt to demonstrate that the city’s fantasies do not reflect its 
actual development but are rather fantasies for Songdo that effectively shape the 
behaviors, perceptions, and material practices of people working and living in the city, 
who in turn interpret and act upon Songdo’s physical and symbolic spaces.8 
To address the fantasies of Songdo and the ways in which people apprehend and 
rehearse them in their daily lives, I am drawn to the work of urban anthropologists. 
Anthropology has had a rather distant relationship with cities, for which the study has 
primarily been undertaken by disciplines with inclinations towards large-scale processes, 
such as sociology and geography. Anthropology’s pedigree has predominantly focused 
on the ‘exotic’ Other and on an ethnographic approach to everyday life that seeks to 
apprehend a holistic reading of small-scale communities (Toulson 2015). While 
anthropologists have explored peoples’ everyday practices in cities since the 1950s, the 
city itself was largely absent from the analytical script, that is, these were ethnographies 
that happened to take place in the city but were not of the city. The urban was surmised as 
                                                
8 The argument I make here is inspired by the work of Erik Harms (2011) who examines how people on the 
urban periphery of Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam continually reproduce ideal oppositions between the city 
and the country despite the everyday contradictions of those categories. As he writes, myth is “not a 
reflection of everyday reality [but rather] a form of myth-making itself” (22). 
  8 
a silent context – an empty receptacle – docilely conforming to the agency of its 
inhabitants (Toulson 2015, 33). 
An important transition came about in the 1980s with the integration of political 
economy in anthropology. The angle of analysis shifted from the agency of people to the 
wider structural forces that shaped everyday practices. Consequently, some 
anthropologists sought to introduce studies of the city to attend to ways in which cities 
shaped their inhabitants, but these approaches were criticized at the time for over-
emphasizing – and therefore essentializing – the city (Low 1996, 384-386). In her 
important review article, Setha Low (1996) advocates to re-enliven this latter approach 
and bring it into concert with studies in the city. She writes: “The city as a site of 
everyday practices provides valuable insights into the linkages of macroprocesses with 
the texture and fabric of human experience” (384). The city here is not the entire story, 
but rather a character in the script in ongoing relations with its inhabitants (Toulson 2015, 
30). 
An anthropology of and in the city remains relevant to the discipline today. Barker 
et al. (2013) have recently addressed a similar problematic between individuals in the city 
and the larger processes that inform their practices. The authors contextualize their 
approach between the work of Friedrich Engels who approached people of the city as 
“instantiations of a structurally defined sociological type” and Georg Simmel who 
observed the subjective individual in the city, with “phenomenological depth, but without 
historical specificity” (162). Barker et al. (2013) dialectically ‘toggle back and forth’ 
between these two oppositions to describe the agency of individuals in the city and the 
larger social-structural context of the urban terrain (166). The authors approach people in 
  9 
the city as “urban figures” and see them as both products and forces of the ground onto 
which they stand. 
In this thesis, I attempt to present an anthropology of and in the city by exploring 
the linkages between, on the one hand, the fantasies that suffuse the physical spaces of 
Songdo and, on the other hand, how the city is apprehended and “acted upon” in the 
everyday practices of people working and living in Songdo (see Hansen and Verkaaik 
2009, 12). As an approach that specifically examines the relations between the 
mythologies of and in the city, I find Hansen and Verkaaik’s (2009) notion of “urban 
charisma” uniquely suited for the purposes of my research. The concept of urban 
charisma does not relate to a unique and trans-historical attribute of special individuals 
but rather to a context of two relational forms. On the one hand, charisma of the city 
conveys the mythical presence permeating its physical spaces, buildings, infrastructures, 
people; its advertisements, maps, promotional documents. This form is “a reservoir of 
myth” that soaks through the city and makes itself available to its inhabitants who can 
identify themselves in reference to the urban landscape. As the authors write, charisma 
can be “attributed and distributed as unique powers and potentials embedded in people, 
things, places and situations” (8). 
On the other hand, charisma in the city refers to individuals who know the city 
well and can confidently and authoritatively interpret and define its spaces as well as 
manage its production with their knowledge, skills, and abilities to make connections. 
These individuals can include powerful politicians and bureaucrats, city planners and 
technicians, as well as residents in the city. Each chapter in this thesis will follow 
different ‘urban types’: a powerful bureaucrat, wealthy residents, and state officials who 
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promote and sell the city. These two forms – the mythical charisma of the city and the 
performative charisma in the city – are relationally entwined and support one another. 
Hansen and Verkaaik (2009) write, “the charisma of the city functions as a reservoir of 
myth and narrative that can be re-interpreted, re-invented and re-enacted by those who 
claim charisma in the city in a variety of forms” (9). As I aim to show, fantasies of 
Songdo can render transnational connections, transform landscapes, create massive 
property speculation, conjure social and historical contexts, refashion identities, 
reproduce class distinctions, and determine visibility and invisibility in the urban fabric 
through the ways in which people interpret and perform Songdo’s urban fantasies in the 
city. 
 The chapters in this thesis each elucidate situated aspects of Songdo’s charisma as 
different groups in the city deploy it. In chapter 2, I follow the story of an “urban 
specialist”, a high-level politician who ‘divined’ the idea of Songdo in the mid-1980s and 
subsequently undertook the task of making connections with powerful state actors and 
transnational developers to bring his idea into production. This individual effectively 
deployed the idealic form of his dream city and performed it with the help of his skills, 
knowledge, and ability to take risks, infusing a charismatic allure onto himself and his 
idea, which eventually situated a zone city within the borders of Korea. In chapter 3, I 
demonstrate that though Songdo is far from a transnational urban formation, the city’s 
charisma permeates from its urban forms and in its residents. I first examine residential 
units of the city that encourage situated fantasies of transnationalism and modernity. I 
then follow the accounts of a small group of residents in the city who interpret Songdo’s 
urban forms and define Songdo and themselves alongside. The fantasies of these 
  11 
residents are not in opposition to state power or transnational forces of capital, but rather 
entwined in these processes, reinforcing them in surprisingly creative ways.9 In chapter 4, 
I follow the work of public city makers to illustrate ways in which they rehearse the 
vision of a transnational zone city built on a flexibly configured terrain. These agents in 
the city perform Songdo’s charisma through routinized practices, while the charisma of 
the city bestows upon these city makers ‘gifts’ of professional success as they promote 
and sell the city. The chapters will each illustrate relations between the dominant 
fantasies of Songdo and different aspects of their charismatic powers performed in 
people’s everyday lives and experiences. 
This introductory chapter will serve to contextualize Songdo and this study. First, I 
will offer a historical background of zones in the East Asian region to illustrate the 
conditions of possibility for the formation of Songdo along the western shores of Korea. 
Second, I will outline the three founding narratives of Songdo – a grand state project, a 
blank slate, and a frictionless world – and describe how they have been deployed in the 
city. Third, I will position myself in this study and unpack the methodologies that frame 
its narrative. 
1.3 A Historical Context of Songdo 
The pre-history of the zone city lies in colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism’s 
propensity to maintain spaces of ambiguity in order to facilitate the circulation of people, 
goods and capital (see Bach 2011a, 100; Orenstein 2011, 39). Zones first appeared in the 
East Asian context in Singapore (1819) and Hong Kong (1841). In conjunction with its 
                                                
9 Michel de Certeau (1984) makes an opposition between planners who attempt to make the city congruent 
with an idealized concept, and the city’s dwellers who practice ‘microbe-like’, ‘swarming’ activities that 
the ‘concept-city’ can never fully capture. In the case I present here, the concept of the city and the ways in 
which people live and imagine their city are not oppositional but rather align in often surprising ways. 
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sister colony in Singapore, Hong Kong initially acted as an “entrepot” to mediate trade 
between Britain and China. It was a free port: “free of import and export restrictions and 
dues” (McCalla 1990, 126). Over this period up until the 1940s, Hong Kong also 
mediated trade relations with Japan, some European countries, and the US (McCalla 
1990, 126). 
 The 1950s to the 1980s witnessed a global rise of export-processing zones 
(EPZs), zones oriented towards manufacturing for export. This breed proliferated rapidly: 
eleven EPZs existed in 1970; by 1981, there were 96 (Chen 1995, 600); and by 1986, 
there were 307 (McCalla 1990, 130). Hong Kong came center stage as a pivot in the 
formation of EPZs in East Asia. The city had little success reemerging as an entrepot 
after the Second World War. While China had consistently absorbed forty percent of its 
exports, the Korean War (1950-1953) would see those exports come to a halt as China’s 
attention was directed against the US. Concomitantly, the United Nations imposed 
embargos on Chinese imports to thwart the country’s trade flows (McCalla 1990, 128).   
 As a means to promote exports and attract foreign capital, Hong Kong moved 
away from its role as an entrepot and shifted towards becoming an EPZ – though not 
named as such at the time – specializing in the production of textiles and clothing. By 
1955, textiles and clothing comprised sixty percent of Hong Kong’s exports. This 
transformation is attributable to a plethora of elective affinities: large numbers of Chinese 
refugees granted few rights, formerly established trade networks, enforced political 
stability, deregulated wages and working hours, subjugated labour unions, rising 
worldwide demand for clothing, among others (McCalla 1990, 128).10 
                                                
10 Meanwhile, a similar phenomenon was taking shape in Shannon, Ireland, but rather than a seaport, 
Shannon served as a customs-free airport (McCalla 1990, 128), exporting the majority of its production to 
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 Emulating the ‘success stories’ of Hong Kong and Shannon, Taiwan would 
establish its own zone, officially coined an “export processing zone”, in Kaohsiung in 
1965 (heretofore ‘KEPZ’). KEPZ was remarkably successful in attracting capital: in its 
second and third years, it attracted USD 26 million; in 1985, it attracted USD 167 million 
(Chen 1994, 8). As such, it became an exemplar of economic success for other countries. 
From 1970 to 1986, representatives from Asia, South America, and Africa came in 
droves to learn about KEPZ’s model for growth (Chen 1995, 598; McCalla 1990, 129). 
KEPZ’s real economic advantage however primarily came from the exploited labour of 
young women between the ages of 16 and 24 who would work for low wages and 
extended hours, conditions far worst than outside the zone (Chen 1994, 11; McCalla 
1990, 129; Ong 2006, 103). By 1985, the ratio of female to male workers in the zone was 
572:1 (McCalla 1990, 129). 
 KEPZ was not a frictionless site seamlessly plugged into transnational circuits of 
capital. Rather, its growth was tied to webs of connections in its regional context. KEPZ 
had historically sedimented ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and structural ties with nearby 
Hong Kong, China, and Japan. Taiwan was already part of “loosely connected alliances”, 
linked by informal activities between private firms, common markets, and low 
government intervention (Chen 1995, 606). To illustrate, virtually all foreign investors in 
KEPZ hailed from the region. In 1975, the largest investor was Japan, with its recent and 
long-held colonial presence in Taiwan, and China. Only nine percent came from the US, 
Europe, and other countries (Chen 1994, 9). Over time, the China-Hong Kong-Taiwan 
triad formed an economic triangle, involving “heavily interdependent ties of trade, 
                                                                                                                                            
Europe (electronics, textiles, industrial diamonds). Shannon’s story as well is one of potential demise to 
one of development into a “generator of employment and trade” (McCalla 1990, 129). 
  14 
investment, manufacturing, and marketing among the three… economies” (Chen 1995, 
607). 
 Some of the first foreign delegates to visit the KEPZ hailed from South Korea. 
These delegates undertook “study tours” to learn from Taiwan, which led Korea to 
establish its own EPZ in Masan in 1970 (Chen 1995, 598). Masan (heretofore “MEPZ”) 
was strategically positioned near Busan’s port with Japan just across a small body of 
water. It was also along the peninsula’s industrial corridor connecting Seoul and Busan 
(Douglass 2000, 9-10). MEPZ’s story is quite similar to KEPZ. It was successful in 
attracting foreign investment: from USD 5.3 million in 1971 to USD 235 million by the 
1980s (Chen 1994, 8-9). Most investment came from nearby Japan: in 1975, of the 105 
foreign firms in Masan, 75 were Japanese and an additional 22 were Korean-Japanese 
joint ventures (Chen 1994, 9). The labour force was highly gendered: women comprised 
between seventy to ninety percent of the workforce over the lifespan of MEPZ, while 
men were on average ten years older and held higher managerial positions (Chen 1994, 
11). 
 Both Kaohsiung and Masan served as reified icons of the economic success zones 
could bring to a host nation, and they played a central part in inducing a worldwide 
proliferation of EPZs along with a new breed of zone: the special economic zone (SEZ). 
The SEZ is different from the EPZ in a number of ways. For example, it aims to offer 
greater investment incentives while it is more heavily regulated by the central state. It is 
also far larger in size. The first SEZ to come to life in East Asia was Shenzhen in 1980, 
located in southeast China just north of Hong Kong. To illustrate the difference in scale: 
Kaohsiung and Masan covered 170 and 431 acres, respectively; at its inception, 
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Shenzhen’s scale comprised 77,120 acres (Chen 1994, 7). Shenzhen was indeed a new 
form of zone, one inspired by the ‘successes’ of the former two EPZs. To create 
Shenzhen’s model, the Chinese state studied the experience of both Kaohsiung and 
Masan by contacting business people in Hong Kong who conducted business in these 
EPZs (Chen 1995, 598; Hays 2013). Shenzhen was primarily instituted as a “social 
laboratory for market-oriented reforms in China”, and the form it took was a highly 
diversified and comprehensive economic zone, balancing multiple economic sectors 
(Chen 1995, 600). It thus became a particular urban form, a “metropolis that welcomes 
every conceivable residential, business, and cultural program” (Easterling 2014, 42). 
Shenzhen was the first zone city. 
 An important distinction between the zone city and the EPZ is that the former is a 
permanently integrated place in the national territory rather than a mobile space with a 
temporary lifespan. Zone cities are intended to “connect to regional policies and act as 
portals to generalize a liberal trade regime to the whole country” (Bach 2011a, 103). 
Shenzhen emerged in 1980, three years after Deng Xiaoping came to power. Deng is 
generally associated with China’s “Open Door” policy and his popular invocation: “To 
get rich is glorious” (cf. Bach 2011b), but the Chinese leader emerged less as a grand 
visionary than a crafty politician able to nimbly and flexibly negotiate the changing social 
circumstances in China and ensure that the Communist Party stay afloat (Hays 2013). 
Deng’s era thus witnessed economic, industrial, and planning reforms that relied heavily 
on attracting foreign investment, technologies, and knowledge (Hays 2013). Shenzhen 
was the first urban manifestation to bring to life these policy changes. 
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Shenzhen also appeared successful on the surface of it, much like Kaohsiung and 
Masan. In its first three years, the zone city attracted USD 200 million; by 1989, the 
figure was USD 2.9 billion. However, foreign investment actually accounted for only 25 
percent of total investment – the rest of which was borne by the state – while 93 percent 
of that figure came from nearby Hong Kong and Macau (Chen 1994, 9). Shenzhen would 
form a “city cluster” along with Hong Kong and Macau, which would lead to rapid and 
sustained economic growth for each locale (Easterling 2014, 44).11 With Shenzhen’s 
success, the Chinese state subsequently established additional zones. In 1984, fourteen 
more zones were set up in coastal cities, and between 1988 and 1993, nearly one hundred 
more were instituted in various guises throughout China (Chen 1995, 603).  
The rapid spread of zones in China did not go unnoticed, especially in nearby 
Korea, as policy makers were growing uneasy with China’s opening up. The shift in 
Korea however would happen over a decade later12 in April 2002, when President Kim 
Dae-jung’s administration revealed an ambitious plan to transform the Korean peninsula 
into a Northeast Asian Business Hub. By November 2002, the National Parliament 
enacted a bill entitled “Free Economic Zone (FEZ)” that gave the government permission 
to provide various tax incentives, cash grants, deregulated land use, and more flexible 
labor conditions in designated areas in Korea, measures aimed at attracting foreign firms 
and promoting private economic activity (Park 2005, 856-858; Lee and Hobday 2003, 
498). The first designated area was Incheon Free Economic Zone (IFEZ), officially 
established in August 2003, and by March 2004, the subsequent president, Roh Moo-
                                                
11 Shenzhen sustained a 27 percent annual growth rate since it broke ground, and is today a distinctive 
place: the average age of the population is 28 – ninety five percent of which were born elsewhere, and the 
city is a unique “desiring machine”, imagined as a place with the potential for a new wealthy life (Bach 
2011b). 
12 Importing the idea of a zone city into the situated context of Korea is the subject of chapter 2. 
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hyun, established two more zones in the south, Busan/Jinhae FEZ and Gwangyang Bay 
FEZ (Park 2005, 856). Today, there are a total of eight FEZs throughout Korea, all of 
which are not intended as temporary spaces but rather as permanent, expansive and 
highly comprehensive places. 
 Songdo is Korea’s founding zone city, positioned on one of the three poles of 
IFEZ. Located on the northwest coast of Korea fifty kilometers west of Seoul, IFEZ 
projects a total area of 132 square kilometers with an anticipated population of over five 
hundred thousand by 2020. The three points of IFEZ consist of Songdo, for commerce 
and (bio)technology research and development; Yeongjong Island – where the Incheon 
International Airport is located – for logistics and tourism; and Cheongna, for finance, 
tourism, and technology research and development. Songdo itself is built on a projected 
53 square kilometer landfill on the coast of Incheon,13 with a planned population of over 
250 thousand. As of June 2015, the city’s population is 88,268, with 1,971 expats hailing 
from China (436), the US (409), Japan (119), Canada (84), and other East Asian nations 
(ifez.go.kr). The first memorandum of understanding to begin constructing Songdo was 
signed in July 2001 between Gale International, a Boston-based real estate developer, and 
POSCO Engineering and Construction (E&C), a subsidiary of the Korean steel giant 
POSCO, establishing a 70/30 joint venture partnership, called New Songdo International 
City (NSIC), to develop Songdo International Business District (IBD) in sections one and 
three (Segel 2007, 4-5). The city comprises eleven sections, for which the construction is 
distributed across an array of public and private stakeholders, but the IBD sections, as the 
inaugural and most developed portions of the city, generally stand in for the city as a 
whole. Virtually all promotional images and events of the city revolve around Central 
                                                
13 As of 2011, about 33 square kilometers of land have been filled (Ko et al. 2011, 12). 
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Park and its surrounding structures, at the center of Songdo IBD. As such, though I 
discuss other sections of the city, I will generally focus on the initial development of 
Songdo. 
 
Figure 1.6 – IFEZ development map – Korea’s “Golden Triangle” (ifez.go.kr). Songdo is the southeast 
point of the zone, directly connected to Yeongjong Island and the Incheon International Airport to the 
northwest via the twenty one kilometer Incheon Grand Bridge. 
Location Project title Usage Size 
km2 
Projected 
cost (won) 
Main Developer(s) 
Sections 1, 
3 
International 
Business District 
Business, 
industry, 
residential 
5.77 24.4 
trillion 
Incheon Municipality, NSIC 
Section 4 Knowledge & 
Information 
Industry Complex 
Research and 
development 
2.4 555.5 
billion 
Incheon Municipality 
Section 2 City Construction 
Complex 
Residential 
and 
commercial 
1.3 130.8 
billion 
Incheon Municipality 
Section 1 Fisherman Living 
Countermeasure 
Complex 
Residential 0.3 28.1 
billion 
Incheon Municipality 
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Sections 6, 
8 
Songdo Landmark 
City 
Business, 
tourism, and 
residential 
5.8 18.8 
trillion 
Incheon Municipality, NSIC, 
Portman Holdings 
Section 4 Bio Complex Research and 
development, 
medical 
tourism 
1.3 16.8 
billion 
Incheon Municipality 
Section 7 Songdo 
International 
Complex 
Education, 
research and 
development 
1.4 2.75 
trillion 
Incheon Municipality, Songdo 
Global Complex Development 
Company 
Sections 5, 
7, 11 
High-tech 
Industrial Cluster 
Education, 
research and 
development 
4 772.3 
billion 
Incheon Municipality 
Section 9 Aam Distribution 
Complex 
Distribution 
harbor 
2.6 343.8 
billion 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries, Incheon Port 
Authority 
Section 10 New Port 
Distribution 
Complex 
Distribution 
harbor 
12.5 5.4735 
trillion 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries, Incheon Port 
Authority 
Table 1.1 – Songdo development sections (table compiled from ifez.go.kr). 
 
Figure 1.7 – Songdo development map (ifez.go.kr). The shaded portion of the map represents Songdo IBD, 
section one (northeast) and section three (southwest). To the north are Songdo Landmark City (sections 6 
and 8) and the Aam Distribution Complex (Section 9). To the southeast are sections 2, 4, 5, 7 and 11. The 
large triangular landfill to the south is the New Port Distribution Complex (Section 10). 
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Figure 1.8 – Songdo IBD development map with labels (ifez.go.kr). 
1.4 Songdo’s Fantasies 
The development of Songdo is a process borne by public and private actors. To attract 
and engage private stakeholders, state rule is variously and selectively applied (see Ong 
2006; Park 2005), allowing for greater integration between national and transnational 
development projects and visions, a process that forges unique fantasies and aspirations 
of future modernities. I outline below three of Songdo’s central fantasies along with a 
descriptive account of how these imaginaries have been deployed by public and private 
actors to shape a unique and highly mythologized city. These fantasies, in their ideal 
forms, serve as the infrastructure linking the chapters of this thesis, as I follow how 
different people in the city deploy these urban fantasies in their everyday lives and 
practices. 
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1.4.1 The Zone City is a Grand State Project 
The zone city is “a powerful political pawn” for national state projects (Easterling 2014, 
27). Since their inception in 2002, Free Economic Zones (FEZs) have multiplied in Korea 
with the inauguration of each new administration, rounding to eight FEZs at present, with 
the exception of other permutations, for example Jeju Island and Masan Free Trade 
Zones.14 Park Bae-gyoon (2005) argues that FEZs are delimited areas in which Korea’s 
historically sedimented developmental state can implement liberalization policies that 
would otherwise meet pronounced political resistance in the national territory, a practice 
he calls “spatially selective liberalization”. But in implementing FEZs throughout Korea, 
the state has also imagined and promoted FEZs as pivotal nodes that direct the future of 
the country. These zones have thus been conjured as places of oncoming modernity, the 
borders of which are envisioned to wash over the entire peninsula. As former Prime 
Minister Kim Duck-woo stated in 2002 at the advent of the first FEZ: “Let’s hope that the 
boundary of the FEZ gradually expands to cover the entire nation through a learning 
process” (cf. Park 2005, 864). 
 As each new presidential administration follows in turn, so do their visions for the 
country’s future. Songdo serves as the placeholder for these shifting visions, each of 
which act upon and manipulate the city’s production. As the privileged site of envisioned 
futures, the state’s idealized modern nation, Songdo is an orchestrated zone of exception 
in the way Aihwa Ong (2006) deploys the concept. Ong (2006) defines the exception not 
as a suspension of rights for the maintenance of political stability but rather “positive 
kinds of exception that create opportunities, usually for a minority, who enjoy political 
                                                
14 Kim Dae-jung instituted Incheon FEZ; Roh Moo-hyun established Busan/Jinhae and Gwangyang Bay 
FEZs; Lee Myung-bak established Yellow Sea, Saemangeum/Gunsan and Daegu/Gyeongbuk FEZs; and 
Park Geun-hye instituted Chungbuk and East Coast FEZs (fez.co.kr). 
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accommodations and conditions not granted to the rest of the population” (101).15 
Songdo is thus a terrain made to grow and nurture new privileged classes that come to 
support the central state and thus aid in the management of less privileged classes.16 
Thus, while state projects perpetually change, Songdo has remained the site to implement 
these grand imaginaries, and has in turn gained allure and prestige within the national 
territory and abroad. 
The initial Kim Dae-jung administration (1998-2003) implemented the first 
economic zone before leaving office in 2002 and envisioned the entire country becoming 
an international business hub. The zone would be the seed to sow this grand scale 
transformation. The following Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008) continued the 
trend by installing two additional FEZs and focusing specifically on logistics, finance, 
and industry, imagining FEZs would recreate the nation into a knowledge-based service 
economy (Lee and Hobday 2003, 489). The following president, Lee Myung-bak (2008-
2013), had a more substantial and high profile impact on Songdo. He adopted a ‘green’ 
agenda and intended to fundamentally reconfigure the country towards his vision of 
“Green Growth”. Green Growth intends to promote eco-friendly development, raise 
quality of life, and assist in a worldwide effort to fight climate change (oecd.org). This 
proposition elicited international recognition for President Lee. For example, a United 
Nations Environmental Program praised South Korea, stating that the vision “represents a 
                                                
15 According to Ong (2006), variously applying state rule across a fragmented territory allows the state to 
simultaneously confront transnational economic challenges and secure control over the national population 
(19). 
16 Valérie Gelézeau (2003) makes a similar case with regards to the formation of the Korean apartment 
complex (tanji) during Korea’s rapid economic transformation. The tanji became the site of modernity and 
facilitated the formation of new privileged classes that would garner support for national state projects. 
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major attempt to fundamentally transform the country’s growth paradigm from 
‘quantitative growth’ to low-carbon, ‘qualitative growth’” (cf. Kuecker 2013, 22).17 
Songdo’s development would integrate President Lee’s Green Growth policies. In 
2008, Kohn Pedersen Fox (KPF)18 revised its plan of the city and placed environmental 
sustainability at centre stage of Songdo’s design. The planning document claims that 
Songdo will offer a carbon-free network of transportation and mobility, eco-friendly 
water sanitation technologies, energy-efficient heating and cooling systems, a 
hydraulically powered central waste management system, and measures to preserve 
biodiversity and wildlife habitats (KPF 2008, 46-63). Furthermore, Songdo's developers 
aligned their vision with Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), a 
“green metric” established under the US Green Building Council (USGBC).19 The city’s 
planners intend to have eighty percent of its buildings LEED certified – designed to 
purportedly consume twenty percent less water and fourteen percent less electricity than 
ordinary structures – making the city “the largest private LEED development site in the 
world” (DAC and Cities 2014). 
Another development in Songdo’s ‘greening’ is the coming of the United 
Nation’s Green Climate Fund (GCF)20 in late 2013. Songdo won the bid to host the GCF 
                                                
17 “Green Growth” has also spurred much protest from local and international environmental groups (see 
for example Ko et al. 2011). 
18 KPF is a large US architectural firm that was contracted by the planners of Songdo to design the city’s 
master plan. 
19 The USGBC claims that LEED certification “provides independent verification of a building or 
neighbourhood’s green features, allowing for the design, construction, operations and maintenance of 
resource-efficient, high-performing, healthy, cost-effective buildings” (leed.usgbc.org). 
20 The GCF is an organization that is intended to accept funds from wealthy countries in order to fund 
environmentally sustainable development projects in less wealthy countries. According to its website, the 
fund aims to “promote the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development 
pathways by providing support to developing countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
and to adapt to the impacts of climate change, taking into account the needs of those developing countries 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (gcfund.org). 
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in 2012 over Germany, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, and Switzerland, in part because 
President Lee “aggressively” lobbied other national leaders to back Korea (de Nevers 
2012). Winning the bid gave a critical boost to President Lee’s declining popularity in 
Korea, and he took it as an opportunity to promote the GCF as “a blessing for the Korean 
people”. Lee continued: “For the first time in our history, we will host one of the biggest 
international organizations” (cf. Goldsea 2012). 
The GCF has become caught in a flurry of promotions. It intends to raise USD 
100 billion per year from wealthy countries by 2020 to become a source of funding for 
environmentally sustainable development projects undertaken in less wealthy countries 
(Khan 2015). If this actually unfolds, it is estimated that the GCF will grow to USD 800 
billion by 2027 (Goldsea 2012). The Lee administration has exclaimed that the GCF 
could become bigger than the IMF or the World Bank; meanwhile, the Korea 
Development Institute (KDI) estimated that hosting the GCF could affect local business 
by almost USD 400 billion; the mayor of Incheon, Song Young-gil, also stated that the 
GCF will have “ripple effects on the local economy” (Goldsea 2012; de Nevers 2012; 
Kim 2012).21  
In addition, the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), a Korean state-backed 
organization started in 2010 that aims to promote Lee Myung-bak’s “Green Growth” 
policies worldwide, opened a liaison office in Songdo shortly after the GCF came in 
2013. The GGGI came in collaboration with the Incheon Municipal Government and 
                                                
21 In actuality, the GCF has been rather moot since coming to Songdo. The more recent Park Geun-hae 
administration, focused on the “Creative Economy”, does not directly support “Green Growth”, and local 
funds to sustain the GCF have faded (Business Korea 2014); the GCF has only raised USD 10.2 billion so 
far, about one percent of which has actually been paid out (Goldenberg 2015; Khan 2015); and most 
recently, some of the GCF funds have gone towards financing coal plants, what has been called “brown” 
development. The latest undertakings, as campaigners say, “make a mockery of the fund” (Goldenberg 
2015). 
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IFEZ Authority that together aim to work synergistically to “promote the global green 
future” (PRNewswire 2013). The Director-General at GGGI, Howard Bamsey, stated, 
“We intend to change the whole way in which development works around the world. 
When we succeed in doing that, much credit will devolve to Incheon City for assisting us 
as well as to the Korean government” (cf. PRNewswire 2013).  
Since 2008, in its interaction with Lee Myung-bak’s grand national vision, 
Songdo’s design has been dramatically redefined and reshaped, both physically and 
symbolically. Since implementing LEED and bringing the GCF and the GGGI to the city, 
Songdo has conjured its position as a global ‘green’ hub, raising its profile in Asia and 
the world, while presenting itself as an antidote to an exteriorized and vague enemy: the 
imminent ecological catastrophe that threatens the existence of life on Earth (see 
Swyngedouw 2009). LEED, the GCF, and the GGGI together engage Songdo as a pivotal 
node in enacting an infrastructure of hope and possibility for ‘green’ futurescapes that 
reaches “for the global register” (see Hetherington and Campbell 2014, 194; Tsing 
2005).22 
 Songdo has thus been significantly shaped by national state visions. It has served 
as the initial starting point of these grand imaginaries, and as such, has been contrived as 
the manifestation of the country’s future direction, of the nation’s onward push towards 
                                                
22 Since Park Geun-hae took office in 2013, she has pursued Creative Economy policies, based on the 
notion that ideas lead to profit. According to President Park, the creative economy is driven by “talented 
individuals” who should aim to become world leaders in their industries (cf. Yoon 2014). In a 
simultaneously individualizing and collectivizing narrative, as well as one that calls on the past when 
Korea, despite significant human rights violations, experienced rapid economic growth, President Park 
urges Korea’s youth and young workers to do their best “in order to serve as a driving force of the 
country’s national development” (Yoon 2014; see also president.go.kr). Indicative of President Park’s lack 
of interest in “Green Growth”, central state support for the GCF has waned (Business Korea 2014) and in 
general, according to promoters and planners at IFEZ Authority, Park’s rhetoric has focused almost entirely 
on facilitating foreign investment and promoting Songdo’s research clusters. In conjunction, Songdo has 
recently been presented as “the optimal testbed for deregulation and the Creative Economy” (Cho 2015). 
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modernity. Walking through the city, one’s eyes are drawn to the “I (heart) GCF” flags 
and banners that line the main boulevards of Songdo, reminding the visitor, the resident, 
and the worker, that this city has a global presence. In particular, this has caught the eye 
of Incheon’s wealthier classes, who have come to populate the city’s opulent high-rise 
condominiums in search of prestige and distinction.23 
 
Figure 1.9 – The GCF comes to Songdo (Allen 2012). 
1.4.2 The Zone City is a Blank Slate 
Near the end of my time in Korea, I managed to arrange an interview with Joon-seo,24 an 
architect who had formerly worked for KPF during the early 2000s and who had played a 
central role in putting together Songdo’s master plan. He had been trained at Cornell’s 
graduate school of architecture and then went to work for KPF in New York City. He was 
promptly recruited in the Songdo project for his design skills, leadership, and ability to 
speak Korean. 
 Joon-seo looked back on his time designing Songdo with excitement, pride, and a 
hint of nostalgia. Those were days where he could let his imaginative and creative 
                                                
23 Songdo’s residents and their fantasies is the subject of chapter 3. 
24 This name is a pseudonym. 
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faculties guide his hand, where he could design buildings, neighborhoods, an entire city, 
with the most elaborate and inventive details. He brought with him his laptop to show me 
some 3D renderings of gleaming buildings and perfectly symmetrical landscapes. He 
offhandedly informed me that when he showed his ornate designs to other architects, they 
would react with disbelief and skepticism over how anyone would finance such 
structures. But Joon-seo was involved in a project where these landscapes were possible. 
There was a promised overabundance of capital and no hindrances in his way. Joon-seo 
and his team had been given instructions to make a world-class city, something never 
before seen, directly onto a blank canvas. 
 The blank slate is not only symbolic, but dramatically material as well. Songdo is 
built on an expansive patch of land along the west coast of Incheon, dredged up from the 
bottom of the sea. This ‘reclaimed’ terrain is physically separated from Incheon by a 
narrow body of water, over which a series of bridges connect the two places. Songdo thus 
stands as symbolically and materially separate from Incheon and the rest of Korea. As 
illustrated by Joon-seo’s narrative, the city is fantasized as an archetypal “creation city”, 
starting from a tabula rasa and built precisely the way it was envisioned and planned, 
made perfectly geometrical, and wholly separate from its host nation (see Doevendans 
and Schram 2005, 30-31). Songdo is conjured as a place of unrestrained development, a 
place without a history or sedimented customs, a place of pure possibility. 
 To clarify Songdo’s blank landscape, Joon-seo employed the Ferrari Company as 
an example: what makes Ferrari Italian when the division of labour in the automobile’s 
production process involves places around the world, and the car’s expert design team 
hails from various places outside Italy? For Joon-seo, Ferrari may have an Italian name, 
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but the car itself does not come from any one place. Likewise, while Songdo finds itself 
along the shores of Korea, it is situated in a hollow elsewhere, and can thus become 
anything one can dream.25 
 The blank slate also opens an imaginative space for the creation of a utopian 
community, where order and efficiency of circulation is maximized. As a “test-bed” for 
new forms of urbanism, Songdo has over its short lifespan attracted a large number of 
planners interested in testing out new technologies on populations, experimenting on 
human behavior and consumption, and monetizing ‘big data’ findings (see Halpern et al. 
2013; Lohr 2012). In the early 2000s, Songdo was initially presented as an “intelligent 
city”, composed of discrete zones - industrial, commercial, residential, recreational - 
weaved together by a carefully planned and integrated transportation system (Holusha 
2003). The concept of an intelligent city became more granular when NSIC joined efforts 
with LG CNS in 2006, a Korean company that specializes in large scale IT 
infrastructures. This partnership was branded under the name “U-Life”, “U” standing in 
for “ubiquitous” (songdoulife.com). Since that period, Songdo has been conceived as a 
singular and bounded urban space in which technologies are seamlessly integrated into 
the everyday micropractices of its residents, aiming to provide them with a “convenient 
life”, a “peaceful life”, and a “safe life” (songdoulife.com). According to Steiner (2007), 
the planners intend to build the world's largest “ubiquitous city”, “where wireless 
                                                
25 In practice, the story of Songdo is quite distant from its placeless fantasy. Joon-seo would later leave the 
development because it became overly “Korean” and only a distant shadow of KPF’s master plan would 
actually materialize on Songdo’s canvas (I examine Songdo’s development in chapter 3). Too many 
obstructions came in his way and Joon-seo was no longer able to express himself creatively. The fantasy of 
the blank slate however remains unscathed and rather healthy, as it continues to inform future 
developments. IFEZ is heavily saturated with other master planned cities – projects not turning out as 
envisioned (see for example Jun 2013 and Stradbrooke 2013), for example Midan City (midancity.com), a 
resort city, or Eightcity (eightcity.kr), a casino city of massive proportions intended to compete with 
Macau’s City of Dreams (cityofdreamsmacau.com). 
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networks and radio-frequency identification will link all information systems - every 
laptop, stoplight, cellphone, TV and toaster”. 
Though Cisco, a California-based network company, had signed on as a partner in 
Songdo's development from as early as 2002 (Lyne 2002), the company would claim a 
minority stake in U-Life in 2011 to integrate its own brand of ‘intelligence’ called “Smart 
+ Connected Communities” (S+CC) (Marketwire 2011), technologies the company had 
already been developing since 2003 (Carter and Saxena 2010). The city has most recently 
been promoted as an organic, self-aware nervous system that “operates at the synaptic 
level of its inhabitants” (Halpern et al. 2013, 279). From this point, Songdo has been 
marketed as a “smart city” and appears not only intended to breed a new urban form but 
also a new form of urbanism in which the city’s residents, cars, buildings, all behave as a 
singular organism (Arlidge 2010; Lobo 2014). 
During my time in Songdo, I visited the Cisco office and was given, in a 
serendipitous turn of events, a private tour of their showroom. The tour began with the 
underlying premise, “the internet of everything” (IoE), and I was subsequently shown a 
world where assisting technologies encapsulate virtually every sphere of life. Here are a 
few examples to illustrate. A centralized monitoring system, integrated with roads and 
other facilities that service cars, is ordered to keep track of license plates, make of the car, 
color, etc. To monitor on this scale without the use of magnets or other sensors, the 
system requires powerful algorithms to sort through a massive amount of visual 
information. With their cars registered into the system, drivers can, for example, program 
their building’s elevator to await them once they’ve parked their car. Additionally, 
vehicles are captured into a virtual safety net, where car theft is simply not possible. I was 
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told of an instance where a car-owner’s son borrowed the car without notice and once he 
crossed the bridge to exit the city, the owner was promptly notified by phone of his car’s 
whereabouts. 
People too can be registered into the system. For example, if parents want their 
child to remain in a designated zone, say a school zone, and the child should exit the zone 
for whatever reason, the control centre is automatically notified and can track the child’s 
location, while the video screens installed throughout the city immediately alert passersby 
of the child’s zonal exit. The child’s picture is magnified on all video screens, with the 
flashing caption “Have you seen this child?” A watchful safety net is thus cast over the 
city and all its public spaces. 
Other spaces are integrated with these kinds of technologies: classrooms, offices, 
and even stadiums. The stadium is a particular case because integrated information 
systems tend to encourage people to remain in private spaces. If one can work, take 
classes, shop, etc. all from home, there is less reason to go out at all. Thus, Cisco 
encourages people to frequent public spaces by making stadiums more convenient for 
consumption. When customers arrive at the stadium, they are invited to log onto their 
Facebook accounts. This allows them to keep track of what’s trending in real time as well 
as access a service through which they can order food, drinks, and anything else available 
for purchase. This system is connected to their credit card account to streamline 
consumption. 
In the private sphere, every household has an integrated command screen, a 
system called “TelePresence”, to centrally control the domestic space, connect with other 
homes, access classrooms, and even offer medical services. There are also default 
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settings one can set, for example “party mode” (this mode was actually part of the 
presentation, during which a disco ball emerged from the ceiling!). Cisco is also working 
on ensuring the health of Songdo’s residents by furnishing the city’s luxury high-rises 
with in-house medical stations from which one can remotely receive medical treatment 
via special cameras. The technical term here is “remote diagnosis”. Clients can receive 
low-cost diagnoses for minor conditions, outsourced to countries like India, as my guide 
explained. Additionally, for security purposes, if one so wishes, one can allow the control 
centre visual access, via cameras, into one’s entire apartment in case of emergency. For 
legal reasons, Cisco is not allowed to employ these technologies to their full capacities in 
Songdo, but as my guide reported, they are working with the government to make 
medical laws more flexible to allow the use of “remote diagnosis” throughout the city. 
The smart city intersects with notions of environmental sustainability. Cisco’s 
S+CC project is designed to “transform physical communities to connected communities 
that run on networked information to enable economic, social and environmental 
sustainability” (Halpern et. al. 2013, 277). Sustainability is achieved by monitoring and 
managing urban life in order to ensure that residents remain within the system’s 
designated circuits, and thus require as little movement as possible. Buildings, cars, 
bicycles, people, are all streamlined into a singular data grid such that time is spent and 
distance is covered ‘optimally’, ultimately lowering the city’s carbon footprint. As a 
POSCO employee informed me: “Green and ubiquitous go hand in hand - ubiquitous 
services for more efficient lifestyle and work environment which can save energy, cut 
down gas emission, save time” (email correspondence, July 8, 2014). Wim Elfrink of 
Cisco iterates a similar point: “Telepresence can cut the number of journeys in the city by 
  32 
twenty percent” (cf. Arlidge 2010). The fantasy of the “creation city” has thus attracted a 
wide array of designers and planners hoping to assemble designs, ideas and products that 
would not be possible in other contexts. In their relentless pursuit of modernity, these city 
makers ultimately hope to create what they imagine is the future of how humanity will 
live next. 
 
Figure 1.10 – KPF master plan of Songdo IBD (KPF 2008). 
1.4.3 The Zone City Exists in a Frictionless World 
I had set up an appointment with a guide at Compact & Smart City, an exhibition hall 
located at the northern edge of Central Park, across the road from POSCO’s twin-tower 
headquarters. The tour began in a large viewing room with about two hundred seats. I had 
the theatre all to myself as I watched the latest IFEZ promotional video in the dark. The 
video dramatically opens with a view orbiting the globe, hovering high over land and 
ocean until it locates the Korean peninsula. Accompanied by inspiring music, the view 
begins to zoom in on the city of Incheon, on the northwest coast of South Korea. As it 
does, other cities in the region appear on the map – Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, Tokyo – 
each with a line drawn converging onto Incheon.26 A deep resonating voice presents 
                                                
26 The opening image resembles a dartboard as Incheon forms the bull’s eye of regional trade. This is very 
similar to the 1950s maps of the puertos libres in Mexico that made no reference to nations, and through 
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IFEZ and begins an exposition of the location’s strategic connectivity and supporting 
infrastructure – its air and sea ports for rapid transit. A flash of light, and the view is 
transported over Songdo’s dazzling urban panorama of skyscrapers that blend into the 
clear blue sky. 
The video goes on to display the high quality of life the zone offers, its luxury 
resorts and beaches for relaxation, and at one point, the word “culture” is uttered as the 
video displays large casino halls with smiling white people gambling their money. This is 
an idealized and synergistically singularized world for unhindered consumption and 
flow.27 The zone city calls to mind Kenichi Ohmae’s (1993) “region state”: a place with a 
small, easily manageable and largely homogenous (and wealthy) population, endowed 
with air and seaports in order to maximize circulation and accumulation of capital. The 
logic of the region state is to closely connect itself with regional and global economies, 
while dissociating itself from the host state and its concomitant disruptive, overly 
complex, and regulatory government bureaucracy. To solidify its definition, the zone city 
distances itself from oversized and overwhelmingly complex global cities – New York, 
London, Tokyo. It is the new global city-lite, a “one-stop” corporate enclave to serve the 
needs of capital (Easterling 2014, 26). 
The zone city’s infrastructure is exceedingly conspicuous,28 made to conjure an 
aesthetically efficient landscape. For example, the video will show a white businessman 
                                                                                                                                            
direct connections with faraway places, collapsed space as though the local was global (Orenstein 2011, 
48). 
27 See ifez.go.kr for a variety of similar videos. 
28 Songdo’s infrastructure is central to the city’s promotional materials. These make sure to flex Songdo’s 
muscle by pointing out the metric capacities of its airport, seaport, bridge and highways. The city’s 
infrastructure specifications are as follows: as of 2012, the Incheon International Airport has a cargo 
capacity of 2.4 million tons, the second greatest in the world; it moves 28 million people a year, placing 
ninth in the world; it is connected to 1/3 of the world’s population in a 3.5 hour flight radius, which also 
includes 61 cities with over one million in population; it is connected to 181 cities worldwide. At present, 
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standing at the foot of a tall glass tower as an airplane hovers overhead, reminding the 
viewer of a city wedded to an airport, or as Kasarda and Lindsay (2011) call this urban 
form, an “aerotropolis”. In similar fashion, the video shows a child looking out the 
window of a car traversing the Incheon Bridge. The bridge’s pillars are reflected off the 
tinted glass, while below, a large cargo ship passes under. These moving images elide the 
purely technical character of infrastructures with aesthetic dimensions, and in so doing, 
turn the city’s infrastructure into a “grand spectacle” (see Larkin 2013), a dramatic 
performance of a possible futurescape: a city embedded in a scale much larger than the 
actual geographical terrain it occupies, enveloping faraway places into its domain and 
enabling its occupants to move seamlessly across vast spaces. The zone city conjures a 
formless node of constant motion that envisions a smooth un-striated world (see Hardt 
and Negri 2000) where one is not required to answer to local governments. It essentially 
takes the correlation between circulation and accumulation of capital to its apogee: “the 
brisker the flow, the greater the wealth… of the city” (see Swyngedouw 2006, 112). 
The zone city is additionally supported by an infrastructure of ‘world-class’ 
“global” education institutions, the most prominent of which is Songdo Global University 
Campus (SGUC), Songdo’s ‘brain’ as it were.29 At present, SGUC houses three US 
universities (SUNY at Stony Brook, George Mason, and Utah) and one Belgian 
university (Ghent).30 The campus envisions shaping “global leaders” and intends to offer 
                                                                                                                                            
the Incheon Seaport occupies 61 percent of Korea’s cargo volume with China and by 2020, the port will 
have an annual handling capacity of 2.4 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). The Incheon Grand 
Bridge, a ten billion USD project exclusively funded by the Korean government, covers the 12.3 kilometers 
between Songdo and the airport on Yongjeong Island and facilitates a fifteen minute commute between 
both places. Songdo is also connected to an array of major highways directly connected to Seoul, Korea’s 
capital and most populous urban center. 
29 SGUC was recently renamed to Incheon Global Campus (IGC) (sgu.or.kr). 
30 According to the website, only SUNY has launched its graduate program; the rest are in planning stages 
(sgu.or.kr).
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classes such as “World Literature” and “World History”, all taught in a “World 
Language”, that is, in English (Looser 2012, 104). The curriculums are streamlined into a 
single frame such that relations and dialogue between disciplines are evacuated “in favor 
of a more simply nondisciplinary terrain, with a single and unified perspective” (Looser 
2012, 106). According to a Korean student (Chang 2015), there are great pressures to 
become a “global citizen” in the present “global” context, and SGUC offers an entry 
point into this singular world.  
A recent SGUC video (Incheon Global Campus 2014) candidly explains the 
symbiotic relation intended between Songdo’s universities and corporations. The premise 
follows that corporations fund university research they require, and universities in turn 
provide corporations with a “global” workforce.31 The video states it as follows: 
In this virtuous educational circle, corporations donate scholarships, nurture human 
resources, and fund research to develop fundamental technologies, while students are 
grown into global talents that the corporations demand. 
The zone city is a corporate paradise. According to the intended vision of SGUC, the 
human population itself is an infrastructure made to support the needs and desires of 
capital. The frictionless fantasy of the zone city chimes with the utopian community of 
the “creation city”, where “people are secondary to production… and everyone is to 
behave according to their role” (see Bach 2011a, 109).32  
 Correlatively, a comprehensive brochure made to showcase the Korean FEZ and 
its population presents the “average Korean” by gender, Mr. Kim and Ms. Lee (KFEZ 
                                                
31 This relation is taking shape in Songdo’s Technopark where universities aim to “incubate companies and 
increase the technological competitiveness of small- and medium-sized enterprises” (itp.or.kr). 
32 It is interesting to note here that in Korea, large corporations, chaebol, are not approached negatively. 
Having served as pivotal actors in Korea’s rapid development since the 1960s, chaebol are often considered 
a source of pride and securing employment at a chaebol is commonly regarded as prestigious. This 
exemplifies the situatedness of this imagined modern world (see Tsing 2005). 
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2015). Mr. Kim is highly educated with a degree in science and engineering and has “a 
global mindset”; he is a man of integrity, fully committed to his work like his nation’s 
former generations who “helped Korea achieve miraculous economic growth”; he is 
always connected to his smartphone, able to work on-the-go; and he studies after work in 
his unending pursuit for personal growth. Mr. Kim’s entire existence appears to revolve 
around production. Ms. Lee, on the other hand, performs secretarial work in an English 
environment, preparing reports for her foreign boss; she enjoys Teumsae Ramyeon33 for 
lunch; she has chimaek – Korean fried chicken and beer – in the evening with friends, 
goes shopping and drinks “a cup of coffee with foreign friends”, and finally watches 
“quality TV” to relax at the end of her day. Ms. Kim spends her daily life primarily for 
the purpose of consumption (KFEZ 2015, 31-35). These two characters are indeed 
imagined as the ideal ‘infrastructure’ for corporations: the man produces, the woman 
consumes, and their citizenship no longer belongs to either of them, for it has been 
farmed out by the state to “global economic actors” (see Sassen 1996 cf. Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005, 33). As a unit, Mr. Kim and Ms. Lee together form a circular cog 
continuously spinning for a globally connected conveyor belt, simultaneously fuelled by 
and fuelling the movement of capital.34 
                                                
33 According to the brochure, Teumsae Ramyeon has become more popular worldwide than Japanese ramen 
(34). 
34 As I will show in chapter 3, Songdo’s residential units are materially configured to support and 
encourage these kinds of gendered behaviors, while these units are simultaneously conjured as 
transnational spaces into which wealthy buyers can envision themselves. 
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Figure 1.11 – Songdo’s frictionless connectivity (songdo.com). 
Songdo’s three dominant fantasies – a national state project, a blank slate, and a 
frictionless world – together conjure modern futurescapes that have powerfully shaped 
and informed the city’s ongoing production. These fantasies are highly variegated and in 
constant mutation, but their ideal types remain intact as empty placeholders for new and 
improved versions of modernity awaiting humanity around the corner. National and 
transnational processes are not mutually exclusive in the zone city, but neither do they 
seamlessly blend into one another. While the zone city relentlessly conjures a world in 
which the separation between inside and outside has been flattened out and the whole 
world has been domesticated in one place (see Bach 2011a, 110; Hardt and Negri 2000, 
187-188), the national state is a crucial player in this grand urban drama, exercising 
“graduated sovereignty” to manage its territory and populations (see Ong 2006). As one 
interviewee from IFEZ Authority makes clear: “The nation state is holding the knife” (cf 
Shin et al., forthcoming).35 
                                                
35 In the context of Songdo, the national state seeks to attract private investors and developers into the city, 
but the state reserved final judgment in every case. The private sector must always verify its projects with 
the state, while the state can change its policies and make decisions over the city’s development regardless 
of consent from the private sector. 
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The manifestations of Songdo’s fantasies are thus not to be construed as 
generalizable principles about all zone cities that authoritatively tend towards a 
homogenous and coherent urban form. Rather, while zone cities may present themselves 
as universal urban formations, their particularities are also universal (see Harms 2011; 
Tsing 2005). Songdo’s idealized fantasies link to global trends while locally reworked 
permutations reflect the city’s territorial embeddedness (see Harms 2011, 8). In this 
regard, this thesis positions itself alongside scholarship that challenges overarching 
universals and essentialized particulars in and beyond urban contexts, for example studies 
in relational comparison36 (Edensor and Jayne 2012), urban assemblages37 (Farias and 
Bender 2010; McCann et al. 2013; McFarlane 2011), cyborg urbanization38 (Gandy 
2005), flexible planning39 (Gururani 2013), situated urban binaries40 (Harms 2011; 
                                                
36 Edensor and Jayne (2012) take after Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) to decenter Western-centric theories and 
approach the comparison of cities not seeking to bring out absolute similarity and difference between 
mutually exclusive places but rather as urban forms that share “interconnected trajectories and identities” 
entangled across various scales while also grounded in local processes and dynamics (6). 
37 Farias and Bender (2010), McCann et al. (2013), and McFarlane (2011) approach cities as ongoing socio-
material assemblages characterized as heterogeneous, contingent, highly unstable, and always incomplete. 
These activities do not clearly define spatial boundaries but rather come together through connected lines 
across various scales, thus illustrating a continuous relationship between “global-relationality and territorial 
embeddedness” (McCann 2013, 583). 
38 Matthew Gandy (2005) approaches cities not as large sociotechnical systems but rather as shifting sites 
of interconnection between people and infrastructures. He deploys the metaphor of the cyborg to think of 
the city as a prosthesis of the human body relationally constituted in specific sites, such as homes, 
hospitals, schools, etc., thereby collapsing the clear distinction between nature and culture and the 
corresponding teleology of Western modernity (see also Latour 1993). 
39 Shubhra Gururani (2013) approaches the development of India’s “Millennium City” Gurgaon neither as a 
spectacle of Indian neoliberal economic success or an urban formation of completely unregulated planning. 
Rather, Gurgaon is a ‘flexibly planned’ urban form made to accommodate the ongoing and shifting “desires 
and demands of the wealthy and political elite”. The notion of “flexible planning” is not specific only to 
India but can also relate to Western contexts, consequently challenging the reductionist and highly 
simplistic theoretical foundations of Western modernist urban planning. 
40 Erik Harms (2011) follows people who live in HokMon, a suburb of Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam to 
illustrate the situatedness and particularities of a universal binary between the country and the city and 
inside and outside. His interest is not in the binaries themselves but in the ways people variously practice 
them in their everyday lives. See Cronon (1991) for a similar yet differently approached problematization 
of the city and country opposition. 
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Cronon 1991), worlding41 (Roy and Ong 2011; Simone 2001), ontological politics42 
(Oppenheim 2008), policy mobilities43 (Peck 2011; Lee and Hwang 2012), theorizing 
beyond neoliberalism44 (Robinson 2011), urban informality45 (Roy 2005), as well as 
technocracy46 (Mitchell 2002) and fragments47 (Tsing 2005), that may serve as 
comparative heuristics across multiple urban places and processes. 
                                                
41 Roy and Ong (2011) aim to challenge theories that approach Asian cities as mere recipients of Western 
urban forms or sites that seamlessly integrate Western-issued neoliberalism. Rather, Asian cities are urban 
sites that produce their own situated visions and practices of what “can count as ‘global’” (2). Worlding 
also interrupts a top-down analysis: worlding practices are also assembled from ‘below’, bringing together 
a mass dream co-constituted between states and citizens (see also Simone 2001). 
42 Robert Oppenheim (2008) approaches the formation of place as a constitution of socio-material practices. 
Place is an outcome of practices that form a “density” in one location but these convergences are 
simultaneously tied to multiple scales that can span across transnational spaces (14; see also Latour 2005). 
43 Jamie Peck (2011) aims to challenge the notion that policies begin in the West and are transferred to the 
non-West. Rather, everyone is making policies and they circulate in multi-directional ways that are far too 
messy to be rendered mappable and traced to any foundational origin. For an applied example of policy 
mobilities, see Lee and Hwang (2012) who explore how ‘creative city’ policies are manipulated, 
refashioned, and integrated into the situated context of Seoul, South Korea. 
44 Jennifer Robinson (2011) contends that urban theory should take into account a wider range of urban 
experiences rather than focus strictly on the “rolling out” (Peck and Tickell 2002) of neoliberal policies and 
practices. Overemphasizing neoliberal urbanism tends to elide and silence a wide array of factors and 
experiences, consequently reproducing the hegemonic dominance of Western thought. 
45 Ananya Roy (2005) contends that the notion of urban informality, once relegated only to ‘third world’ 
cities, may be the dominant mode of urbanization in most of the urban world. Urban informality challenges 
the opposition between formal and informal and instead approaches the making of cities as variegated 
forms within shifting parameters of informality. All cities vary in their treatment of the urban poor, access 
to markets and property, and various applications of exception and sovereignty, placing into question the 
very notion of formality. 
46 Timothy Mitchell (2002) addresses histories of expert knowledge not as human endeavors but rather as 
webs of connections between human and nonhuman processes. By decentering the human as the main 
protagonist of the story, history no longer appears linear. Since the human and nonhuman opposition and 
the centrality of the human are Western products, deploying these models invariably positions Europe at 
the center, while other places are measured in relation to Europe’s particularized history, as either a replica 
or variation (Mitchell 2002, 28-29). Decentering the human and foregrounding human and nonhuman 
relations in social analysis thus presents an effective means to problematize the Archimedean unity of 
historicism, through which a singular history of humanity begins in Europe and the West and serves as the 
‘measuring stick’ (Latour 1993) against which non-European societies are positioned (Chakrabarty 2000). 
47 Anna Tsing (2005) examines global connections that present themselves as universal truths as what she 
calls “engaged universals”. Universals are always practical, ephemeral, and culturally specific projects 
brought into being in a heterogeneous world. The scales of these projects are not reflections of the world 
but rather fashion the world in particular ways for the limited duration of their existence. Universals are 
thus not global totalities but rather situated and limited “fragments” of time and place.
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1.5 Methodology 
In this thesis, I approach myself, as the researcher, and the site as relationally 
constitutive. Everything I have gathered, interpreted, and ‘written up’ in the following 
pages, ‘came to me’ through an “intersubjective experience in the ethnographic 
encounter” (see Riles 2006, 1-2), an encounter comprised of connections between myself 
and particular groups (see Abu-Lughod 1991) across multiple sites which are themselves 
multiple (see Hannerz 2003; Marcus 1999; Mol 2002). To be clear, in no way do I intend 
to allude to a seamlessly blended intersubjective encounter where the site and I congeal 
into one. An intersubjective construction is a messy and often times frustrating encounter, 
riddled with far more misunderstandings, contradictions, and loose ends than 
connections, a process that is correspondingly mentally, emotionally, and physically 
taxing. This includes conducting interviews just as much as writing this ethnography. In 
this section, though the methodological themes in this study are inexhaustible, I will 
explain a number of important themes, specifically the formations of the ethnographic 
site and myself in the process. 
1.5.1 Field Site(s) 
Gupta and Ferguson (1997) offer an important discussion on archetypal spatial and 
temporal categories related to ethnographic fieldwork. In the present project, one in 
which I travelled to a far away place to conduct fieldwork and later returned home to 
write, “field” and “home” could easily be contrived as wholly separate, both spatially and 
temporally. The separation is problematic however because it contributes to constructing 
the boundedness and absolute difference of the field site, and, correlatively, the 
archetypal self and other. These spatial and temporal tropes of home and field reproduce 
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difference, a process that intersects with forms and expressions of imperialism (Gupta 
and Ferguson 1997, 12-15; 1992, 14-16). These are elements I attempt not to reproduce. 
The research site is not a bounded thing; it is rather comprised of “shifting 
locations” that continuously extend into the past, into the “field”, and into this very 
moment, as I write these words (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 38). Consider the writing 
process. During my time in Songdo, I did not record the voice of a single person; instead, 
I took light notes during discussions and fleshed them out immediately after parting 
ways. These ‘raw field notes’ contained summaries of what people said, situational 
observations, reflections on the larger picture of what I understood at the time, and 
various other thoughts. Very few words from my interlocutors directly made their way 
onto my field notes. These notes then travelled with me to Canada, where they would 
play a role in assembling this ethnography. They became enmeshed with a large selection 
of formal academic texts, theories, and a wide array of news articles, gathered in years 
prior and over this last year. The field notes themselves were continually reinterpreted in 
relation to these newly added textual actors and shifted according to the fluidity of my 
memories over time. Many of my field notes were not found to be meaningful to the 
unified narrative of the present text, which is required to have a singular thread traversing 
its core. Indeed, the vast majority of the ethnographic encounter in this study is ‘set 
ablaze’48 and relies on pronounced elision to keep the script streamlined. Importantly, in 
                                                
48 The idea of ‘setting ablaze’ relates to the notion of “fire space”, a concept used to approach a site that 
holds its shape “as an effect of discontinuity” (Law and Mol 2001, 615). The constancy of my field site in 
this thesis is achieved through discontinuity with other expressions of Songdo. We might think of it as a 
single space supported by a multitude of othered others. Law and Mol summarize: “To say that there is a 
fire topology is to say that there are stable shapes created in patterns of conjoined alterity” (616). For 
example, a mathematical formalism that defines the physics of an airplane’s trajectory would never hold 
together were it not to elide the messy history of its conception and all the actors involved, to which the 
formalism owes its very existence (616-618). 
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no way does the attempt at coherence in this text aim to convey a sense of coherence in 
the field, as though its immanent logic were seamlessly translated here (see Asad 1986). 
Elisions and continual reinterpretations of what was gathered in the field site 
present important political implications. This study indeed expresses pronounced 
representational violence,49 which is especially significant if I were to claim innocence or 
omniscience as a researcher (see Rosaldo 1989; Said 1989). In this written work 
however, assembling and assembled through a multitude of texts and forms of writing, 
the questions that I have wondered about are: where is the actual site of Songdo? What 
kind of authority can be bestowed on this text, if any? How much ownership and control 
can I claim over these words? With a bit of reflexivity, the texts with which I surround 
myself as I write – my field notes, academic texts, news sources, promotional documents 
– are not silent representatives of an independent reality; rather, they are actively engaged 
in the production of situated realities, that is, they produce the various sites of Songdo in 
this text (see Clifford 1983; Riles 2006; Stoler 2002, 2009; Zeitlyn 2012). This text is 
thus an assemblage of reformulated and translated materials “bricolaged” (Hebdige 
1979)50 into a thematically streamlined narrative, itself always “partial”, “incomplete”, 
and contingent upon a whole series of unmappable factors (see Clifford 1986). Any 
number of factors could have redirected the narrative elsewhere. 
My objective here is to problematize the authority of this text by highlighting that 
it enacts particular realities. However, I simultaneously wish to authorize it to the extent 
of any other version of reality: the text, in effect, rehearses ways through which reality is 
                                                
49 Representational violence relates to the reduction of reality as an outcome of rendering the narrative of 
this thesis intelligible and coherent. 
50 Bricolage refers to an improvised assemblage of various components to generate new meanings out of 
them (Hebdige 1979, 104). 
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enacted, just like any other version (see Law and Mol 2001).51 Bruno Latour (1993) 
claims that reality can never fully gel into an essence, for there is no stable and fixed 
essence to be discovered from the beginning. In conjunction, Theodor Adorno contends 
that reality can never completely close the gap between the concept and the thing, that is, 
there will always remain “nonidentity”, a residual excess that resists reconciliation (cf 
Bennett 2004). Despite vigilance to capture every detail, the world simply cannot be 
grasped to its full extent, and will obdurately remain far more complex, ungraspable, and 
unpredictable than human thought can ever hope to capture (see Deleuze and Guattari 
1987). This text thus enacts positioned realities of Songdo, and in doing so, follows Anna 
Tsing (2005) in attempting to highlight the situated fragmentedness of the world in order 
to interrupt more powerful realities, those that claim to reflect a stable reality of “unified 
and successful regimes of global self-management” (271). In other words, reality can 
never be the reflection of a universal truth; a universal is always an engaged, specific and 
practical project, tentatively accomplished for a moment in history, enacted in a 
heterogeneous world (Tsing 2005). I now turn to my positionality in relation to the field 
to elucidate the contingencies and power-laden dimensions of my ethnographic 
encounter. 
1.5.2 Positionalities 
The form of this project is contingent upon my own positionality, defined here in 
archetypal terms as a white male English-speaking Westerner in Korea (see Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997, 11). In Korea, these factors variously position me at particular 
                                                
51 Empiricism and fiction – which this thesis is an example of the latter – are fundamentally similar forms 
of story telling. The former however is assumed to have an immediate relationship to the external material 
world and thus comes to stand as ‘truth’ (Cameron and Ronen 2004). I offer an example of this in chapter 
2. 
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intersections, depending on the group with whom and the material with which I interact. 
In the most archetypal terms, the white Westerner in Korea is seen to hail from a 
‘modern’ country with a higher quality of life than in Korea. For example, a Westerner 
may have more leisure time and generally enjoy a well-balanced work/leisure lifestyle. 
This concomitantly facilitates mobility, as per the Westerner’s very presence in Korea. 
On this point, the lifestyle of the Westerner may be an object of envy. On the flipside 
however, a Westerner may be looked on with disdain. The Westerner is individualistic 
and cares little of the opinions of others. They may thus be selfish, untrustworthy, and 
even promiscuous (see Abelmann and Lie (1995) and Kim (2006) for similar dualisms). 
Certainly, the two largest Western expatriate populations in South Korea, English 
teachers and US soldiers, in many ways act out and even hyperbolize these stereotypes, 
as many behave in ways they never would in their home countries, but they are 
simultaneously seen from situated vantage points in Korea.52 
As a Western graduate researcher in the field however, I was not so 
straightforwardly categorized. I was an international student, and seen as a wealthy one. 
Korean graduate programs generally do not fund their graduate students beyond covering 
tuition fees, and so those who attend must cover the costs of their livelihoods. 
Furthermore, the general trend in Korea – which may not actually relate to most Koreans 
– follows that one should secure a job in a company right before university graduation. 
Attending a graduate program can signal that one has not found a job and thus requires 
additional training. Otherwise, graduate students are in it for the long haul to eventually 
become scholars. This is how I was generally approached, and since I could afford to 
                                                
52 Similar depictions of Western foreignness can be observed in other East Asian contexts, for example in 
China (Henry 2013) and Taiwan (Muskowitz 2008). 
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come to Korea for graduate research, I was seen as someone with significant financial 
means. This assumption is quite accurate in relation to the Korean context: I am a highly 
privileged Westerner with the means to devote a summer in Korea and the subsequent 
year to engage in research about Songdo. 
I was encountered in various ways, depending on certain groups. Korean residents 
of Incheon and Songdo, for example, often saw me as an object of curiosity, and because 
I could hold a conversation in Korean, many were delighted to speak with me. 
Government officials generally saw me as a well-funded researcher. They were 
sometimes pleased that I would take an interest in their city and their work, and were 
keen to tell me about Songdo as an important achievement for Korea. Some of these 
informants were also interested in speaking with me to rehearse their English or make a 
foreign friend, while others had little interest, if any, or were generally too busy. Mr. 
Park, to whom I devote chapter 2, was a particular case: he was markedly interested in 
advising me as a student and in conveying, as lucidly as he could, his visions for Songdo. 
After my first meeting with Mr. Park, as Ye-joon (the interpreter I had hired for our first 
meeting) and I were walking back to the subway, he told me an ‘ordinary Korean’ would 
never have the opportunity to speak so candidly with such an important political figure. 
Evidently, my Western-ness – and perhaps my whiteness – was an influential factor that 
afforded me access to an elite bureaucrat.53 
 An important factor to consider, one of the most influential and limiting in this 
project, is the English language, which today occupies a complex position in Korea. It 
carries associations with American imperialism, liberatory possibilities, cosmopolitanism, 
and powerful symbolic markers for professional success, all of which can be variously 
                                                
53 Perhaps my gender might come into the equation here, but this I can only speculate. 
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regarded depending upon one’s class position (see Collins 2005; Lee et al. 2010; Park 
2011; Park and Abelmann 2004). English is very challenging to learn from a Korean 
language background, and in the context of the overly rigorous and highly systematized 
Korean education system, it is even harder to master. Generally, middle to upper class 
groups, those who can afford to send their children to international schools or to an 
English speaking country, can master English. Thus, from my position as a fluent English 
speaker, I occupied a certain status of privileged authority. For example, it is very 
common for Koreans to apologize because their English is not ‘good enough’; meanwhile 
my broken Korean is hardly ever assessed on the same basis. English is indeed 
“enmeshed in conditions of power” (Asad 1986, 163) from which many Koreans may 
express “deference and inferiority” (Kim 2006, 387). 
 While in Korea, I attended evening Korean classes in the hopes that I would use it 
on a daily basis with informants, and while this did happen early on in the study, with 
residents of Songdo for example, the field would eventually lead me to highly educated 
specialists who are at least highly proficient in English, if not completely fluent. For 
some of these informants who very often speak with foreign investors in English, I was 
perhaps a curious presence who fit the appearance of the foreign investor but made 
strange and at times probing queries. I discovered that other researchers had come to 
Songdo before me and had visited the offices at IFEZ Authority, but these were 
researchers of disciplines such as business management or urban planning, not 
researchers of anthropology, interested in the everyday lives and histories of these people. 
 English paved paths of inquiry but also limited others. Other non-English 
speaking specialists integral to making Songdo were difficult to access. They had little 
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interest in speaking with me, especially in my broken Korean. Also, though in my eyes 
their English was excellent, some informants were uncomfortable speaking with me 
because it was straining for them to hold a one to two hour conversation in English, as 
much as it would be for me to converse in Korean for an hour, as I attempted. This is 
indeed exhausting and certainly a source of considerable stress. 
 The written sources that inform the narrative of this text are primarily written in 
English, and some in French. Though I read some Korean news sources, they did not find 
their way directly into this narrative. While the vast majority of what’s written on Korea 
will be written in Korean, this project does not directly come into conversation with this 
rich literature. I do however bring in many sources written by Koreans who include a 
wide array of Korean sources. The present study is thus limited linguistically, which can 
only offer a situated angle of analysis. This is not to say that Korean texts offer access to 
a more ‘real’ or ‘total’ conception of ‘Korean culture’, which I, as a Western researcher, 
could potentially capture as a whole; Korean texts as well would render a situated 
standpoint. Ultimately, whatever the angle of analysis, it will always render particular 
“singularities” excerpted from a horizon of inexhaustible, overabundant, and excessive 
factors and events (see Augé 1995).
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CHAPTER 2 Dreaming and Performing Songdo: 
Situating a Zone City in Korea 
2.1 Mr. Park’s Epiphany 
On a bright early summer day in 1985, upon returning from seven years spent in the 
southeast as a government official, Mr. Park found himself on the shores of his 
hometown of Incheon, just west of Seoul. As he stood looking out onto the sea, in a 
serendipitous moment of clarity, it all came to him. Excitement ensued. Incheon may not 
have looked like much at the time but Mr. Park suddenly realized that it was destined for 
greatness. It had all the properties to become the new center of Asia.1 
 Mr. Park looked back at the city. It wasn’t very impressive. It looked more like a 
patchwork of awkwardly juxtaposed urban and rural spaces. Incheon had grown quickly 
since the 1960s but most of its growth was in heavy chemical industry, and the majority 
of its factories were rusty and decrepit, having undergone little maintenance over the 
years. Incheon was less ‘city’ than it was ‘factory zone’ for the neighboring capital. 
Meanwhile, large companies were moving to Seoul and so were the city’s residents, at 
least the ones who could afford it. Property value was too low to sell and so residents 
who could not find a buyer had to remain in Incheon. And many took the long and 
inconvenient commute to Seoul for work. With little speculation, hardly any residences 
were built and those that had been constructed all had the same generic look. 
                                                
1 This chapter is based on a series of meetings with Mr. Park, during which I did not use a recording 
device; I only employed a notebook. Mainly because he thought his English was not adequately polished, 
he felt uneasy about having his voice recorded. As such, I cannot include block quotes of his statements. 
The quotes I do use are of words or expressions he repeated consistently, those he felt were most important 
to convey. The opening vignette of this chapter is Mr. Park’s genuine vision of Songdo, a story he felt 
pleased to communicate. 
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 Regulations imposed on Incheon were increasing in the 1980s. Public funds were 
cut and private investment was increasingly limited. The construction of highways 
connecting Incheon to Seoul was also restricted. These were the measures taken by the 
central state from the late 1970s to stifle the rapid population influx into Seoul (see Park 
2005, 860; Douglass 2000, 13). To redistribute and scatter the population, developments 
were redirected to other parts of the country far away from Seoul. Cities in Seoul’s 
immediate proximity, like Incheon, were heavily restricted by the central state. Also, 
Incheon’s port was stagnant, such that the city did not perceive direct access to the sea as 
a boon; rather, the shoreline was approached as a barrier to the city’s industrial growth. 
 Incheon’s destiny could not be perceived beneath the smokestacks and uniform 
apartment blocks, but the time was right to awaken the city’s true purpose. To do this, 
Mr. Park would have to go to the field, but not limit his purview to Incheon, nor to Korea 
proper. To free Incheon from its regulatory shackles, Mr. Park had to take on the role of a 
true “visionary” and look to the outside. It was the time of the Cold War but things were 
stirring in nearby China, as it appeared to be on course to opening up to the world. To 
connect to China, the shoreline of Incheon had to be mapped as an opportunity rather 
than a barrier. 
 The growth model of Korea up to this point relied most heavily on low wage 
labor, and if China were to open its massive workforce to the world, Korea would never 
be able to compete. Cheap labor was thus an unsustainable growth engine for the small 
peninsula. Korea’s growth model had to be reconfigured. It had to upgrade from a low 
wage manufacturing center to a high wage service economy, and Incheon would lead the 
way to this paradigm shift. 
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 There was the need for a specific place to start Korea on its quest for economic 
renewal, and Seoul, as Korea’s major urban center, was not the ideal location to do this. 
Seoul was already densely built and land prices were very high. The plan required a blank 
slate, an untouched drawing board to construct a brand new city. 
 Mr. Park saw three factors to bring his plan to fruition. First, to create an entirely 
blank slate for a new city, Incheon’s coast would be ‘reclaimed’. Second, the city would 
need a large international airport to bring the city into transnational circulation. And 
third, a tourist destination would ensure that the city become known around the world by 
continuously attracting tourists. Under these conditions, the new city would eventually 
become a place where everyone would want to live. 
 The relation between the city and its land would engender its own engine of 
capital accumulation through a circular logic of exchange. ‘Reclaimed’ land could be 
sold again at much higher land prices, from which the subsequent profit could then be 
reinvested into the city’s infrastructure and would then add further value to the land. 
Through this cycle of speculation and reinvestment, the city would eventually grow to 
become the center of Asia, casting its shadow over the likes of Shenzhen, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, the new city’s simultaneous benchmarks and competitors. 
 The new city would blend nature and technology to nurture a harmonious 
community. The category of nature would be captured in the city’s ‘green’ properties. 
These include both ecological (such as parks and efficient buildings) and security (for a 
safe and pleasant life) measures to establish a foundation of comfort and care for its 
residents. These properties would simultaneously make the city stand out among its 
competitors and attract people of the “highest quality”. The category of technology would 
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be present in the city’s ‘intelligent’ dimensions. It would be an IT-based city wired 
together by high quality, cutting-edge technology, assimilated into the everyday lives of 
its residents. 
The city’s blend of green and intelligent properties, when fused into the lifestyles 
of its residents, would give rise to an integrated community. The city would be located in 
a Free Economic Zone so that people from around the world could easily come live in 
this new city. Indeed, people of the ‘highest quality’ could come from anywhere, but in 
the city’s integrated green and intelligent infrastructure, the differences between people’s 
specific historical, social and cultural backgrounds would wither away, and they could 
then live comfortably together as a “fusion” community. As a city designed to “keep life 
inside”, where its residents would not want to leave, it would offer everything one can 
imagine, the whole world all in one place. In the city, life would become art, and enable 
its residents to live “beautiful lives”. 
Upon having his vision, Mr. Park would go straight to the office of the Incheon 
Mayor. It would take much work to transform the trajectory and the transnational position 
of an entire nation, with many powerful people to persuade, but Mr. Park felt up to the 
task and had the charisma to render such a dream possible. 
2.2 Approaching Mr. Park 
Standing on the shores of his nation, Mr. Park dreamed a utopic city, one that lucidly 
rehearsed the three central fantasies of the zone city. The city would be a grand state 
project that would induce a paradigm shift in Korea’s future growth model, from a low-
wage industrial base to a knowledge hub of transnational proportions; the city would be 
built on a clean slate and developed into a utopian community, where difference would 
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be eradicated and urban life would operate as a uniform system; the city would be 
seamlessly connected to the entire globe, where the whole world would be drawn to the 
city’s irresistible charismatic appeal. 
In this chapter, I wish to explore how these fantasies come alive and how they are 
deployed to bring the zone city into production. To examine this dual process, I engage 
with Mr. Park’s narrative and track the path he laid out. On the one hand, in the 
experience of envisioning his dream city, Mr. Park is “traversed” (see Biehl 2005, cf 
Barker et al. 2013) by the transformation of Korea during the 1980s and the shifting 
political, economic, and cultural terrain across the way in China, where zone cities are 
proliferating rapidly. In this sense, Mr. Park is a ‘personification’ of the wider political 
economic factors that give rise to his vision, setting the conditions through which he 
comes to dream a mythical urban form (see Mitchell 2002).2 On the other hand, Mr. Park 
is an “urban specialist”, a performative ‘diviner’ of the city by virtue of his skills, 
knowledge, ability to establish connections, and willingness to take risks at opportunistic 
moments (see Hansen and Verkaaik 2009). 
These two elements, the mythical urban form that ‘traverses’ Mr. Park and his 
decisive actions, support one another, imparting onto the other a powerful charismatic 
appeal. The vision of the city is a “reservoir of myth” conferring onto Mr. Park the 
fantasmic charisma of a visionary capable of “conjuring” (Tsing 2005)3 far away 
processes in both space and time – processes occurring across the world and the direction 
                                                
2 The notion of personification comes from Karl Marx who conceived of individual capitalists not as 
sovereign actors but rather, through their relations with capital, as personifications of its power. Capitalist 
history is thus not about the will and intention of individuals but “the expansion of value through the 
exchange of commodities, in particular the exchange of labor power” (see Mitchell 2002, 30). 
3 “Conjuring” visions of the world that span across vast scales of time and space refers not to a reflection of 
these processes but rather their situated creation (Tsing 2005). 
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to which they tend, while Mr. Park bestows onto his imagined city performative charisma 
as he skillfully and adaptively presents the vision, intelligibly explains its necessity, 
convinces and recruits powerful actors, and even enacts sovereign power to influence the 
fate of his nation in order to bring his vision to reality. 
In this chapter, I retell Mr. Park’s story as he explained it to me, but by attempting 
to mediate the relationship between Mr. Park and the social-structural context of his 
actions, I ‘toggle back and forth’ between “a fine-grained analysis of agency and the 
wider social context of political economy” (Barker et al. 2013, 166). I approach Mr. Park 
as both a product and a force of his context.4 
2.3 Meeting Mr. Park 
Mr. Park was the first informant I met during my time in Korea. A contact at a research 
institute put me in touch with him. He was described as someone who had been there 
from the inception of Songdo and, based on word-of-mouth, was the individual to meet.5 
After a series of email exchanges with Mr. Park, we eventually organized to meet at his 
office at Korea University in Seoul – his alma mater, where he was teaching graduate-
level classes in city planning and engineering. I brought with me an interpreter in case of 
difficulties communicating, but Mr. Park’s English was advanced and so an interpreter 
was not necessary for future visits. 
                                                
4 The method of this chapter also resonates with the way in which William Cronon (1991) approaches the 
human imagination/object world problematic. As Cronon writes, “[Chicago]’s history may have begun in 
the human dreams that prophesied its rise, but those dreams laid their foundations on solid earth, tracing 
their destiny onto the land’s own patterns” (23). In other words, in the early days of Chicago, boosters 
imagined the city and laid it out over the landscape, and that landscape concomitantly inspired the booster’s 
imagination. Cronon’s study lucidly illustrates that there is no clear separation between the imagined and 
the material world, that is, the landscape is simultaneously cultural and physical. 
5 Joon-seo of KPF also corroborated this when he informed me that Mr. Park was pivotal in bringing people 
together towards the undertaking of the project. 
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During my first moments with Mr. Park, I took note of his confident body 
language and mannerisms. He wasn’t imposing, but very calm and open, like a man who 
walked through the world with ease. He smiled naturally and made us feel comfortable. 
Sitting behind his desk in his office at a prestigious Korean university, he came off as a 
man of great charisma.6 He offered my interpreter and I each a beverage, and as he 
opened them, he wiped with a tissue the brim of the bottles before handing them to us, 
very calmly and gently, as he recited his story. 
For our first meeting, he seemed to have prepared a narrative to present a sort of 
prepackaged idea of Songdo. But I realized later that he had rehearsed his story countless 
times, to the extent that it was imprinted in his muscle memory. He had even written a 
book about it, his own autobiography. He offered me a copy, personally signed, of his 
book, and I graciously accepted.7  
  Mr. Park and I would meet multiple times over the course of my fieldwork, and 
successively had longer discussions at each meeting. He considered me one of his 
students, and he wanted to advise me on how I should write about Songdo. He would 
have liked that I write about the potential benefits Songdo could bring to Korea, and what 
the city would require to turn its envisioned plan into reality.  
 It was challenging at times speaking with Mr. Park. I often felt disingenuous, 
asking him questions about Songdo and smiling outwardly at his answers while recoiling 
inside at his profound sense of entitlement and willingness to decide on the fate of an 
entire nation. He was truly committed to transforming Korea, and was blindly convinced 
that his creation was the key to the country's future. Being in the presence of such an 
                                                
6 I mean to refer to charisma in a situational sense, not as a strictly individual attribute. 
7 Mr. Park’s autobiography is written in difficult and extremely florid Korean prose. I was only able to read 
a small portion of it; the account here is based on my personal interactions with Mr. Park. 
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individual was fascinating for me, but part of me was also subtly terrified by the sheer 
determination and calculated risk of his actions. I take Mr. Park’s story at his word, and I 
will stay close to his narrative as he relayed it to me, while integrating larger forces at 
work in his context. 
2.4 The Context of the Dream City’s Charisma 
After receiving a doctorate in civil engineering from Korea University in 1977, Mr. Park 
went to work for the central government in Seoul and was relocated to a satellite city of 
Busan in the southeast of Korea, where he would spend seven years working as a high-
ranking city official. These two factors, his alma mater and the southeast of Korea, are 
significant if one considers the regional and educational bias in the Korean state’s 
recruiting methods, along with the peninsula’s uneven regional development. From 1961 
to 1979 during President Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian rule, the Korean state began 
showing pronounced regional and educational bias in the recruitment of its officers, 
privileging those from Seoul and the southeast – from where President Park himself 
hailed8 – and hiring primarily graduates from Seoul National, Yonsei, and Korea 
Universities, the country’s most prestigious institutions.9 Furthermore, under President 
                                                
8 Following Park Chung-hee’s military coup in 1961, state bureaucracy began showing signs of regional 
bias in the way bureaucrats were recruited, with particular preference given to the southeast, from where 
Park himself hailed. The southwest, on the other hand, was neglected in its governmental representation. 
The disparity escalated to the extend that by the 1980s, when regional preference did not exist twenty years 
prior, bureaucrats from the southeast outnumbered those from the southwest nearly four to one (Ha and 
Kang 2011, 84). The pattern here illustrates the extent to which the central government sought to mobilize 
legitimacy and loyalty from its bureaucrats while mitigating uncertainty in policy implementation by 
recruiting those with close personal ties to the leader and to those doing the recruiting. In promoting 
candidates, though these practices were framed as merit-based, higher officials generally preferred 
candidates from their own regional backgrounds, which tended to be from the southeast. Those from the 
southwest simply had less opportunity to show their abilities (Ha and Kang 2011, 90). 
9 Under President Park’s rule, there was a preference over a candidate’s alma mater. At the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI) for example, between 1961 and 1979, about 65% of new recruits had 
graduated from Korea’s three top-ranked universities: South National, Yonsei, and Korea Universities (Ha 
and Kang 2011, 91). Regional ties were important in these institutions, as high school students from the 
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Park, Seoul and Busan became the privileged urban regions to lead in the country’s rapid 
growth, where most of the industrial development took place.10 As a graduate from Korea 
University working in a rapidly growing part of the country, Mr. Park was thus well 
positioned among the country’s bureaucratic elite. 
Mr. Park was then relocated to his hometown of Incheon in 1985, to become the 
Director General of the Incheon Planning Bureau. He explained that during this period, 
there was insistent chatter among policy makers that an imminent change was upon East 
Asia, and many of Mr. Park’s colleagues were busily seeking out possible solutions for 
how Korea could absorb the oncoming impact of these changing tides. Nearby China was 
the main cause for concern, for it had begun ‘opening up’ under Deng Xiaoping’s rule 
and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were cropping up very close to the shores of 
Incheon and Korea. Oppressive labour conditions and export-led growth had supplied 
                                                                                                                                            
southeast attended these universities. Recruiting personally and ideologically loyal bureaucrats was 
important for President Park, especially as he was implementing ambitious programs for economic 
development. Through these large-scale programs, his state would gain political legitimacy, but he needed 
legitimacy among his workforce to ensure that his policies follow through (Ha and Kang 2011, 93). 
Concomitantly, the private sector emulated the state in its regional and scholarly bias, which facilitated and 
strengthened the relationship between the public and the private sectors. Korea’s ‘economic miracle’ is thus 
not explained by a strong state imposing its will on the private sector but rather an informal congealing of 
state/market relations (Boyd and Ngo 2005; Glassman 2011; Ha and Kang 2011; Jessop 2005; Koo 2005). 
State practice and its relation to the private sector thus had much more to do with informal social ties. 
10 Spacio-structural factors are deeply involved in the formation of regional inequality in Korea. Park 
Chung-hee’s export-led growth strategy focused primarily on low-wage labour industries such as textiles, 
shoes, and wigs (Park 2008, 48). In this endeavor, the state gave precedence to areas of the country that 
already had a well-established infrastructure for industrial production. These areas were the Seoul and 
Busan regions (Bae and Sellers 2007, 546; Park 2008, 48). Though Seoul had been largely devastated by 
the Korean War (Minns 2001), it had the most well established infrastructure by virtue of its role as the 
Japanese colonial administrative capital. As a result of Park’s growth strategies, the capital region captured 
56 percent of the country’s population growth from 1966 to 1977 (Douglass 2000, 10). Busan, relatively 
undamaged by the war, took advantage of its proximity with Japan, Korea’s greatest supplier of industrial 
technologies (Douglass 2000, 12; Park 2008, 49). Seoul and Busan were connected by a railway line built 
during the Japanese occupation that crossed the peninsula and had brought with it industrial development to 
these major urban centres (Park 2005, 49). Park supplemented the rail line with Korea’s first major 
expressway built in the early 1970s (Douglass 2000, 9). These factors formed a corridor between Seoul and 
Busan that polarized development to select regions in Korea. 
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Korea with a competitive edge over other economies,11 but it was not a sustainable means 
of development. Korea would need to diversify its economy towards adopting novel 
approaches for development and growth. If China made its labour force available for 
transnational markets, Korea would likely not survive under its present economic model. 
According to Mr. Park, technological development as a new model for growth 
was not a viable option.  New technologies on a nationwide scale require substantial 
resources, investment, and training throughout the country, and policy makers, in their 
pursuit to ‘catch up’ to other wealthy nations, found this to be an unlikely solution. Mr. 
Park imagined that the change would thus have to come from human labour and the 
creation of new jobs, that is, to turn Korea’s human capital from low-wage labour 
manufacturing to high quality labour service. The solution would be in intellect-based 
commercial growth model, including trade and logistics, banks and finance, located in an 
urban center and modeled after places like Shenzhen, Hong Kong, London, New York. In 
his mind, the solution had to be urban. The new city would offer high paying knowledge-
based labour for Koreans, thereby establishing the nucleus that would set a new trend to 
reconfigure Korea’s growth engine on a national scale. 
To prompt this dramatic transformation, one that would completely refashion the 
country, Korea correspondingly needed a specific place, a blank canvas to built a brand 
new city from scratch. The basic strategy was twofold: first, create a competitive new 
town; second, bring talent and expertise into the city. A new transnational hub city would 
hereafter not approach nearby China as a threat, but rather as an opportunity from which 
the world could employ Korea as a logistical base by which to engage the opening up of 
its neighboring giant. The imminent tides of change in Asia could thus be reinterpreted as 
                                                
11 See for example Koo (2005), Minns (2001) and Park (2005). 
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a boon for Korea. Mr. Park became convinced that Incheon could become the solution for 
the impending turning point in Asia. As a city on the western shores of Korea between 
China and Seoul, it would become the “key” for Korea’s new development model. 
Mr. Park’s dream city was a version of Shenzhen and other important ‘global 
cities’, with a situated twist from his engineering background. His imagination was not 
unlike sci-fi author William Gibson’s (2001), who begins his imaginary tales with 
technological artifacts and unravels cultural practices and historical trajectories from 
these stabilized objects.12 In similar fashion, Mr. Park described the world through 
ahistorical technological mechanisms that would invariably and seamlessly determine 
human behavior. His elaborations on technological systems were crystal clear, describing 
objects over which he had clearly spent much time thinking. Mr. Park dreamed of a car-
free city, a city designed to ensure that distances between places are short enough for 
people to walk or bicycle. If they need to go further, the city would be equipped with a 
Personal Rapid Transport (PRT) system, convenient enough for visitors to park their cars 
outside the city’s boundaries before entering. To get to the airport nearby, Mr. Park saw 
in his mind’s eye a high-speed maglev rapidly transporting people over the sea.13 In 
contrast to William Gibson’s stories however, Mr. Park’s imagination was a legitimate 
form of knowledge for the creation of cities. He hailed from Korea University with a 
doctorate in engineering and years of experience managing urban spaces, and therefore 
his ideas carried authority.14 
                                                
12 In Gibson’s (2001) words: “all cultural change is essentially technologically driven”. 
13 In Mr. Park’s vision, the human was a faint and indistinct shadow, a sort of “generic absolute” (Herzog 
2013, 14-15). The human was bland, faceless, and quietly conformed to the city’s configuration. In fact, 
Mr. Park could not clearly describe the avatar for his city in any clear way. The most specific attribute was 
a person of “high-quality” for a “high-quality” city. 
14 Historiographer Paul Ricoeur (1981) claimed that theories and stories employ essentially the same 
techniques, both being very similar forms of story telling. The difference is in their relationship to the 
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 Mr. Park’s dream city also intersected with two significant factors shaping the 
growth of Korea during the 1980s: land reclamation and rising property value.15 
Reflective of larger social-structural processes in Korea, Mr. Park spontaneously 
imagined a city built on a massive landfill site capable of converting its value into a 
source of profit of city-making proportions. Land reclamation projects in Korea date back 
to Japanese occupation as a powerful tool to manage the population, eventually becoming 
Japan’s central colonial program in Korea. Following Independence, land reclamation 
became a method to produce large rice fields to nourish the population and symbolically 
demonstrate Korea’s ability to reconstruct. Together, these two elements crystalized to 
conjure a “reclamation myth” that promised to bring Korea out of poverty (Choi 2014, 
428-434). 
By the 1970s, land reclamation had grown into mega-scale engineering projects 
for the development of infrastructure and the expansion of territory. It also became a 
method to ‘incubate’ the overaccumulation of capital, as Korean conglomerates, chaebol, 
that were stagnant in the country were offered mega-scale reclamation projects. This 
process allowed the Korean construction industry to develop, and slowly solidified the 
justification for reclamation projects as a practice for the production of land in itself. By 
the 1980s, when Mr. Park came to dream his city, land reclamation was a well-
established practice across Korea, and was intensifying rapidly (Choi 2014, 434). 
 The 1980s was also a time of accelerated real estate construction in Korea as the 
population was undergoing rapid urbanization, through which real estate speculation 
                                                                                                                                            
‘external’ world: theories are different “in the ways they are deployed, consumed and reproduced as 
representations of objective reality – as truth” (cf. Cameron and Ronen 2004). In similar fashion, while Mr. 
Park’s imagined landscapes may resemble Gibson’s stories, they extend further than from the pages of a 
book. 
15 For a comprehensive historical account of land reclamation and speculation in Korea, see Choi (2014). 
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“was becoming the nation’s most lucrative investment field” (Choi 2014, 434). To 
illustrate, in the capital region, where most growth took place, property value rose almost 
800 percent from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s (Douglass 2000, 15-16). As a 
commodity with such formidable exchange value, real estate construction became a 
means to its own end, irrespective of the actual population coming to urban centers (Choi 
2014, 434). Imagining a city that could produce itself purely from speculation and 
reinvestment was not a far stretch under the social-structural trends of Mr. Park’s time. 
As he explained, land reclamation was very economical. He estimated a production cost 
of USD 300 per square meter, and by adding design and location value, the profit could 
reach in the many thousands.16 
 Mr. Park thus had the ideal solution for Korea’s future amid the shifting terrains 
of the regional and global economy. His dream city potentially had great charismatic 
appeal for the country and abroad; it was a question of intelligibly and resourcefully 
spreading his vision and recruiting the right people who could help him bring it to life. 
And he was the man for the job. As an engineer trained at one of the country’s top 
institution, he was an authority over technological systems and urban layouts; he had 
experience as a public official in a rapidly developing urban context; and he had the 
attributes of a “visionary”, capable of seeing far beyond the borders of Korea and 
understanding the trends and patterns of where the world was heading. 
2.5 Performing the Dream City Charismatically 
In preparation to present his dream city, Mr. Park needed to arm himself with “weapons” 
of persuasion, material anchors from which the charismatic appeal of the city could 
                                                
16 Indeed, as the following chapter will show, this is precisely what happened in Songdo. 
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emerge: presentation documents. Mr. Park was a very charismatic man but his charisma 
was tied to particular myth-making objects, such as his presentation materials. In his 
extensive experience with presentations and persuading audiences, he found that 
numerical figures/statistics and images generally catered to everyone. Some may like 
images while others may like figures, so the aim was to include both elements.  
Effective presentation documents needed to present backup material, follow a uniform 
logic, and make things seem simple and straightforward. While images, color, font, and 
arrangement were all important elements, content and logic were paramount. 
Mr. Park made a distinction between power point and paper presentations. While 
power point was effective for large groups, it created distance between the presenter and 
the audience. In contrast, according to Mr. Park, paper closed this gap, and if one wanted 
to zero in on the individual when trying to make a connection, paper served as the more 
effective tool.17 Paper brought closeness and intimacy, powerful elements of persuasion. 
Paper also made the interaction more durable. Mr. Park used the following 
analogy: ‘talking is talking; it goes away, like a fleeting fragrance. Paper is materially 
there, like a seed from which a plant may grow’ (field notes, 10 August 2014). Paper thus 
made the interaction crystalize. Mr. Park made yet another distinction with paper 
documents: official documents for signing and decision-making, and documents to 
explain, report, and persuade. The latter he equated to a “weapon” with which to fight 
                                                
17 Matthew Hull (2012) similarly describes the material and symbolic effectiveness of paper. See also 
Manning (2012). 
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(field notes, 10 August 2014). Thus, with his “weapons” in hand, Mr. Park was off to 
make his first connection.18 
 Mr. Park first went to meet with Incheon Mayor Park Bae-geun in 1986. As an 
official appointed by the central state to look over a heavily regulated satellite city of 
Seoul, erecting a new city along the shores of Incheon was something entirely absent 
from the mayor’s purview of possibility. Nonetheless, as Mr. Park’s vision adaptively 
catered to the future of the entire nation, as a pivotal node that could transform Korea’s 
growth model, Mayor Park Bae-geun was captivated by the idea and endorsed Mr. Park, 
organizing a visit to the Blue House in Seoul to meet with the state president’s entourage.  
Things did not go well at the Blue house. None of the officials there could fathom 
Mr. Park’s plan, and adding additional infrastructure to Incheon would facilitate the 
influx of people into Seoul, already overcrowded as it was. Limiting the population of 
Seoul was the most important national measure for the country at the time, and Mr. 
Park’s vision could not overpower the obduracy of this paradigm. According to Mr. Park, 
these officials were too small-minded to understand his vision, and he left the Blue House 
with renewed conviction. Back in Incheon, he began spreading the word publicly of 
Incheon’s destiny, writing in newspapers and giving lectures at various venues. He would 
wait patiently for his next opportunity. 
 The following year, President Jeon Doo-hwan (1980-1988) would visit Incheon, 
which afforded Mr. Park the opportunity to meet directly with the president and present 
his vision. President Jeon was not completely convinced by Mr. Park but he was 
nonetheless open to the idea and approvingly allowed him to make an attempt. The 
                                                
18 Mr. Park never showed me the specific documents he employed in his presentations from the 1980s. He 
was intent however on describing his techniques and strategies to materially leverage his performative 
charisma and consequently the mythical charisma of his dream city. 
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president’s entourage however was fervently opposed to Mr. Park’s dream city. There 
were three reasons for this. First, Mr. Park’s plan for Incheon was directly at odds with 
the central government policy of restricting development and would enable more people 
to come to Seoul. Second, building an airport in Incheon contradicted the already-
established plans to build the Cheongju Airport, which was intended to service Seoul and 
for which the land had already been purchased. Third, Yeongjong Island next to Incheon 
– where Mr. Park envisioned building an airport and a tourist destination – did not belong 
to Incheon proper; it was designated as part of the surrounding Gyeonggi Province. 
Following these unsuccessful encounters, Mr. Park would eventually establish a 
strong connection. On 23 April 1988, just three days before the general election, 
presidential candidate Roh Tae-woo paid a visit to Incheon. Candidate Roh was a former 
head of the green berets in Incheon and, according to Mr. Park, a great “visionary” 
capable of seeing far into the future of his country and intent on developing Korea. Roh 
was persuaded by Mr. Park’s vision and displayed full commitment to Incheon’s plans, 
which also enabled him to raise his profile in the city and gain voter confidence. Roh 
made a firm promise to build an airport on Yeongjong Island and begin filling the land 
around Songdo Island, off the coast of Incheon. Upon his election, President Roh (1988-
1993) immediately endowed Incheon with Yeongjong Island, which he would designate 
as the construction site for the Incheon International Airport the following year. Mr. Park 
thought highly of President Roh, who he claimed had vastly developed the country by 
inaugurating the construction of the airport as well as the Korean Train Express (KTX) 
connecting Seoul and Busan. 
  64 
With the central state backing him, Mr. Park instituted a new branch in the 
Incheon government designated to oversee the development of the landfill and what 
would become the city of Songdo.19 The new branch was called the Incheon Public 
Development Agency (IPDA), and Mr. Park would serve as the commissioner. Filling the 
land around Songdo Island was scheduled to begin in 1991, but the central state 
postponed the development, stating that the ongoing construction of the airport was 
already exacerbating Seoul’s regional traffic circulation (Shwayri 2013, 44). Land 
reclamation around Songdo Island would eventually begin in September 1994 (Shin, 
forthcoming). 
After passing through a variety of potential plans for their new city of Songdo, 
IPDA and the Incheon government eventually signed a memorandum of understanding 
with seventeen local private firms to begin construction of what would hopefully become 
Korea's “Silicon Valley” (Shin, forthcoming). With lack of financing and a declining 
interest in the project from the central state however, the plan would never materialize, 
and whatever hopes floated about in Incheon were quickly extinguished when the Asian 
Financial Crisis hit Korea late 1997 and extended into the following year (Shin, 
forthcoming). With the real estate downturn, Incheon was unable to make substantial 
returns from land sales to finance the continued land filling around Songdo Island. The 
financial crisis thus brought state support and investment to a halt, immobilizing the 
realization of Mr. Park’s vision mid way. 
In a significant turn of events, the financial crisis would become a boon for 
Incheon and Mr. Park’s plan. By accepting a USD 58 billion bailout from the 
                                                
19 According to Mr. Park, state presidents were the only ones to understand the plan of Songdo; they were 
the only ‘visionaries’ whose purview could grasp the largest scale of the country, of both space and time; 
and they were the most important individuals to recruit in order to implement his city. 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Fund insisted that Korea seek outside investment 
in order to increase its foreign reserves. The central government agreed to this and gave 
Incheon permission to recruit a foreign developer (Steiner 2007). Mr. Park had 
meanwhile been attempting to recruit investors locally but following the crisis, he found 
that local firms were particularly reluctant to part with their finances. Seeking investors 
abroad was thus a welcome option, but it was also a perilous one, for, according to Mr. 
Park, most transnational investors who claim to seek to finance large-scale project are at 
best looking for a quick turnover profit, and at worst, outright “swindlers”. 
Mr. Park thus went through an acquaintance. He found a distant contact in the US 
named Jay Kim in 2000. Jay Kim was a Korean-American who had graduated from Mr. 
Park’s own alma mater, attended Stanford University for urban planning, and was 
working as a scientist in the nuclear industry in California. Kim would become Mr. 
Park’s transnational liaison, and approached a number of American developers but failed 
to recruit interest in the project at first. After hearing about Stan Gale, a large Boston-
based real estate developer, and his company’s success with One Lincoln Street in 
Boston, he called John Hynes, Gale’s associate in Boston. The two met for a brief 
encounter over a cup of coffee, and Kim invited Hynes to come to Korea and build a city. 
In disbelief over the size to which Kim was referring, Hynes was invited to come to 
Korea in person to see through his own eyes what Korea was constructing off its 
shoreline. Two days later, Hynes called Stan Gale directly from the shores of Incheon and 
excitedly reported to his partner, “Stan, you’ve got to get over here. These guys are 
serious. This is for real.” (Segel 2007, 4; Steiner 2007). 
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A few days later, Mr. Park and Stan Gale were on the phone. Gale was intrigued 
by what his partner was telling him: was Korea really making an entire city from scratch? 
Mr. Park replied, “Come and look with your eyes and I will explain everything” (field 
notes, 22 August 2014). With Stan Gale on his way to Korea, Mr. Park had to prepare 
himself and adapt his strategy to convince a foreign patron to agree to undertake the 
development of an entire city in another country than his own. 
In engaging Stan Gale, Mr. Park had to adapt his performance of Songdo from a 
national economic project to a transnational connector. He performed this feat 
simultaneously as an idea and a practice. Thus, Mr. Park had a two-step strategy: first, he 
would explain his idea of Songdo, the region, and its population; second, he would 
employ the city to build a close transnational relationship with Gale. The charisma of the 
city would thus emerge as the mythical object it could become as well as the 
performative infrastructure it would facilitate. 
First, Mr. Park focused on the business hub dimension of Songdo. China was the 
principal target, and the intent was to make China and its markets attractive to Gale. 
Songdo would be presented as the springboard to China, Japan, and the rest of the 
region’s markets. Furthermore, to attract “high quality” business classes, aside from 
location and profitable business conditions, the city would require high living standards, 
be green, and be intelligent. To persuade Gale, Mr. Park told him that he would be 
making not a mere development, but an entire city, blazing new frontiers among private 
developers. Songdo could not settle for the status of an ordinary city; it would have to be 
a spectacular and “top quality” urban creation. According to Mr. Park, Stan Gale became 
fascinated by this idea, and he perceived in Gale a “great mind”, a visionary that could 
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fathom building an entire master-planned city onto the expansive yet completely empty 
terrain along the edges of Incheon.20 Finally, along with being the first private developer 
to make a city, Mr. Park fervently guaranteed Gale profit at the end of the road. There 
were thus two charismatic visions that arose to which Gale could become associated: 
make a world famous city – becoming a world-renowned developer by extension – and 
make a sizable profit, and Mr. Park presented himself as the one to give Gale that 
opportunity. 
Mr. Park gave Gale as much information as he could in the form of paper 
documents, which piqued Gale’s interest, but he remained uncertain. These informative 
documents were interesting in themselves, but they required a human touch to enliven 
their charismatic power. Mr. Park henceforth sought to develop a close personal 
relationship with Gale, one based on friendship, trust, mutual understanding, and 
“opening one’s mind to the other”. It was about constructing a common vision and 
becoming accountable to the other. Mr. Park thus made it a point to meet with Gale 
frequently and share personalities, flying to Boston and inviting Gale to Korea. As Mr. 
Park explained it, the project of Songdo was like the infrastructure in their relationship, 
performatively demonstrating the transnational connections the city could facilitate. The 
idea of the city was thus performed in practice, and would eventually win over Stan 
Gale’s heart. 
                                                
20 Stan Gale would become convinced that Songdo could be “a model assembly-line city, ready to be rolled 
out anywhere from Colombia to China”, developing twenty new Songdo’s around the world: “The G20 – 
Gale 20” (Arlidge 2010). In his engagement with Songdo, Gale considers himself a “risk-taker”, but 
‘calculated’ enough to the extent that “destiny and demographics are on his side” (Arlidge 2010). He is also 
a ‘warrior’ of sorts. Gale and John Hynes, his partner – in hyper-masculine and racially charged prose – 
have compared themselves to General MacArthur who came sixty years ago to “conquer” the shores of 
Incheon (Steiner 2007). 
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Mr. Park’s relationship building extended over the duration of one full year. 
When Mr. Park and Gale met to finalize the agreement in early 2001, Gale showed up in 
Korea with his cohort of lawyers and the Kohn Pedersen Fox (KPF) architectural design 
team that he had recruited. Mr. Park took this display as a clear message: Gale was 
serious, committed, and trustworthy. In finalizing the agreement, the Incheon Mayor had 
given Mr. Park independent authority to make the final decision. At the moment of 
signing, Stan Gale remarked that this practice was different from Japanese officials, who 
constantly needed to go ‘upstairs’ to finalize an agreement. In contrast, Mr. Park had 
been bestowed by the state a ‘fragment of sovereignty’21 (see Hansen and Stepputat 
2005), from which he could determine the outcome of a large-scale national project. He 
used it to his advantage towards what he believed would bring his city to life. 
Mr. Park laid out three conditions before signing with Gale: first, the Incheon 
government would build a subway running through Songdo. Second, the national 
government would build a bridge connecting Songdo to the Incheon International 
Airport. Third, the national government would designate Songdo part of a Free Economic 
Zone. Mr. Park required it of Gale to inscribe these measures in the memorandum of 
understanding, or he would not finalize the deal. Mr. Park essentially leveraged the 
official agreement with Gale to enforce a series of requirement onto the Korean state.22 
Once the agreement was signed between the Incheon Government and Gale, the partners 
decided to perform the signing ceremony in New York City in order to capture 
                                                
21 Fragmented sovereignty relates to the notion that central state power does not homogenously ‘penetrate’ 
the national territory. In practice, certain spaces can be made semi-autonomous. The signing with Gale 
demonstrates an instance during which Mr. Park ‘wielded informal sovereignty’ (Hansen and Stepputat 
2005, 31). 
22 This is not to say that Mr. Park was the sole reason for bringing Free Economic Zones (FEZs) to Korea, 
but I submit that he was a pivotal figure – as both a product and a force – in inducing their proliferation in 
the country. 
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international attention and elicit excitement to get the project moving, both in Korea and 
abroad. The signing ceremony rehearsed a partnership between two countries, presented 
as a global event with global exposure: New York City brought Songdo into its 
charismatic halo of global proportions. As Mr. Park remarked, had the signing ceremony 
been performed in Seoul, it would not have garnered the same degree of attention. The 
signing needed to be performed in a well-established ‘global city’.  
It had indeed been a long journey for Mr. Park, full of obstacles and setbacks, but 
through his incessant determination and hard work, he eventually managed to present his 
dream city to the world. Mr. Park had never had any doubts through his peregrinations: 
Songdo’s destiny was unfolding as it should.  
By mid-2001, Gale and POSCO signed a memorandum of understanding and set 
up a 70/30 joint venture named New Songdo International City (NSIC). The following 
year in April 2002, President Kim Dae-Jung revealed his grand national plan to transform 
Korea into a Northeast Asian Business Hub, and by November 2002, the National 
Parliament enacted the “Free Economic Zone” bill. Incheon Free Economic Zone (IFEZ) 
was officially established in August 2003, solidifying Songdo’s definition as Korea’s first 
zone city. 
2.6 Conclusion 
My objective in this chapter was to explore ways in which zone city fantasies come to life 
and how they are deployed to bring a new urban form into production in Korea. The three 
fantasies of the zone city – grand state projects, the blank slate, and a frictionless world – 
were not reflections of the world; rather, they were powerful fantasies for the world. The 
main character in this chapter was Mr. Park, while I also attempted to bring in 
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conversation with his actions the wider social-structural context of his time. In dreaming 
his city, Mr. Park was informed by the cultural, political, and economic circumstances in 
Korea and East Asia in the 1980s, namely Korea’s growth model and China’s rapidly 
transforming economy. His dream city became a solution to Korea’s imminent struggles 
ahead, gaining mythical power as the beacon that could illuminate the future of Mr. 
Park’s nation. Mr. Park was also a performative ‘diviner’ of his city with special skills, 
conjuring visions across vast geographical spaces and deep into temporal trends. He was 
also a highly educated engineer at a top institution and a political leader with experience 
in a rapidly growing urban area of Korea. He was able to make calculated connections 
and recruit powerful figures towards his project, both in Korea and in foreign contexts. 
And he was finally given a ‘fragment of sovereignty’ to prompt the Korean state to 
conform to his dream. This relational process, Mr. Park’s mythical urban form and his 
decisive and calculated actions, constituted a sharing of ‘gifts’, reinforcing and infusing a 
charismatic allure onto the other, which would eventually situate a zone city within the 
borders of Korea. 
At his home during our last meeting together, Mr. Park showed me a prized 
possession of his, a modest binder containing about two hundred pages. It was a copy of 
the original memorandum of understanding between he and Stan Gale, the Incheon 
Government and Gale International. It contained various plans, agreements with pricing, 
and stipulation over which party would incur which expenses. He made sure to show me 
the three conditions he had required Gale to sign for: the subway, the bridge, and the Free 
Economic Zone. Mr. Park took full credit for this, and showed me the many signatures at 
the end of the document. Going through the document together, I saw his vision on the 
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paper, and as he spoke and illustrated his ideas, I could feel his performative charisma 
shine through as a powerful figure that had reshaped the landscape of Korea. Mr. Park’s 
fantasies for the world however can never completely tame it, but nor can the world, in its 
unruly messiness, break the obdurate will of these ideals, as I will show in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 Living in Korea’s Future: Apartments of 
and Residents in Songdo 
3.1 A Visit Through Songdo 
Before visiting Songdo in early June 2014, I had developed expectations of the place. I 
had read that Songdo was an ‘international city’ where English was widely spoken, and 
though I was not completely taken by the city’s promotional materials, the images and 
narratives of these promotions had invariably infiltrated the imaginary of what I came to 
anticipate. I thought perhaps that it would be easier to conduct my first research project 
there on the account that there was a chance English would be more common than in 
other areas of Korea. 
On my first visit to Songdo, I went with the intention of finding a place to stay. 
When I arrived at Campus Town Station, I went directly to the nearest real estate office. 
Campus Town Station is near Sondgo Global University Campus (SGUC) and so has the 
largest number of short-term apartments for rent. When I met with an agent, I began the 
conversation in Korean but proceeded to ask if he spoke English. He answered that he 
could not. We continued our conversation in Korean and he informed me that the 
apartments in his building were all occupied, but kindly directed me to other real estate 
offices nearby. After visiting a number of other apartments, strolling through the streets, 
stopping in a variety of small shops, and passing by a few restaurants, I was surprised to 
find that I had to draw on my Korean to the best of my abilities, and though I enjoyed this 
element of my discovery, I distinctly thought to myself that it would be very difficult for 
a foreign resident to come live in Songdo without a background in the local language. As 
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I continued my walking tour through residential neighbourhoods, these spaces felt like 
quiet suburbs far removed from major urban centres, and I was noticeably gazed at as an 
anomaly passing through these spaces. These were the southeastern sections of the city. 
Perhaps things would be different in sections one and three to the northwest. Sections one 
and three were the inaugural sections of Songdo, where Gale, POSCO, and the Incheon 
municipal government, along with the design expertise of Kohn Pedersen Fox (KPF), 
were together making the Songdo International Business District (IBD), the first material 
exemplar of the zone city. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Songdo Central Park. Photographed by author (1 August 2014). 
I arrived in Central Park. The panorama was indeed majestic, and the place felt 
vast. The buildings along Central Park stood as towering synecdochical icons of 
transnational design in the sense that they were not connected to any particular place. 
Joon-seo, KPF’s architect, explained to me that these buildings were zone city structures, 
connected in inspiration and design to transnational elsewheres. The dazzling exteriors of 
these buildings were primarily the product of a large influx of capital during the early 
2000s, a time during which Songdo was a fresh new concept and hopes were high. It was 
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then that KPF architects could design to their heart’s content. And those skeptical of 
Joon-seo’s designs would have undoubtedly swallowed their words, as they would have 
witnessed the rise of intricately designed luxury glass towers line the borders of Central 
Park (field notes, 4 August 2014). However, beyond Central Park’s opulent edifices sat 
residential buildings powerfully associated with Korean design. In comparison with 
Songdo’s international luxury high-rises, with flowing edgeless lines and glass facades 
that reflected the clouds in the sky, Korean residential buildings illustrated an urban 
landscape of hard-edged concrete box-like designs. This was how Joon-seo described the 
design contrasts, and the Gale team saw it in the same way. According to Joon-seo, one 
of the main reasons John Hynes, Stan Gale’s partner, left the development in 2012 was 
because he witnessed too many Korean residential units rise up on Songdo's soil for his 
liking. KPF and Gale defined Korean designs as local objects, while the glass towers 
were apprehended as open designs of transnational circulation (field notes, 4 August 
2014).1 
As I visited the residential neighbourhoods in zone one, these too had a calm and 
quiet feel. Further northwest to the edge of Songdo IBD sat a handful of tall glass 
commercial towers, built to house the many offices of multinational companies that 
should have come to Songdo. This was the official International Business District (IBD) 
area. The buildings here were lifeless however, as foreign firms had not been induced2 by 
                                                
1 The contrast between these two styles of residential units is actually more complex than a simple case of 
clear-cut binaries. Historically speaking, Korean apartment complexes, called tanji, bring together an array 
of properties from outside the peninsula. Valerie Gelézeau (2003), in her comprehensive account of the 
tanji's history, demonstrates, for example, how the emerging tanji from the 1960s were financed publicly 
from internationally-derived funds, while the designs brought together elements of international modernist 
architecture made to conform to – and intentionally manage – the political, social and economic 
circumstances of a rapidly changing society. 
2 This was the term city promoters at IFEZ Authority used to describe the purpose of their work. 
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Songdo’s charisma, and while the streets that fed these buildings were open for driving, 
there were no noticeable tire marks on the smooth concrete. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Central Park condominiums. The man with a camera in the image exemplifies a common sight 
around Central Park, as many Koreans (and expats) came to take pictures of Songdo’s futuristic panoramas. 
Photographed by author (1 August 2014). 
 
Figure 3.3 – Along the edge of Songdo International Business District (IBD), with one of its empty office 
towers. Photographed by author (28 June 2014). 
The above reading of Songdo reveals a rather different city than the one captured through 
the lens of zone city fantasies. Looking past the veneer of its ceaseless promotions, 
Songdo would evidently appear to have undergone, as Sofia Shwayri (2013) argues, a 
thorough “Koreanization” of its landscape. Correlatively, Shin Hyun-bang (forthcoming) 
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and Kim Jun-woo and Ahn Young-jin (2011) contend that Songdo is not actually about 
transnational investments and the conception of new economies but rather about the 
creation of land and real estate for the country’s elite. The empirical record of the city’s 
development will corroborate these claims. However, in its connections to powerful 
fantasies of modern futures, Songdo’s urban imagination as a zone city remains intact and 
stable in the city’s residences and residents. In a highly variegated city like Songdo, 
fantasies are fashioned in highly creative and adaptive ways, and always conjure a 
modern future. However, as one resident will show, fantasies of future modernities can 
also conjure, like infrastructures, “the foreclosing of that possibility and a resulting 
experience of abjection” (see Larkin 2013, 333). 
 In this chapter, I focus, on the one hand, on charisma of Songdo and its props: 
people, objects, buildings, sidewalks, goods. Like a gift, charisma can be bestowed onto 
objects in the ways they are presented, while people can become charismatic in their 
associations with the city. On the other hand, I examine charisma in the city as I follow 
the narratives of residents who confidently and assertively interpret, define and 
correspondingly act upon the city. Songdo is a place of overflowing charisma that can be 
liberally shared and distributed between and among its spaces and privileged residents 
(see Hansen and Verkaaik 2009). This also suggests that the zone city is a highly 
exclusive and exclusionary place, and its powerful charisma obliterates the zone city’s 
shadows, those who always remain absent despite their constant presence. Songdo’s 
shadow figures include people displaced from Incheon’s shoreline for the construction of 
the city, those in Incheon affected by the relocation of institutions and the corresponding 
redirection of capital (for example Incheon National University), construction workers, 
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gardeners, and anyone else working in the backstage to ensure the proper functioning of 
the city (see Park 2010). I did not speak with nor can I claim to know their relations to 
Songdo’s charisma, but it was evident that these groups did not share a place in the city’s 
singularized urban imagination. 
In an effort to capture the lived experiences of Songdo’s wealthy residents, I 
present the narratives of four people. My sample consists of two Koreans and two expats 
who related anecdotes about their everyday lives and the ways in which they understood 
the city.3 These are people who permanently – or over the long term – live and 
work/study in the city. As such, they are part of a well-to-do class and in no way 
represent the majority of people who occupy the city in the daytime. While each 
individual had a different relation with the city, notions of modernity and the future were 
always entwined in their narratives. Furthermore, the residents I present here 
problematize the opposition between state and society. They deployed highly reductionist 
and power-laden fantasies that did not counteract state power and circuits of capital, but 
actually reinforced and integrated these fantasies into the operation of the zone city in 
remarkably creative ways. 
I divide my discussion into three parts. First, I offer an empirical account of 
Songdo’s production since 2001, one that will show the material production of a city 
rather distinct from its fantasies. Second, I offer a walkthrough of one of POSCO’s 
apartments being developed in section three of the city. Residential units have come to 
command Songdo’s landscape and production, and while these will display, as Joon-seo 
would say, Korean design, they also exhibit situated transnational elements that give 
                                                
3 Though there is a distinction between Koreans and expats in Songdo, there is also overlap in their 
fantasies. As such, I’ve decided to place both groups under the same heading to emphasize the continuity in 
their fantasies. 
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impetus to the charisma of Songdo. Finally, I examine the accounts of residents of how 
they express charisma in the city and actively fashion their identities alongside. 
3.2 Making Songdo 
Upon signing a memorandum of understanding in July 2001, Gale and POSCO would 
form a 70/30 joint venture named New Songdo International City (NSIC). Gale would 
oversee the design – contracted to KPF – and financing, while POSCO would undertake 
the construction of the city. In its promotions, Songdo claimed a speculated value of 
anywhere from twenty all the way to forty billion USD (McNeill 2009), nearly all of 
which would be borne by the NSIC joint venture (Shin, forthcoming). However, and to 
basically give the plot away right here, virtually no foreign capital actually made its way 
into Songdo. To illustrate, a recent article published in The Korean Herald, a source 
whose primary purpose is hyperbolized promotion and publicity, proudly claims that 
IFEZ has attracted 94 percent of Korea’s FDI among its seven other FEZ competitors in 
the country, rounding a total sum of USD 1.7 billion since its inception in 2001 (Sang 
2015). This is well off the speculated mark. In actual practice, the financing for Songdo 
has come almost exclusively from Korean Banks.4 
To repay bank loans, NSIC has had to look to the city’s local real estate as the 
main source of its revenue. From the beginning of the development, Korean banks seem 
to have been well aware of the risks and potential profits in financing Songdo. Contrary 
to Incheon Government’s hopes for office development, Korean banks underwrote their 
loans based exclusively on the revenue from real estate, with the implicit agreement in 
                                                
4 Though Morgan Stanley, a US financial services corporation, did offer NSIC USD forty million in 2003, 
all other investments came from local banks: USD fifty million in 2003, USD 180 million in 2004, USD 
1.5 billion in 2005, USD 2.7 billion in 2007, and USD 2.2 billion in 2013 (Segel 2007; Shin, forthcoming; 
see also Bruns 2008 and Ramstad 2007). 
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further financing down the road (Segel 2007, 10). As the banks would have predicted, 
Songdo’s real estate market was a massive success: in 2006 when the first 2,600 
apartments went up for sale, they were over-subscribed by about eight to one (McNeill 
2009). Frommer (2012) reports the figure in different yet equally impressive terms: 
62,000 buyers came for the first 2,600 apartments. After the 2008 downturn, things seem 
to have slowed down in the real estate sector, and these lower sales have correspondingly 
slowed Songdo’s growth. As of May 2012, according to a Gale developer, seventy 
percent of the apartments in a new complex have been pre-sold (see Frommer 2012). 
However, later in that same year, after it was announced that the GCF would be housed in 
Songdo, real estate agents reported that one thousand new apartments had been sold (Kim 
2012). Indeed, hosting the GCF feeds into the fantasy of a city of international stature, 
and subsequently provides impetus in the rise of real estate speculation and purchase.  
 As Songdo has attracted a substantial local population for real estate, the land use 
plan of the city was modified between 2005 and 2009. Over this period, land for 
international business was reduced by 38.4 percent while residential land increased by 24 
percent (Shin, forthcoming). Unsurprisingly, the profit margin for residential land is 
remarkable. The Incheon Government sold reclaimed land to NSIC in 2002 for KRW 
160,000 per sq. meter and by 2007, the land was valued at KRW 4,200,000 per sq. meter 
(Shin, forthcoming). Indeed, living in Songdo is for the select few. Apartments are priced 
on average at 500,000 USD and some go for two to three times that price, while tuition at 
Chadwick International School starts at USD 25,000 (McNeill 2009). Most recently, 
POSCO has been given full rights to build the city’s entire residential units, and since 
office space has been in low demand, the Incheon Government has allowed POSCO to 
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cover section three in its entirety with what it considers “temporary” residential units 
(Nam 2013). 
 Other private developers also see Songdo as a wealthy Korean suburb, and have 
designed their projects accordingly. For example, Morgan Parker, Taubman Asia’s 
president does not share “optimism in Songdo becoming north-east Asia’s trade hub” (cf. 
Oliver 2009). Parker’s commercial projects are “wholly based on Koreans [rather than 
foreigners] looking for variety in shopping” (Oliver 2009). An American researcher 
similarly notes that though the commercial developments in Songdo display a “cookie 
cutter” Western appearance, “the most avid consumers of this type of lifestyle will be 
eager Korean middle class residents who are drawn to promises of a modern Western-
style life” (Stokols 2014).  
As for Gale, although stories vary according to who tells them, the company 
appears no longer interested in the outcome of Songdo as an international model for 
future cities. Gale’s sole interest now is coming away with a return on their investment 
and getting out of the deal, as a prominent Gale planner pointed out to me. In my 
conversation with this planner, he offhandedly discussed the intended resident of Songdo 
as a Korean individual and left out foreign residents from the picture. It appeared rather 
clear that the city was no longer conjured in his mind as a transnational hub, and 
attracting a foreign population now seemed off the table (field notes, 28 July 2014). 
Correlatively, John Hynes, the chief executive at Gale, stated in 2013 that though the 
project may have begun with the intention of creating a transnational hub city, “it 
basically became a Korean project with an American name only at the wheel” (cf. Nam 
2013).  
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Has Songdo become a purely national place, completely cut from its transnational 
connections? This would appear to be the trend. But fantasies in the zone city have 
“tremendous staying power” (see Harms 2011, 25), and though the actual development of 
the city would seem to render Songdo’s fantasies irrelevant, they persist in the city’s 
urban forms and in the perceptions and practices of its residents. To illustrate the material 
reproduction of these fantasies, I offer here an account of a visit to POSCO’s apartment 
showroom in section three, under construction at the time of my fieldwork. 
3.3 POSCO Apartments of Songdo 
  
Figure 3.4 – POSCO apartments under construction in section three. Photographed by author’s friend (22 
August 2014). 
 
Figure 3.5 – Map of section three development. The three lightly shaded squares to the southwest is where 
POSCO was constructing the apartment complexes I visited (songdo.com). 
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Section three is located to the southwest of section one. It was initially designed by KPF 
and is now headed entirely by POSCO. To fund the construction of residential units, 
private firms in Korea pre-sell apartments. In order to attract buyers, firms set up a show 
room, coined ‘모델하우스’ [‘model house’], with fully built and luxuriously furnished 
apartment units inside for viewing. I visited POSCO’s section three viewing station on 22 
August 2014 with a friend, as we travelled the city on bicycles. 
 We were riding the boundary road lining the Jack Nicklaus golf course to the 
southwestern edge of section three and we came across a bulky white windowless box-
like structure with a large “POSCO” logo above. There were many cars parked along the 
road, far more than we had seen visiting these parts. We locked up our bicycles outside 
and entered the building for a tour. Our presence was met with noticeable confusion. 
Instantly, employees scrambled to find someone, anyone who could speak at least some 
English. Evidently not many (Western) foreigners visited this place. We were promptly 
presented with a guide who could speak very little English, but she was pleasantly 
surprised to hear us willing to speak with her in our own broken Korean. 
 We were first directed to a centerpiece in the airy and very crowded foyer area. It 
was a scale model of section three. There was the Jack Nicklaus golf course to the 
southwest and Central Park to the northeast. Between these points were light-colored 
residential buildings all of similar height, and in the center was an international school 
servicing the area. It looked near identical to the configuration of section one, with 
Chadwick International School as the nucleus. It also looked oddly similar to the optimal 
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design format for the video game “SimCity”, where building residential units around 
service facilities ensures the highest level of citizen ‘happiness’.5  
 We were then guided to the two full size apartment replicas. The first was a 
medium-sized three-bedroom apartment with basic furniture, and the second was a very 
large three-bedroom luxury suite with opulent chandeliers and oak furniture. We were 
informed that the front doors of these apartments could be unlocked via fingerprint 
scanner; the living room would have a screen with which residents can control 
temperature, lights, blinds, fans, make video calls, and even look out directly onto the 
courtyard to monitor one’s children; there would be additional video screens in the 
bathroom as well as the kitchen so one won’t miss their favorite shows; the kitchen sink 
was equipped with a pedal to ensure that water is not wasted; and the kitchen was even 
equipped with an oven. The oven was particularly interesting: in an odd contradiction, 
while ovens are not used in Korean cooking, the apartment’s oven only operated in 
Korean language. Indeed, the oven seemed to exclusively invite Koreans to cook Western 
style cuisine. Also, the larger apartment was supplied with a yoga room, with soft wood 
floors and caricatured images of women holding yoga poses lining the walls.  
The apartment complex as a whole also presented many facilities for its residents. 
The complex would include a fitness center, a six-lane swimming pool, and a screen golf 
driving range to practice one’s swing. It would also be equipped with a reading room for 
quiet study; there would be “Mom’s Lounge” for mothers to get together, and if they had 
to bring their children along, mothers could spend their afternoon at the “Kid’s Café”, 
where their child could play while they enjoy a cup of coffee or tea in peace. Indeed, the 
                                                
5 For a compelling article on the intersection between SimCity and neoliberal urban planning, see Kofman 
(2015). 
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apartment units and the complex were configured to support female sociability in the 
private sphere, while the male was out making an income. The embedded technologies 
and facilities in these apartment units and complexes would seem to materially and 
spatially encourage self-regulation and surveillance (see Foucault 1982, 1986) over 
gender roles, class distinction, Western-style living, a healthy lifestyle, and 
environmental friendliness, the last of which is particularly curious when one takes notice 
of how all these gadgets, say a digital scanner, would effectively consume more energy 
than a mechanical keyhole.  
The prices for these units were similar to mid-range prices in Seoul’s wealthier 
areas, starting at around KRW 500 million, but since there was an international school in 
the works, this was considered a bargain. Our sales agent was very enthusiastic to point 
out the comparison between Songdo and Seoul. In Songdo, one can get international 
school living at a lower price than Gangnam, Seoul’s wealthiest area. Based on this 
narrative, it seemed evident that Songdo was competing against the “existing geography 
of prestige” of Seoul.6 Our guide informed us that we were fortunate for having come 
early enough to secure an apartment on the second of third floor. Units on upper levels 
had already been purchased. Evidently, these properties were selling well.7 
What would Joon-seo, in search of his elusive blank slate populated with 
transnational designs, find in these POSCO apartments? Though to him they are 
                                                
6 Llerena Searle (2013) finds a similar distinction between the marketing of apartment in Gurgaon in 
contrast with the centrality of Delhi, India. 
7 Interestingly, in a recent article (Viser 2014), John Hynes discusses his experience in developing Songdo. 
Initially, he wanted Songdo to emulate certain small-scale elements of his hometown of Boston. According 
to the article, as the development took on different directions, Hynes and Gale, with large unfettered egos, 
started “banging heads” and Hynes eventually left, vowing never to do business with Gale again. In his 
most recent development project in Boston, Hynes is transferring what he learned from Songdo and is 
attempting to pair houses with an international school, much like zone one and three. Boston’s mayor, 
Martin Walsh, is purportedly not opposed to the idea. 
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obdurately Korean products, would he perhaps come across a wisp of charisma secreted 
from their walls and props? While these apartments may be Korean, they evoke 
“futuristic, transnational representation, with localized characteristics”, as Bach (2011a) 
points out of zone city structures in general (110). And while some Western 
commentators may find residential units such as these intrusive (for example Werly 2014; 
Arlidge 2010), others may find them “pretty slick”, and even “familiar and mundane” 
(Arbes and Bethea 2014). These apartments may belong to the national order, but they 
simultaneously incorporate and domesticate situated transnational fantasies, intersecting 
in creative ways to conjure modern futurescapes. 
Mr. Kim and M(r)s. Lee (from chapter 1), state-issued “average Koreans”, would 
find these apartments highly suitable for and supportive of their lifestyles in the zone city. 
Mr. Kim would spend his long workdays at his global IT company doing his part to help 
grow the national economy, and in the evening, he could study in a quiet reading room to 
keep growing as a successful and competitive individual. Mrs. Lee, after quitting her 
menial office job, could look over the household, practice yoga, watch TV or monitor her 
children in the courtyard from any of the “TelePresence” monitors throughout the 
apartment. She could spend time with the other mothers on the complex at the lounge or 
the café, and she could prepare Western meals for her occasional Western guests, all the 
while saving water – an important responsibility for any resident of a green city.  
Valérie Gelézeau (2003) argues that the history of Korean apartments can be 
described as a history of “laboratories” for the manipulation of customs, one that brings 
into concert surveillance and safety. Accordingly, the idea of technologies shaping and 
observing urban subjects, of embedded technologies and ubiquitous cameras in and 
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around domestic spaces, is perhaps not worthy of apprehension for certain groups in 
Korea. In this case, Songdo may be read as a safe and secure city. Correspondingly, 
Songdo’s population may be perfectly fine to live the experimentation of these 
technologies and act as “technological pioneers” for future forms of urbanism, for orderly 
and efficient ways of life, as Werly (2014) reports. Indeed, technological pioneering, 
Western cuisine, health and the environment, safety and security, international schools, 
these are some of the ingredients for charismatic fantasies of a modern urban future for 
Korea, a new “way of being” in a global world (see Hansen and Verkaaik 2009, 12), all 
condensed into the “total environments” of Songdo.8 I will now turn to the narratives of 
residents in Songdo who imagine and define their zone city in creative and often 
surprising ways. 
3.4 Residents in Songdo 
The residents I present here9 are part of Songdo’s wealthy population, at present almost 
ninety thousand with slightly fewer than two thousand expats (ifez.go.kr). I relay the 
narratives of two Koreans who relocated to Songdo from Incheon, and two expats, one 
from Germany and one from Australia. The urban imaginations of these residents are 
distinct in many ways, yet they intersect with the structures of power that shape the city. 
As both products and forces of Songdo, these residents perform charisma in the zone city 
in relation with the mythical charisma of Songdo. 
                                                
8 Total environments relate to integrated and master-planned community complexes in which residents 
need not leave to fulfill their everyday needs (Searle 2013, 290-291). 
9 All names are pseudonyms. 
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3.4.1 Do-hyun 
Do-hyun was an engineer who oversaw waste-management projects in the city. He took 
me on a tour one day of Songdo’s water treatment plants and incinerator. He was pleased 
about this since he could spend the day speaking English with a Western foreigner. He 
would have liked to do this more often in Songdo, but Western foreigners were difficult 
to meet and communicate with, and his relations with them were generally fleeting. 
Expats were a mobile bunch. They came and went as they pleased and, according to Do-
hyun, there was no strong sense of a foreign community in Songdo. 
Do-hyun came to Songdo two years ago from Incheon, primarily for the education 
of his two children. While he lived comfortably, he didn’t consider himself wealthy. Do-
hyun could not for example afford the USD 25,000 annual tuition from Chadwick 
International School, nor could he afford to live in the newly built towers in section one. I 
was rather surprised by this, especially since as we toured his facilities, other office 
workers acted overly courteous with him. As a highly positioned project manager, he 
rarely visited these sites, and so local workers were surprised to be in the presence of a 
high-ranking manager. 
According to Do-hyun, having his children attend Chadwick or living in Songdo’s 
most expensive properties were not the most important factors of living in the city. 
Simply living there was adequate to access its aura of high-quality education. It was the 
exceptional residents of Songdo themselves who engendered the city’s charisma. Do-
hyun informed me that the young people of Songdo had a clear idea of their futures early 
on in life, as opposed to young people in other parts of Incheon. Young people here knew 
what they wanted out of life and would decisively act in accordance with successfully 
attaining this end goal. Bringing his children to a place populated by these kinds of 
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people, where they could mingle with citizens destined for success, would invariably 
afford them a better life later on (field notes, July 17, 2014). 
It has been well documented in Korea that wealthy families move to where the 
most prestigious schools are located. This tendency, rooted in a Confucian tradition that 
valorizes intellectual professions, continues today as a means to affirm one’s place 
among Korea’s urban bourgeoisie (see Gelézeau 2003). One of the central reasons 
Gangnam has become so wealthy in comparison with other districts in Seoul is because 
highly-ranked schools were relocated to southern Seoul from the 1970s (Kim 2011). 
Today, properties in Dogok at the southernmost point of Gangnam are the most 
expensive properties in the country (Gelézeau 2008). According to Do-hyun’s narrative, 
Songdo too is following the same logic to attract residents to the city, who 
simultaneously shape it into a place for wealthy Koreans and reproduce class and spatial 
distinctions with the rest of Incheon. 
Do-hyun fantasized a city of exceptional people, destined to join the ranks of the 
nation’s future elite. The charisma of a brand new, planned and organized urban form 
spills into its inhabitants and correspondingly fashions them as highly civilized people, 
with ‘correct’ values, behaviors, desires, and who collectively seek individual success. 
The zone city is entirely devoid of social vices. Do-hyun’s fantasy chimes with the more 
recent transformation of Songdo into a creative city. Since President Park Geun-hye took 
office in 2013, government officials at IFEZ Authority informed me that her ‘Creative 
Economy’ policies have focused entirely on facilitating foreign investment and 
promoting Songdo’s research and development clusters. Correspondingly, Songdo has 
recently been presented as “the optimal testbed for deregulation and the Creative 
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Economy” (Cho 2015). If the creative economy is to take off, it will indeed require the 
well-bred brainpower of Songdo’s exceptional population. 
3.4.2 Mi-yeon 
I met Mi-yeon at her mother’s church.10 Her mother was a priestess who runs a church 
around Bu-pyeong, Incheon’s downtown core. We had just finished the main ceremony 
and, as the only white foreigner there, the churchgoers invited me to have lunch with 
them on the floor above the main hall. I sat to eat lunch with the students in a separate 
room from the adults. I was basically the centre of attention. Everyone was very 
interested in my presence and eager to ask me questions about my life and what I thought 
of Korea. I told them about my research project and Mi-yeon informed me that she had 
recently moved to Songdo from Incheon. She appeared very eager to talk about her city. 
Songdo, she told me, was completely different from the rest of Incheon. Incheon 
was poor while Songdo was rich. With the aim of making her point unambiguous, she 
emphasized the contrast using body movements and grimaces to express disdain for 
Incheon and smilingly raised her thumbs up for Songdo. I was quite surprised by this 
display, since she was the only one in the room who lived in Songdo. The other students 
however seemed perfectly fine with this and openly agreed with her assertions. She 
continued: Songdo was international because one could find foreign products there. 
These were expensive luxury items that could not be found in Incheon. She evoked 
European bread as an example. Songdo’s Paris Baguette franchises were special and 
carried products exclusive to Songdo. 
                                                
10 I do not identify as religious, but I was invited to this church for a sermon and gladly accepted because I 
was informed that the priestess lived in Songdo. 
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“European bread” came from the outside and carried with it the charisma of the 
origin of the Western world. In its association with this foreign object, Songdo as well 
was conferred European charisma, making it an exceptional place with transnational 
connections. In her utterance, Mi-yeon too was simultaneously indexed under the same 
guise, by which she enacted her own class distinction, mobilized in that very room. Mi-
yeon appeared rather rude and inconsiderate in front of her peers during her exposition, 
and I suspect it had much do to with her status as the daughter of the church’s priestess. 
Nevertheless, her point was clear: Songdo had greater value than Incheon because it 
afforded, through access to and consumption of outside products, access to the foreign. 
Incheon was not only poor, but also closed, isolated, and therefore, irrelevant. 
Songdo’s population was imagined as exceptional from its developers as well. For 
example, a promoter at IFEZ Authority described the population of Songdo as very 
“picky” individuals who expected a different quality city than the rest of Incheon. She 
offered an example: HomePlus, an affiliate of the large British distributor Tesco that now 
has an established presence in the Korean market, changed its name to PlusMall in 
Songdo in order to differentiate itself from ‘ordinary’ Korean cities (field notes, 31 July 
2014). This example, along with Mi-yeon’s differentiation with Incheon, conjures a 
distinction between Songdo and Incheon, much like the distinction between Seoul and 
Gangnam. 
 Mi-yeon continued in her exposition, this time employing Songdo’s many parks. 
Incheon was composed of dirty streets and buildings, while Songdo was filled with green 
spaces. Additionally, these spaces were different from any other city in Korea because 
they were not crowded. For many Incheonites however, Songdo was a “ghost town”, but 
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Mi-yeon framed this as something positive and refreshing. She also lived in a POSCO 
apartment building inside zone one. Her apartment was new, clean, and modern. I let her 
know that I had visited a First World Tower apartment recently and discovered that many 
amenities frequently break down in these buildings.11 She was aware of these issues, and 
told me that the amenities in her building work properly and that the neighbourhood is 
safe and calm. Evidently, Mi-yeon didn’t make the same distinction Joon-seo from KPF 
made between transnational placeless and local Korean designs. For Mi-yeon, the modern 
emerged from the technologies with which her apartment was furnished, irrespective of 
the building’s outside appearance. Songdo’s charisma was conferred to all buildings in 
the city by the simple fact that they were in Songdo, and thus wholly separate from 
Incheon and connected to Korea’s outside. 
3.4.3 Brunhilda 
Brunhilda hailed from Germany. She came to Songdo because her husband, an engineer 
of a famous German car brand, was relocated for a two-year contract in Songdo. His 
company had brought one of its production facilities to the city. She had two young 
children and was not permitted to hold a job herself because her spousal visa would not 
allow it. She also had a dog, a very large German Sheppard named Felix. I first met 
                                                
11 When I visited a First World Tower apartment, the doorbell was broken, the air conditioner needed 
servicing, and the whole place was uncomfortably hot. The issue gets worst during the cold and windy 
winter months. For example, in 2013, large banners were posted at the summit of three of Songdo’s Central 
Park I buildings, the city’s most luxurious properties. These read as follows. Banner one: 
“악덕기업포스코건설! 참는데도한계가있다!” [“Vicious POSCO! We’ve endured a lot, but there is a 
limit!”]; banner two: “추워서못살겠다! 포스코건설은이중창을설치하라!” [“It’s so cold that we can’t live 
here. Build double windows, POSCO!”]; banner three: “입주민을무시하는포스코건설은각성하라!” 
[“POSCO, which has ignored residents, wake up (do something)!”] (Medimorec 2013). Though these 
buildings are LEED certified, they were built with single-pane windows that allowed ice to form around the 
window’s borders. When I asked Joon-seo about this issue, he put the blame directly onto POSCO. While 
KPF was in charge of design, POSCO would handle construction, but the company was unhappy taking 
orders from a foreign architectural firm. POSCO built the designs according to KPF’s plans, but evidently 
cut costs in other ways. 
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Brunhilda at Central Park along with her dog. During our first meeting, we decided to 
walk together along the park’s paths. As we began talking, she jumped right into what 
was really on her mind. She began telling me about her and Felix’s vicissitudes while 
living in Songdo. Everyone was afraid of her dog; she couldn’t ride the elevator with him 
in her building; adults looked at her and her dog with disapproval and at times distress; 
children taunted him and threw things at him. Evidently, life was difficult for her and 
Felix in the city. Locals, she told me, only like small and/or cute, submissive dogs, not 
dogs like Felix, with a solid built, large paws, and a mouth that could easily clasp a 
human neck in one bite. While he seemed friendly to me, he admittedly might just as 
easily have come across as an oversized law enforcement canine. 
Brunhilda wanted to open up a dog park in Songdo. She was not the only one. She 
was part of a group of dog owners in the city who also felt alienated from public spaces 
along with their canine companions. The city purportedly has, depending on how one 
counts it (including planned yet un-built areas of the city), 65 green spaces. According to 
Brunhilda, the least the government could do was to give her group of dog-lovers one of 
these spaces so they and their dogs could enjoy themselves away from the judging gaze 
of local dog non-lovers. Her group was a mix of both Koreans and expats, but the 
informal club had recently split. She and a Korean individual wanted a different outcome 
for the club. The other person was interested in monetizing the club by establishing a 
membership fee while Brunhilda had no interest in this sort of thing. She wanted a dog 
park in the city simply for the sake of it, and she was blindingly committed to this goal. I 
explained to her on a number of occasions that, according to Songdo’s logic, her dog park 
would need to render profit in some form, or perhaps she might consider establishing one 
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in a suburb outside the city, but she remained firm in her conviction. Brunhilda wanted to 
make a dog park in Songdo, full stop. 
Brunhilda showed me a document she intended to present to the Incheon 
Government. The document had pictures of dog meat soup and presented Korea as a 
particular and oddly-placed country in the teleological path of modernization. As 
Brunhilda explained, Korea remained behind Europe at this point in its history, and as all 
societies do, Korea would eventually climb the ranks. By embracing animals and animal 
rights, with dogs as leading examples, Korea could show itself on its way to the next 
stage. The country needed only a small push, and Brunhilda, on her civilizing mission, 
could actuate this by placing a mirror before the government to make them realize that 
they still had some work to do. Songdo, as Korea’s most advanced city, was the place to 
showcase Korea’s modernity.  
Brunhilda had lived near Itaewon in Seoul ten years ago with her husband when 
he had had a contract job in the city. She looked back positively on her life in Seoul, but 
when she came to Korea for the second time and arrived in Songdo, she was astounded at 
how Korea could have changed so dramatically in a decade. Though she and her dog had 
trouble with Songdo’s residents, she admitted that Songdo offered a high quality of life. 
Everything was new, orderly, and well designed; the city was a safe place for her 
children; her husband was well paid and they were given an apartment in the First World 
Towers, and though amenities often broke down, it offered more space than her family 
required; Songdo also offered many international products that she could never have 
come across in Itaewon a decade ago. In Brunhilda’s eyes, Korea had made leaps and 
bounds into the future. It had come close to the West, with only a few more steps to go. 
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I let Brunhilda know that perhaps her document would not have the effect she 
anticipated, and proposed to inquire with IFEZ Authority to gain a sense of the feasibility 
of her project. As expected, the idea of a dog park did not gel well with Songdo’s logic. 
City makers in IFEZ Authority either saw it as a foreign idea or as something that would 
not render profit. There were other projects that the government would implement. For 
example, when residents in section one petitioned for the construction of a kindergarten 
on residential land, designated usage regulations were promptly modified. On another 
occasion, residents living in the northernmost Central Park I condominiums petitioned to 
have a pedestrian bridge built to shorten the walking distance between their building and 
Central Park Station, and the government made it so. By making life slightly more 
convenient for residents, these projects added value to their properties and to the city as a 
whole. Concomitantly, the demands for these projects came from a multitude, a 
community that could come together and turn a demand into an important issue for the 
city.12 
A dog park, in contrast, has absolutely no place in Songdo. It is of a different 
order of modernity. A clean, organized, and singularized utopian community in a 
frictionless world has no place for dogs. But in Brunhilda’s situated universal 
modernization path, she hoped that Songdo would conform, for in her eyes, the city 
displayed an image of a future she perceived as familiar, with greater charismatic appeal 
than the rest of Korea. 
                                                
12 The kindergarten and the pedestrian bridge were projects I followed briefly during my visits to the 
offices at IFEZ Authority. 
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3.4.4 Jenny 
Jenny hailed from Australia. She had a doctorate in biology and secured a job at an 
international environmental NGO housed in Songdo. She lived alone, enjoyed running, 
and spent her weekends mostly at home and occasionally went out with some friends. 
When I first met her on a visit to her office, she saw our discussion together mainly as an 
opportunity to vent about her life in Songdo and how miserable the city was.  
As we walked and talked along Songdo’s boulevards, Jenny drew my attention to 
the sidewalk. I noticed crooked cinder blocks and what looks like small sinkholes in 
haphazard formation. The edges of the blocks were inaccurately cut and the whole path 
looked like a slapdash bricolage. For Jenny, Songdo’s infrastructure was not a sign of a 
new modern city, but rather an under-financed and rushed development that illustrated a 
sense of backwardness. Songdo’s infrastructures indeed enact a multiple landscape: while 
the Incheon Bridge may be conjured as a “grand spectacle” of a modern future in 
promotional documents and videos, Jenny saw a sidewalk that came to represent the 
foreclosing of that future and “abjection” to the past (see Larkin 2013, 333-336). She 
imagined a place of a failed future. 
Jenny was not a happy resident in Songdo. She found the city boring and at times 
displayed a tinge of resentment in her descriptions. Being an environmental scientist, she 
was acutely aware of Songdo’s dark (green) secret. Songdo is built on reclaimed land that 
was not formerly deserted, as the city’s promotions insist. One of the central elements of 
Songdo’s presentation in IFEZ Authority’s promotions headquarters illustrates the 
dramatic transformation of Incheon’s coastline in order to display the prowess of Korea’s 
construction sector. To add emphasis – and depoliticize the issue, the comparison 
between the past and the present is entwined with an aesthetic flare, from unsightly mud 
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to a beautiful urban panorama. In reality however, the mudflats were used by large 
populations of migratory birds along with people who used the shoreline to fish. With the 
new city in place, substantial populations of birds have died and people have been 
unhappily relocated (see birdskorea.org and Park 2010). 
In their article, Ko et al. (2011) make a distinction between two green 
developmental approaches. On the one hand, “systematic green” development refers to a 
broad vision that seeks “a balance among economic growth, environmental protection, 
and social justice” (Ko et al. 2011, 5). On the other hand, “segmented green” 
development denotes a narrower definition of sustainable development, stripped of its 
social justice dimensions. “Green Growth” exemplifies this truncated version by strictly 
focusing on “economic growth while reducing environmental impact” (Ko et al. 2011, 5). 
Songdo is built on a landfill that formerly comprised coastal wetlands populated by an 
array of migratory birds, some of which are national heritage species (Ko et al. 2011, 11). 
Songdo’s ‘land reclamation’, alongside other aggressive “Green Growth” projects, has 
impelled environmental NGOs and scientists to express their concerns with the 
consequences and impacts of the country’s present developmental trajectory (Ko et al. 
2011, 13). 
Jenny was one of these scientists. She made a clear distinction between society 
and nature, and the latter should be left alone in order to thrive. The impact of the city’s 
destruction was evident in her visceral disdain for this place. But it was too late for 
Songdo; the tidal flats were long gone, stamped out by this colossal city of dirt, concrete 
and glass. Her efforts were redirected at the Saemangeum development, at present 
Korea’s largest reclamation project and the leading cause of death for migratory birds in 
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Korea (birdskorea.org). Jenny hoped that something could still be salvaged there. It is 
indeed ironic that the environmental NGO for which she worked was housed in Songdo. 
Somehow, the city has been able to lure large environmental organizations, such as 
Jenny’s and the GCF, by conjuring a green and healthy world populated by sustainable 
cities, for which Songdo could become a guiding light, a beacon of hope. How this 
happened completely baffled Jenny; through the charismatic veneer of Songdo, she could 
only see a dark and neglectful future. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored some of the ways in which Songdo’s fantasies are reproduced 
by its urban forms and residents despite the empirical evidence that would contradict the 
validity of the city’s mythologies. First, I gave an overview of Songdo’s production since 
2001 to demonstrate that the development of the city is largely undertaken by the state 
rather than through transnational connections and partnerships. Second, I took a tour of 
Songdo’s POSCO apartments being developed in section three to elucidate the ways in 
which national and situated transnational categories materially congeal, giving rise to 
creative fantasies of modern urban futures. Third, I followed the accounts of a small 
group of Songdo’s well-to-do residents to examine some of the ways in which they 
interpreted and apprehended the charisma in Songdo. Do-hyun imagined the charisma of 
the city endowing its unique and exceptional population with success-driven desires and 
future-oriented values; Mi-yeon bestowed upon the city transnational status in its 
association with foreign products, creating a pronounced rift between Songdo and 
Incheon, and her own distinction by extension; Brunhilda found great charisma in 
Songdo, but she hoped the city would produce more were it to conform to her own 
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visions on its stride along her situated universal path to modernity; Jenny imagined a dark 
future in Songdo, a city that may effectively appear charismatic on the surface but that 
also – both figuratively and literally – hides a nightmarish secret beneath. 
 The fantasies rehearsed by Songdo’s residents are not in opposition to the 
dominant fantasies of the city. The residents themselves reproduce the ideal and highly 
reductionist categories of Songdo. They are therefore not in opposition to state power or 
transnational forces of capital, but rather entwined in these processes, reinforcing them in 
surprisingly creative ways.13 Residents’ fantasies inscribe themselves onto the urban 
spaces of Songdo, as the city’s charisma domesticates an idealized future version of the 
foreign as civilized, orderly, and efficient, outlining the proper operation of the city and 
its occupants. The rehearsal of Songdo’s fantasies from within the offices of the state is 
the subject to which I turn in the following chapter.
                                                
13 Jenny’s narrative is an exception here, as the charisma of Songdo had little effect on her understanding of 
the city. But she is part of a silenced minority of dissidents, insufficient in number to shape the myths of the 
city, and correspondingly shape the material city and its urban life. 
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CHAPTER 4 Promoting a Transnational Urban Form: 
Routinization and Institutional Charisma 
4.1 Entering IFEZ Authority 
In my ongoing attempt to understand city-making practices in Songdo, I visited IFEZ 
Authority on a regular basis and met with a variety of government officers. IFEZ 
Authority, instituted in 2005 and housed in G-Tower at the northwest edge of Central 
Park, is a special branch of the Incheon Government designated to oversee the 
development of Songdo.1 IFEZ Authority is intended to independently facilitate private 
investment into the city, offering a “one-stop” service for interested parties.2 The first 
point of contact for the potential investor is the Business Opportunity Headquarters. This 
HQ comprises four divisions, each with multiple teams to cater to the specific area of the 
investor. For example, hotels will go to the hospitality investment team, or a 
pharmaceutical company will be directed to the new growth investment team. The people 
who work on these teams are investment consultants that I will call promoters. Promoters 
are five-year contract workers – both women and men in a wide age range – who are 
highly proficient in English and generally hold an advanced degree in business 
management or a social science. Promoters are critical conduits of information and 
influence in the city making process and I present here an ethnographic snapshot of their 
                                                
1 IFEZ Authority is similar to the Incheon Public Development Agency Mr. Park instituted in 1989 to 
oversee the landfilling around Songdo Island and the development of the city. 
2 A recent study by Shin et al. (forthcoming) illustrates the cooperative and conflictual relations between 
IFEZ Authority, the Incheon Government, and the central state. IFEZ Authority is densely connected to 
these scales of government, giving it very minimal independence as a special branch specific to Songdo. 
While the central state remains at a distance, Incheon and IFEZ Authority require central state funding to 
develop Songdo’s infrastructure. To complicate matters further, there are now eight FEZs in Korea, all of 
which compete for central state funds, the sum of which can only cover about 70 to 80 percent of a single 
zone (Shin et al., forthcoming). 
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roles. 
Promoters have a number of functions, but their overall purpose is to attract, 
‘induce’3, and ensure that investors smoothly and successfully pass through the 
investment procedure and attain their building permit to begin their development in the 
city. If investors come to Songdo with an interest to invest, promoters will be the first to 
welcome them and begin by presenting the Songdo project and explain the overall vision 
of the city. They will then assist the investor in navigating through the investment 
procedure. For example, they will listen to the investor’s interests and plans and answer 
questions accordingly; they will assemble a specific Task Force Team (TFT)4 catered to 
the investor to help them set up; they will vouch for and support the investor’s interests 
should these interests not strictly conform to the city’s master plan.5 Promoters will 
essentially look after investors and their interests throughout the process. 
Promoters will also scour markets to find potential investors. For example, they 
will attend large international conferences to advertise the city and establish networks, or 
they will contact an institution or firm directly. Generally however, the investors they 
successfully approach will come through a referral from a ‘key’ person.6 Once a 
connection is made, promoters will either invite or visit the potential investor and give a 
presentation of Songdo and promote the city, ultimately aiming to ‘induce’ the investor to 
                                                
3 This is the specific term promoters employed to describe their work. 
4 A TFT is an assemblage of different consultants that assist investors in putting their investment and 
development proposals together. There are three types of teams: internal, mixed, and external. Internal 
consultant comes from IFEZ Authority, but consultants can be recruited from universities, civil 
organizations, and/or the central state. 
5 Promoters will also run background checks on potential investors to determine the feasibility of their 
interests, their sources of funding, and what references will reports about the investor. 
6 Contacting an institution directly, as promoters informed me, is almost never successful because it is 
almost impossible to get in touch with the ‘right’ person. Referrals are the most effective ways to make a 
connection. For example, SUNY came to Songdo Global Campus through a contact at a Korean university 
who personally knew the president of SUNY.  
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come develop in Songdo. The success of promoters is measured according to their ability 
to effectively attract, ‘induce’, and support the investor through the investment procedure. 
Thus, through their practices and the institutional arrangement through which they 
navigate, promoters develop a close relationship with the investor. 
If investors are successfully ‘induced’, they will then present their proposed 
investment and development plans to the Songdo Business Headquarters, where one of 
the four divisions, each with multiple specialized teams, will receive the plans. This 
group I will call planners. Planners are tenured government officers who generally hold 
advanced engineering degrees. Once planners receive the investor’s proposal, they will 
examine the plans and assess them in comparison to the official laws and regulations of 
the city’s centralized plan. The planner’s overall purpose is to oversee the construction of 
the city and to ensure that it is developed according to the master plan.7 Thus, unlike the 
promoter, planners have a close relationship with the plan. 
This relationship is highly experiential. Planners will often go on fieldtrips to the 
city’s construction sites to assess the progress of development. They will oversee all 
public projects in the city, including the development and maintenance of infrastructures 
and city zoning. City zoning refers to the specific ways in which zones relate to each 
                                                
7 The master plan is more than an inscription on paper. It constitutes an assemblage, via electronic 
documents, across multiple scales of government all onto one unified whole. The process is as follows. An 
electronic document representing a given component of the master plan begins on the planner’s computer 
screen, moves up for approval to the IFEZ Authority commissioner, up to the mayor of Incheon, and if 
required, all the way up to the national state. Electronic documents are signed on their way up and on their 
way down, so that planners receive the first and the final signature. Decisions over plans and regulations 
are rendered official as a result of the signatures they accumulate, cementing connections between sectors 
of the government. As an assemblage across various scales of government, a decision becomes a 
“collective agent” with “an impersonal tone, [that eliminates] information about who is responsible for 
what” (Hull 2012, 127). It thus becomes authoritative. Planners map the different scales of government as 
all the same, that is, they are a single unit of governance, and the master plan embodies this powerful 
singularity. In this unified process, planners describe themselves as intermediaries as opposed to mediators, 
cogs rather than delegates that can influence the decision itself. The work of planners is highly 
systematized. As such, they see themselves as purely systematic components in the city-making process. In 
their own word, they are a “system” (field notes, 20 July 2014). 
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other in the overall plan of the city. These are set like puzzle pieces in the sense that the 
modification of one zone will affect surrounding zones and the overall circulation and 
geometry of the city.8 Planners are designated to specific sections of the city to ensure the 
successful completion of one or many infrastructural elements. These can include waste 
management, water pipes, and/or parks. In sum, planners are closely aligned with 
Songdo’s master plan, to the extent that they find themselves uneasy with the term “free” 
in Free Economic Zone because they understand it to mean “against regulations” (field 
notes, 1 September 2014). 
 
Figure 4.1 – G-Tower, IFEZ Authority Headquarters. Photographed by author’s friend (22 August 2014). 
                                                
8 City zones are also inscribed in planning documents in the form of maps and charts, which illustrate the 
measurements of each zone and their designated uses. If an investor wants to develop in a zone with a 
differently intended use, which purportedly happens often, then this affects the entire planned configuration 
of the city, along with the designated land price of the surrounding zones. Additionally, since the material 
infrastructure of the city is already constructed, these are installed in accordance with the zone and its use. 
If an investor wants to change the measurements or use of a zone, there are material constraints.  
  103 
 
Figure 4.2 – IFEZ Authority organizational chart (ifez.go.kr). From left to right: Planning and Coordination 
HQ for public relations and investment grievances; Business Opportunity HQ for promotions; Songdo 
Business HQ for investment proposal assessments; Yeongjong-Cheongna Business HQ for all dealings 
with those sections of IFEZ. 
In the idealized operation of IFEZ Authority, investors would be successfully ‘induced,’ 
submit their project plans, and planners would determine that everything aligns with the 
master plan, for which investors would subsequently be granted a building permit to 
begin construction on their designated lot. In practice however, investors rarely align with 
the plan, if ever. Investors come to IFEZ Authority with their own interests in hand and 
will generally be inclined to construct on lots that do not conform to the master plan and 
that do not align with the already constructed material infrastructure beneath the city. As 
promoters pointed out to me, investors are fundamentally interested in location. Indeed, 
while the master plan and the originally established infrastructure are made to expedite 
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the construction of private development projects, from the investor’s vantage point, these 
elements are a hindrance to their own interests. 
 The tension between the investor and the plan correspondingly relates to an 
internal institutional tension between promoters and planners. While ideally, promoters 
and planners will aim to concede a balance between the investor’s interests and the plan, 
in practice, promoters and planners develop pronounced differences in their approach to 
the city. Planners obdurately stick to the central plan, while promoters, in their close 
connections with investors, systematically deviate from it. This understanding of Songdo 
reflects two divergent renditions of the city. On the one hand, promoters tend to 
understand Songdo as an open blank slate in a frictionless world; it is a city built for 
private investment and the central purpose of IFEZ Authority is to attract investment to 
the city. On the other hand, planners tend to approach Songdo as a closed national 
project; it is the “heart” of Korea’s national economy (field notes, 1 September 2014).9 
Their respective visions are systematically rehearsed in a systemized institutional context, 
that is, promoters and planners are institutionally conditioned to approach Songdo in their 
own deeply situated ways. 
 In this chapter, I focus on one of these groups.10 I follow the work of promoters to 
gain an understanding of their relations to Songdo. Promoters, as agents in the city, 
routinely interact with promotional materials of the city. On the one hand, promoters 
ritually perform the city, bestowing upon it a reified and authoritative presence in their 
purview of reality. As one promoter pointed out, the city he was presenting reflected the 
                                                
9 I employ the term ‘tend’ to signal that promoters and planners do in fact see both sides of the equation, 
but through their practices and the institutional structures they navigate, both groups are driven to isolate 
themselves from the other. 
10 The planner will also have a background presence in the narrative of the text. 
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“truth” about Songdo (field notes, 14 August 2014). It seemed evident that promoters’ 
vision for Songdo, anchored in promotional documents, had greater importance than the 
material production of the city, as it was actually unfolding on the ground. 
On the other hand, making the city affords promoters professional assets with 
which they can build and develop their professional profiles. The institutional terrain in 
which they work, continuous with social-structural trends prevalent in Korea, collectively 
directs promoters towards individual pursuits for “specs”, that is, specifications they can 
inscribe onto their CVs. Successfully inducing investors to make the city is the means 
towards a promoter’s personal development. The analysis I present in this chapter 
demonstrates how knowledge practices and institutional arrangements “internally 
generate the effects of their own reality” (see Riles 2001, 3), where a city that “might be” 
comes to mean as much as the present state of Songdo (see Stoler 2009, 21). 
4.2 Performing Charisma in the City: Routine, Authority, Reification 
I had an interview with Min-joon on 15 August 2014.11 I had scheduled a meeting with 
him the night before over the phone and I was very impressed by his English fluency. 
From his tone, he seemed amicable and enthused by the idea of meeting with me. Min-
joon was the director of the hospitality investment team at IFEZ Authority. He had a 
doctorate in business management and had worked in the corporate sector before joining 
IFEZ Authority in 2005. Questions in hand and a refreshing beverage as a gift for my 
interlocutor, I arrived at his office a few minutes early. Min-joon was there to greet me 
with a radiant smile. We shook hands and he led me into a meeting room with a lovely 
view of the city, where another individual awaited us. I was introduced to Geon-woo, 
                                                
11 This name is a pseudonym, like all other names in this chapter. 
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another friendly character whose English was equally impeccable. Geon-woo was a team 
member on the education investment team. At the time, he was especially busy attracting 
foreign universities to occupy the many available offices and classrooms at Songdo 
Global University Campus (SGUC). I offered him my drink, which I intended to have 
together with Min-joon. Once we exchanged cards12, we sat and I began by informing my 
interlocutors of the general theme of my questions: their dealings and negotiations with 
potential investors. 
Min-joon and Geon-woo were not attentive to the frame I attempted to lay out 
early on for our discussion. They first tried to connect me with the people who ran the 
local university residences, no doubt thinking that I was a newcomer to Korea, and had 
no place to stay in the city. I let them know my situation – that I had been in Korea for a 
couple of months by this point – and they segued right into their presentation of the city. 
They were clearly in full promotion-mode. Min-joon led the way. He had brought with 
him a stack of documents and had placed them at his side. There were promotional 
brochures of the city, of hotels, of international school, as well as full-blown maps of 
Songdo, Cheongna, and Yeongjong Island. But he first began with a very unassuming 
printout of his powerpoint slides, a presentation, I would later learn, homogenously 
shared across all divisions and teams in the Business Opportunity HQ (see appendix for 
presentation slides). 
Min-joon fell back on his ritualized presentation, taking me through the broad 
                                                
12 Name cards are important mediators in professional relations in Korea, and they are associated to a 
specific protocol. First of all, it is very important to have a name card, without which the formal exchange 
cannot take place. When exchanging cards, one always offers and accepts with both hands. However, those 
of higher status can do this with the right hand while the left hand cups the right forearm. Upon receiving a 
card, it is polite to take a moment to read the card, and one can then set the card aside or place it in one’s 
wallet. But it is important to actively demonstrate care for the card, not bend it, and certainly not place it in 
one’s rear pocket as one takes a seat. This was always an awkward procedure for me, and I would always 
try to exaggerate the protocol slightly, just to be safe.  
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strokes of the city. Something palpably conspicuous happened here, as though we became 
our assigned roles: I instantly fell back into spectator-mode and Min-joon was hailed into 
the spotlight. His presentation was heavily rehearsed. He had a memorized script for all 
the images we went through, seemingly imprinted into his muscle memory. Marcel 
Mauss (1973) would be quick to make a similar observation, just as he does when 
lecturing an audience on “techniques of the body”: 
Everything in us is under command. I am a lecturer for you; you can tell it from my 
sitting posture and my voice, and you are listening to me seated and in silence. We 
have a set of permissible or impermissible, natural or unnatural attitudes (76).13 
As I was made acutely conscious of the formation of these roles, my first 
inclination was to interrupt them. I had read through these documents countless times and 
I had my questions to pose, and a limited amount of time. While I was intent on setting 
the frame of our discussion, I was demonstrably unsuccessful at managing this dynamic. 
Their presentation was already in full swing, and I could not overcome the authoritative 
confidence of their corporeal presence. Evidently, I never had a chance. The only way I 
could come to terms with this event was to conclude that this presentation was a 
ritualized performance with deeply sedimented procedures, and my role as a quiet and 
attentive audience member, the one a potential investor might occupy, was involuntarily 
– spontaneously and unwillingly – assigned to me. I decided to set my intentions aside, 
go along with the situation, and listen to what these promoters had prepared and 
rehearsed innumerable times before.  
                                                
13 Mauss coined the term “habitus” not to denote a metaphysical realm of ideas but a “gymnic art”, 
corporeally imitated and rehearsed in the mundane everyday. Moving his analysis from the concrete to the 
abstract, Mauss did not draw the distinction between the physical, the psychological, and the symbolic. 
Rather, and perhaps unlike his uncle Emile Durkheim, Mauss considered “moral and intellectual symbols” 
not the cause of one’s corporeal technique, but ‘cogs’ assembled in physical techniques efficiently 
rehearsed and historically instituted towards a specified goal (71-86). 
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I saw before me on the paper an image taken from the north side of Convensia 
Avenue in Songdo. With a clear sky in the backdrop, the image offered a view towards 
the POSCO First World towers and Songdo’s flagship edifice, the North East Asian 
Trade (NEAT) Tower – also the tallest structure in Korea at present. A closer look 
revealed the side of the Sheraton and its logo between the First World and the NEAT 
Towers. The height of both towers extended beyond the frame of the shot, alluding to 
their dramatic size. Min-joon was less interested in pointing out these structures; he 
directed my attention to the large avenue in the foreground, partitioned by a median 
intermittently lined with national flags and company logos from around the world. He 
told me that these were all the countries represented in Songdo and below were the 
emblems of the multinational companies housed in the city. This was the important 
takeaway point of the opening slide: Songdo was an international business city, concisely 
captured in this image, and reiterated in Min-joon’s words. 
Min-joon turned to the next slide/page. The second slide provided an overview of 
IFEZ, with two subheadings: “Outline of IFEZ” and “Green City”. Min-joon began with 
the first subheading. Passing his finger over the page, he showed me where we were on 
the image on the left hand side, and then again with his finger, went through reading the 
bullet points directly under the image. He echoed what was written on the page: “we are 
one-hour drive from Seoul; the total area of IFEZ is 169 square kilometers, etc.” He then 
crossed over to the image on the right hand side, a blown up scale of Northeast Asia. 
Min-joon continued with his finger, passing his index over the circumferences of the area 
that encompassed the major cities, one by one, from smaller to larger, in the three-hour 
flight radius of IFEZ. Min-joon continued on with the larger bullet points below the 
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images focusing on the strategic location of Songdo and its access to large populations 
and markets inside and outside Korea. There was no mention of countries and borders, 
sovereignty and governments; the connections were made between urban centres, with a 
specific emphasis on large ones. 
Min-joon continued in his exposition, guiding me through the details of the 
document. The next slide showed the projected development plan of all three points of 
IFEZ by 2020. He then placed enthusiastic emphasis on the dramatic transformation of 
Incheon’s coastline, from “tidal mudflats” to “a land of green and premium city”. Min-
joon and Geon-woo together made sure to underscore the aesthetically charged contrast 
between both landscapes, between an ugly past and a beautiful future. The intention here 
was also to lucidly illustrate the capabilities of Korea and its vigorous construction sector 
to completely revamp its territory. Truly anything was possible on these lands, as though 
a clean and modern city could simply rise up out of the mud. 
The next two slides provided an overview of Songdo’s highly comprehensive 
infrastructures for a city of pure motion. Min-joon guided me through the various metrics 
outlined on the paper: “The Incheon International Airport is second in the world for cargo 
volume; a new port is being developed to be completed by 2020, etc.” For the remainder, 
we lightly went over some of the financial incentives of investing in Songdo and closed 
the presentation with the international companies housed in IFEZ, firms referred to as 
‘anchor companies’ that provide social proof to lure potential investors. 
 In sum, the presentation rehearsed by Min-joon and Geon-woo was of a 
transnational city erected on a blank slate. It housed an array of private firms hailing from 
various countries; it was regionally connected to “61 cities with over one million 
  110 
population”; it housed the GCF; it emerged shiny and bright from a muddy tidal flat; it 
had an impressive infrastructure for frictionless circulation; and it offered tax breaks and 
various other incentives for private investors. 
During this presentation, I was most struck by the enthusiasm of Min-joon and 
Geon-woo’s display. They were evidently very engaged with what they were helping put 
together. When I discovered that this presentation was performed across all teams in the 
Business Opportunity HQ, I became curious about their tactics and strategies in 
performing their city, only to soon discover that promoters had no such strategies or 
advice to teach novice presenters. Promoters simply learned the presentation about their 
city and delivered it according to the outline. 
Ji-hoon, a promoter on the new growth investment team, pointed out to me one 
day – with a look of sincerity – that this presentation represented the “truth” about 
Songdo, and he was in no way interested in fabrications or in misrepresenting the city to 
potential investors (field notes, 14 August 2014). I inquired with other promoters about 
tactics and strategies in their presentations, but they unanimously made it clear that they 
had no intention of embellishing or pushing visions of the city that were not present in 
promotional documents. In fact, they felt a moral obligation to this end. In being a 
witness to this presentation, the only thing I became convinced of was that this 
presentation was for the promoter the definition of the city, and I took them at their word. 
They apprehended the promotional materials of the city with which they routinely 
interacted as the city itself. How did this vision become so dense as to blur out of 
existence the actual development of Songdo, the one that would seem to contradict the 
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promoter’s vision?14 
To approach this question, consider the presentation. As Min-joon spoke and 
pointed to each statement on the paper, he was repeating what was written before him, 
while Geon-woo was at his side nodding, adding the occasional “m-hmm” to stress a 
point. This performance resembled what Richard Bauman (2004) refers to as a 
“mediational speech event”. Bauman (2004) observes that when a mediator repeats the 
words of the original speaker, a sense of authority is then bestowed upon the original 
speaker and his or her words. The original speaker in this instance is the paper document, 
the text itself, establishing the outline of the presentation and navigating the central 
pillars of Songdo’s vision. 
Now consider the document. It was published by IFEZ Authority, the special 
government branch specifically instituted to oversee the development of Songdo. The 
official state insignia is inscribed at the bottom left of each page. Further, the main pillars 
of the presentation – the city’s regional connectivity, the infrastructures that expand its 
reach, the dramatic transformation of Incheon’s coastline – are elements that can be 
traced into the physical city. The few words, numbers, and images are not suggestions of 
what could be; they are physical realities in the actual world of the present that extend 
spatially to other places. Indeed, this document is not only a “projection” of the city but 
simultaneously continuous with elements of the physical city itself (Hull 2012, 5). The 
document also extends temporally into the past, where its statements about the 
transformation of land have already been confirmed and acknowledged: they are “prior 
discourse”, repetitions of formerly confirmed facts (see Bauman 2004, 151). 
                                                
14 As per the empirical record of Songdo’s actual development discussed in chapter 3 and the claims stated 
by Kim and Ahn (2011), Shin (forthcoming), and Shwayri (2013). 
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Furthermore, the discourse is dramatically reduced to a very small set of factors 
designed to convincingly drive a very limited yet concise set of points. As Bauman 
(2004) quotes Bakhtin (1981): “authoritative discourse is ‘sharply demarcated’; it allows 
‘no play with its borders, no gradual or flexible transitions’; ‘it enters our verbal 
consciousness as a compact and indivisible mass’” (151). The dramatic transformation of 
Incheon’s coastline is not a highly politicized process riddled with economic setbacks; it 
just happened. The airport is not a place of lineups and delays; it is quite simply 
connected to 181 cities around the globe. Incheon’s highways to Seoul do not traverse 
overly crowded urban areas; they are merely colorful lines over which cars hover. These 
images and statements have no history of their own; they are singular and total. 
Bauman (2004) continues on with Bahktin’s approach to explore how discourse 
becomes authoritative, or in relation to our scene, how the vision of the city becomes an 
authoritative reified object. The witness sits at the table with the presentation material 
before them, and they wait in anticipation at what the presenter will say. The presenter 
rehearses, or “relays”, the words on the page, and the witness nods at the utterance, but 
implicitly understands that the words originate from the page, the source of the 
presenter’s words, that arise from a formerly confirmed past and that were written by the 
state. These words already existed before the presenter uttered them. In repeating the 
words on the page, the presenter is not speaking freely; he or she is speaking “on behalf 
of a specific, identifiable source” (Bauman 2004, 151). The text thus exhibits in situ its 
authority over the presenter. As Bauman (2004) writes: 
Such routines… enact the authorization of discourse, by making its authority 
manifest, objectifying it in overtly perceptible ways. Observe… that these routines 
prescribe that the mediator replicate the author’s discourse intact; the integrity of the 
author’s text must be preserved. Agency resides with the author; the mediator is 
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denied an active role in the formulation and entextualization of the message. Rather, 
he is bound to it (152). 
The more accurately a presenter reproduces the text, the more they demonstrate their 
submission to it, and the more authority is ultimately bestowed upon the text itself 
(Bauman 2004, 153). Min-joon was basically quoting directly from the document. He 
was not expressing himself; rather, as Bakhtin (1981) puts it, he ‘exhibited’ the words, or 
‘ventriloquated’ (cf. Hull 2012, 147).  
The authority of the text over the mediator gains further momentum through the 
ritualization of the presentation by displacing authority (Hull 2012, 132). As Hull (2012) 
writes following Kelly and Kaplan: 
The authority of ritual flows from the ability of the speaker to divorce speech from the 
immediate context of its production, to transform particular utterances made by the 
individual in particular circumstances into discourse that is autonomous, grounded in 
some order beyond the speaker’s intentions (132). 
Min-joon’s presentation exemplified a heavily ritualized procedure to the point that he no 
longer needed to reflect on his words or comportment; these were automatized into a 
sedimented “habitus” (see Mauss 1973). Min-joon was no longer speaking; he was 
traversed, as Hull (2012) claims above, by an order separate from his own intentions: the 
particular and highly reduced elements of the city on the pages of the document. 
While Min-joon authorized the content of the document in his actively displayed 
and highly routinized submission to it, he performatively situated himself as the 
promoter. Min-joon carried himself and executed his monologue with ease and 
confidence, displaying a certain sense of authority in his own composure (see Mauss 
1934, 73-86). Indeed, to authorize the city to maximum effect, the presenter cannot 
simply be anyone repeating the words on the page. The presenter must also conform to 
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certain standards, and by doing so, demonstrates that they are the worthy candidate to 
undertake the mediation of the original text (Bauman 2004, 152-153).15 As Min-joon read 
out the words on the page, he was taking on the role of the mediator that restated the 
words of the object that stood in for the city, infusing it with the authority to define the 
reality of the city as a reified urban form. At the same time, through his material 
interaction with the document, Min-joon identified himself as a city maker, a promoter 
engaged in the production of a zone city. 
In that very room where the three of us were sitting, each simultaneously looking 
down at the paper on the table, took place the performative vision of the city. Through the 
routinized and authorizing performance of the city, promoters themselves came to 
interpret and understand the city as the one with which they interacted on a systematic 
basis, and tied their identities to it as the makers of this specific urban form. The city on 
those pages was the ‘true’ form of Songdo. 
The presentation, however powerful in its routine mundaneness, is one element of 
the story. A ritual such as this one is not a stand-alone performance; it is concomitantly 
bound to social-structural mechanisms that bring to life the charismatic appeal of the 
zone city for promoters. Promoters find their work challenging, especially since drawing 
in capital from foreign businesses to the city has been largely unsuccessful. The common 
trend, they informed me, was that private firms were interested in leasing land in Songdo, 
not in its purchase. Consequently, the city’s growth had slowed as funds were 
incrementally injected into the development of its infrastructure. Thus, while their vision 
of a transnational city did not immediately relate to the actual development of Songdo, 
                                                
15 Correlatively, as Foucault (1997) argued, documents “help produce the very individual and collective 
subjects who use them” (cf. Hull 2012, 114). 
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the reified vision of the zone city was kept alive by providing promoters with much 
sought after “specs”, with which they could forge their own successful future. Promoters 
perform urban charisma in the city while the charisma of the city – linked to larger social-
structural trends in Korea today – affords promoters with ‘gifts’ for personal success, the 
latter of which I now discuss. 
4.3 Mythical Charisma of the City: Accumulating “Specs” 
The first dimension to consider about the promoter is their outlook of their place of work, 
IFEZ Authority. From the promoter’s vantage point, IFEZ Authority’s primary purpose is 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Songdo is thus premised as a mega-scale real 
estate land lot made for private purchase. The fundamental logic of the city is as follows: 
sell land upfront and reinvest funds into Songdo’s infrastructure to expand purchasable 
lots, the justification for which is conferred in the city’s claim to offer employment for 
Korea’s highly-skilled and educated workforce. According to this logic, private 
investment is a fundamental ingredient to bring the vision of Songdo into fruition: if 
private investors do not come to purchase land and develop their assigned lot, the city 
quite simply cannot be built. The promoter is thus hired to present the city and negotiate 
terms of construction with the private investor. Correspondingly, promoters refer to 
themselves as “the frontier”, as those that constitute the face of the city to the outside 
world (field notes, 28 August 2014). 
Promoters are contract workers, a factor that opposes them to government 
officers, like planners, who have permanent positions. A typical contract will extend over 
five years, and promoters will take this period in their careers as an opportunity to 
accumulate as many “specs” as possible. A “spec” – a contracted hybrid Korean-English 
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term for “specification” – constitutes the “building blocks” of one’s CV (Levine 2014). A 
spec is generally used in reference to objects, say a car or a phone, but in Korea, the term 
also relates to people. The most common specs are test scores, foreign languages – 
especially English, and computer proficiencies. Accumulating specs is most important to 
anyone seeking work in Korea, and employers often compare the specs of potential job 
candidates (Levine 2014).16 As five-year contract workers, promoters are preoccupied 
with their future careers, and as such, they are interested in gaining as much experience – 
specs – as they can to build up their CVs over the duration of their contracts. 
The promoter’s most important specs are their language skills in English, their 
advanced foreign degrees and/or experience living and working abroad over extended 
periods. For example, Ye-joon and Ji-min, promoters on arts and culture investment and 
new growth investment teams, respectively, had advanced US degrees from brand-name 
institutions, while Ye-eun, on the commercial retail investment team, had lived in the US 
for over ten years. English is of such importance that it evidently trumps other specs 
promoters may have. During my second interview with Geon-woo for example, we spent 
most of our time together discussing his work, and by the end of the conversation, he 
opened up about something over which he had admittedly felt ashamed. He had worked 
for almost a decade in the private medical industry prior to coming to IFEZ Authority, 
and he was now working to attract foreign universities to Songdo. While he had initially 
applied to work in the medical field, no positions were available, and he was placed in 
education, an area in which he had no experience whatsoever. He was concerned over 
this aspect of his present situation because he thought it took away from his positionality 
                                                
16 The pursuit of specs demonstrates the continuity between state and society, as promoters work within the 
parameters of the state, yet also respond to the social-structural demands of society. 
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as an expert in the area of education, but it mattered little in the overall operation of the 
Business Opportunities HQ (field notes, 26 August 2014). 
Promoters’ work is assessed based on the size and number of companies they can 
attract to the city. Ideally, these companies should be prestigious, reputable, and willing 
to remain in Songdo for the long-term, where they can bring in their workforce to 
populate the city permanently, or over the long-term at the very least. Indeed, promoters 
are fundamentally salespeople, and their main task is to demonstrate or present a city that 
will ultimately bring profit to the investor. If promoters obtain signed contracts with these 
sorts of companies, they are rewarded. Generally, performing well will allow a promoter 
to move up in the team rankings in their division and be given greater responsibilities, 
which can in turn contribute to their professional experience and profile. 
Gathering specs is highly important for contract workers, and while all promoters 
I met were working under five-year contracts, some were about to renew a second one, 
and others were in their second contract. For example, Ye-eun, having lived in the US for 
over ten years, was a pivotal agent in the shared urban project between her division – 
strategic investment planning – and the government of Ecuador, who became interested 
in Songdo. Ye-eun’s division was serving as a consultant to help import some of 
Songdo’s urban principles into Ecuador. A project of this scale temporally extends far 
beyond five years. From her experience living in the US, Ye-eun spoke fluent English 
and claimed she adapts well with people of other cultural backgrounds. She had, like 
many other promoters, become a highly valued specialist in IFEZ Authority (field notes, 
31 July 2014). 
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4.3.1 Risk-Taking 
In general, accumulating specs requires what promoters internally refer to as “risk-
taking”. I noted two ways of doing this. First, to add variety to their experience as 
professionals, promoters often request to be moved to another team or division in the 
Business Opportunities HQ. For example, Ye-joon had moved from the bio-medical 
investment team to the arts and culture investment team in order to gain experience from 
different areas in IFEZ Authority and learn the associated skills and knowledge practices 
of those divisions (field notes, 28 August 2014). The promoter’s expertise, their English 
fluency first and foremost, enables them to easily move around in different divisions in 
the Business Opportunities HQ. The specific skills associated with different teams and 
divisions can be learned in the field, by which they gather experience. The promoter’s 
professional aspiration to explore different lines of work places them at odds with public 
officers, such as planners, who are generally “reluctant to take any action beyond their 
required responsibilities” (see Shin et al., forthcoming). 
The second method of “risk-taking” is to cater to a greater degree to the interests 
of the investor rather than to the plan of the city. Promoters generally see the plan of the 
city as flexible, negotiable, and can thus be made to conform to the ways in which 
investors approach the city. The flexibility of the plan is proportional to the size of the 
investment, the brand name of the company, and how large a workforce they bring to 
Songdo. For small investments, promoters will generally not support the investor, but 
larger investors’ interests will have weight in how promoters negotiate with planners over 
changing the plan for the investor.17 According to promoters, the interests of larger 
                                                
17 Promoters and planners will hold meetings to determine how much IFEZ Authority should concede to a 
potential investor’s plans and interests. During the meeting, they will discuss the following central 
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investors, that is, capital, will shape the city’s plan. The largest investors, for example 
Samsung BioLogics, “can do pretty much whatever they want” (field notes, 12 August 
2014). Promoters thus tend to be on the side of the investor, and their objectives in selling 
the city places them there, for that is how they are assessed and how they can then rise in 
the ranks of their division and gather additional specs. 
4.3.2 The (Un)Important Planning Document 
Songdo’s master plan is inscribed into a bounded document and distributed across all 
divisions in IFEZ Authority. As a document shared among a diversity of group within the 
institution, it is correspondingly addressed in different ways. This document thus does not 
only “store” information; rather, the information it contains is “a potential quality… 
which may or may not become salient in the play of social interactions around [it]” (see 
Hetherington 2008, 53). The planning document is “fungible” and can become engaged 
in conjuring different cities, and while this document plays on creating diverging 
fantasies, it simultaneously establishes an “artifactual bridge” between promoters and 
planners (see Hetherington 2008, 61). 
                                                                                                                                            
question: “For whom is this development, for the investor or the nation?” Once opinions and arguments 
have been weighed, the final decision will be made by vote among high-ranking officials in IFEZ 
Authority, who are tied to the Incheon government and the central state. 
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Figure 4.3 – The central planning document distributed across all division in IFEZ Authority. Photographed 
by author (28 August 2014). 
The planning document contains the dimensions of each zone, their designated 
use, their relation to other zones, and road networks, all inscribed in maps and charts. It 
also keeps track of the changes to zonal dimensions over the course of Songdo’s 
development. Promoters themselves have an ambiguous relationship to the planning 
document. It seems to straddle between importance and unimportance for them. For 
example, Ye-eun informed me that this document did not matter. When asked what her 
division would do if the document did not exist however, she told me that someone 
would have to produce one for the development to continue (field notes, 31 July 2014). I 
didn’t know what to make of this at first, but then I came to understand that promoters 
approach this document as flexible, that is, while whatever is inscribed in it does serve as 
a guide, the information contained therein can be freely modified. 
Promoters will not often use this book, but they are familiar with the specific 
areas they oversee. For example, a promoter on the education investment team will 
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occasionally refer to the book and become familiar with the education sections of the 
city. Some promoters become well versed in certain sections of this book. For example, 
Seo-yeon, a promoter in the bio-medical investment team, could accurately estimate the 
land price of particular zones in relation to other zones, as well as how changing the 
designated use of one zone could affect the price of surrounding zones. Evidently, she 
was quite apt with these calculations because she had often discussed changes with 
investors (field notes, 29 August 2014). Also, some promoters will find that certain 
regulations can be flexibly interpreted, from which they can develop an argument to 
support the proposal of a potential investor interested in modifying the master plan. Ji-
min exhibited excitement and motivation over these sorts of negotiations because if she 
successfully supported the investor, she would be successfully doing her job to make the 
city and would then gain valuable experience in the process, that is, specs (field notes, 12 
August 2014).  
Overall, these practices elucidate the promoter’s approach to the planning 
document: it can be changed. As I was often informed, investors are most interested in 
changing the plan of the city and selecting the location that fits their own interest. While 
the city’s infrastructures have been formerly laid out to facilitate and speed up 
construction, investors seek to strategically develop their projects according to how they 
see the city’s layout and configuration. For example, PlusMall (formerly HomePlus) 
established a shopping center, designated for a distribution zone, in a commercial zone 
because of its close proximity to residential zones. This is not a dramatic change to the 
city, but it does change the circulation of people and traffic and may make other nearby 
distribution zones less attractive and consequently more difficult to develop in the long 
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term. Indeed, changing the plan – like the plan itself – always presents new and 
unforeseeable obstacles. But promoters, in their efforts to gain specs of various kinds, are 
willing to ‘risk’ changing the plan, regardless of future implications. 
In sum, accumulating specs to build their CVs, taking ‘risks’ in the process, which 
entails changing the city plan, are important elements by which promoters identify 
themselves. These endeavors rehearse the internal constitution of promoters as a unique 
group navigating IFEZ Authority’s terrain, and correspondingly urge them to produce a 
transnational city. The transnational city is highly charismatic for promoters, for helping 
it come to life promises many gifts in return: specs to build their professional profiles and 
futures. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I followed the work of promoters in order to elucidate their relations with 
their vision of a transnational zone city built on a flexibly configured terrain. The city 
they were making was to them a charismatic urban form developed through two 
relational processes. First, promoters systematically presented a city that, through 
authorization and routinization, became a reified object that internally generated the 
reality of the city for promoters. Second, in the institutional terrain of IFEZ Authority, 
connected with social-structural trends in Korea, promoters sought to make their city in 
order to accumulate specs. Making their city could therefore afford them the building 
blocks for their CVs and for their personal development that could then ensure more 
secure and successful futures in their careers. These two elements – promoters and the 
city – were relationally bound: promoters in the city performed Songdo’s charisma while 
the mythical charisma of the city afforded promoters with ‘gifts’ for personal success. 
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 Though promoters found it a challenge to attract and induce investment, the 
strongest sense of difficulty came from within IFEZ Authority. Investors would bring 
their proposals but once these plans entered Songdo Business HQ and its armies of 
planners, these proposals were passed under the procedural microscope and thoroughly 
scrutinized to determine if the designs were congruent with the overall plans and 
regulations of the city. Ji-hoon in promotions told me frustratingly of planners: “They are 
crazy! They’re like goal keepers!” For him, planners were unflinching and obdurately 
“obsessed” with rules and regulations (field notes, 14 August 2014). Though planners 
hindered promoters from doing their work, promoters would only respond with greater 
resolve, for a transnational city fully developed by large investors is a treasure trove of 
specs.  
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CHAPTER 5 Conclusion 
Songdo, Korea’s first and foremost zone city, has been conjured as a unique urban form 
through its association with the zone, a spatial entity dominantly defined as a universally 
recognized means to attain modernity and global stature for the host nation (see Bach 
2011a; Orenstein 2011). This has in turn promoted the conditions through which Songdo 
has been imagined as a city for future forms of urban life. In the context of East Asia 
however, the zone is a historically assembled product of colonial, imperial, and capitalist 
encounters, giving rise to highly situated and exploitative spatial forms adopted by 
various states at opportune moments. Songdo emerged out of these regionally situated 
assemblages, modeled primarily after Shenzhen – the region’s first zone city – and other 
‘globally connected’ cities from around the world. 
Songdo presents three central fantasies. First, Songdo is envisioned as a pivotal 
node to effect sweeping transformations across the peninsula, as the starting point for the 
nation’s future. State presidents, for the limited duration of their respective tenures, have 
employed the zone city as a dramatic exemplification of their specific visions for the 
country’s drive towards modernity. Second, the city is imagined as an entirely blank 
slate, one without history or sedimented customs, which could be molded and shaped into 
the utopic dreams of its planners. In this guise, the zone city has attracted an array of 
planners and developers seeking to test out what they fantasized as the future of 
urbanism. Third, Songdo is mythologized as part of a smooth, frictionless world of 
unhindered movement across compressed – or entirely collapsed – temporal and spatial 
scales. Songdo’s infrastructures have been constructed to support and encourage 
streamlined movement across vast spaces, while its institutions have been intended to 
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culturally organize its urban population to maintain the circulation of capital, goods, and 
people. 
In practice however, Songdo has been rather distinct from its fantasies, 
resembling more a wealthy suburb for the country’s privileged elite. The city appears to 
have been more about the creation of land for real estate profit and the reproduction of 
privileged classes than about bringing its fantasies to reality. Yet the urban imagination of 
Songdo has flourished despite the contradictions of the everyday city. Songdo has been 
so thoroughly imbued with mythologies of future modernities that it is these fantasies that 
have come to define the city for the groups I followed in this thesis. The city’s powerful 
mythologies have not been reflections of the actual city; rather, they have been fantasies 
for the city that have shaped the interpretations of the city and the ways in which people 
live their daily lives in the city. 
 To address the relations between fantasies of the city and city makers of various 
guises in the city, I have drawn on recent scholarly developments in urban anthropology. 
Specifically, I employed Hansen and Verkaaik’s (2009) concept of “urban charisma”, an 
approach that foregrounds two relational forms of charisma. On the one hand, I attempted 
to bring into the analytical script the presence of Songdo by exploring the mythical 
charisma of the city. This form represented the mythical presence that saturates Songdo’s 
spaces, buildings, infrastructures, promotional documents, as well as people, who could 
use the city’s charisma to fashion their identities. On the other hand, I followed the 
performative charisma of various ‘urban types’ in the city who confidently interpreted, 
apprehended, defined, and therefore acted upon the city. These individuals – Mr. Park, 
Songdo’s wealthy residents, and IFEZ Authority promoters – actively rehearsed the city’s 
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charisma, directing its development and defining its proper everyday operation. As I 
attempted to demonstrate, mythologies of Songdo were powerful actors in the ways 
through which people in the city deployed them. These fantasies rendered transnational 
connections, transformed landscapes, created massive property speculation, conjured 
social and historical contexts, refashioned identities, reproduced class distinctions, and 
determined visibility and invisibility in Songdo’s cityscape. 
 In chapter 2, I explored how zone city fantasies came to life and how they were in 
turn deployed into the world. I followed Mr. Park, an ‘urban specialist’, while also cross-
referencing his ideas and actions into the social-structural context of his time. In divining 
his city, Mr. Park ‘personified’ the cultural, political, and economic circumstances in 
Korea and East Asia in the 1980s, specifically Korea’s growth model and China’s 
dramatic transforming. His dream city was conjured as a remedy to Korea’s purportedly 
unavoidable oncoming challenges, gaining mythical power as the light that could 
illuminate the future of the country. Mr. Park was simultaneously a performative agent of 
his dream city, armed with his particular skills and summoning visions across vast 
geographical spaces and deep into temporal trends. He was a highly educated engineer 
from a prestigious institution and a political force with years of experience in a rapidly 
developing part of Korea. He was able to make deliberate connections and recruit 
influential figures for his project, both in Korea and in foreign contexts. And he was 
finally given a ‘fragment of sovereignty’ to provoke the Korean state to comply with his 
dream. This relational process, Mr. Park’s mythical urban form – charisma of the city – 
and his decisive and calculating actions – charisma in the city, constituted a sharing of 
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‘gifts’, reinforcing and infusing a charismatic allure onto the other, that would eventually 
fashion a zone city within Korea’s territory. 
In chapter 3, I focused on ways in which fantasies of Songdo were rehearsed in its 
urban forms and how residents interpreted and deployed these fantasies in the city, 
despite the empirical evidence that would contradict the validity of the city’s 
mythologies. I first went on a tour of Songdo’s POSCO apartments being developed in 
section three in order to illustrate ways in which national and situated transnational 
categories materially congealed, giving rise to creative fantasies of modern futures. Next, 
I followed the accounts of a small group of Songdo’s well-to-do residents to elucidate 
ways in which they understood the city’s charisma. Do-hyun imagined the charisma of 
the city endowing its unique and exceptional population with success-driven desires and 
future-oriented values; Mi-yeon bestowed upon the city transnational status in its 
association with foreign products, creating a pronounced rift between Songdo and 
Incheon, and her own distinction by extension; Brunhilda found great charisma in 
Songdo, but she hoped the city would produce more were it to conform to her own 
visions on its stride along her situated universal path to modernity; Jenny imagined a dark 
future in Songdo, a city that may effectively appear charismatic on the surface but that 
also – both figuratively and literally – hid a nightmarish secret beneath. Though Jenny’s 
narrative was exceptional among the group of residents I presented, her narrative 
conjured a future for Korea. 
 The fantasies of Songdo’s residents were not in opposition to the dominant 
mythologies of the city. The residents themselves reproduced the ideal and highly 
reductionist categories of Songdo. They were therefore not in opposition to state power or 
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transnational forces of capital, but rather entwined in these processes, reinforcing them in 
surprisingly creative ways. Residents’ fantasies inscribed themselves onto the urban 
spaces of Songdo, as the city’s charisma domesticated an idealized future version of the 
foreign as civilized, orderly, and efficient, outlining the proper operation of the city and 
its occupants. 
In chapter 4, I followed the work of promoters in the city to elucidate their 
relations to the rendition of the city in promotional materials with which they routinely 
interacted. The city they were making was to them a charismatic urban form developed 
through two interrelated processes. First, promoters systematically presented a city that, 
through authorization and routinization, became a reified object as – if not more – real 
than the actual city. Second, in the institutional terrain of IFEZ Authority and linked to 
social-structural trends in Korea, promoters sought to make their city in order to 
accumulate specs. Making their city could therefore afford them the building blocks for 
their CVs and to their personal development that could then ensure more secure and 
successful futures in their personal careers. By conforming to the everyday societal 
pressures of accumulating specs, promoters illustrated the continuous relations between 
people who work in the state and those outside its formalized boundaries. 
In this project, I have argued that mythologies of Songdo conjured modern 
futurescapes that have powerfully shaped and informed the practices of various groups in 
the city, who have in turn acted upon Songdo’s material and symbolic production. While 
these fantasies were interpreted and rehearsed in various ways, their ideal types offered 
placeholders for new and situated ways to imagine modern futurescapes. In the context of 
Songdo, as a zone city that ceaselessly summoned a singularized world contained in one 
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place, the Korean state was a pivotal force, exercising “graduated sovereignty” to manage 
its territory and populations (see Ong 2006). What took shape was a situated urban form 
made to house Korea’s powerful classes and redirect circuits of capital towards the hands 
of a few. Songdo is fundamentally distinct from its mythologies and evidently grounded 
in the circumstances of its territorial context. 
The manifestation of Songdo is a situated example of a zone city, demonstrating 
that zone cities do not become their universal fantasies in refashioned worlds of utopic 
societies on a smooth, unstriated sphere. Zone cities – like all cities – are universally 
particular (see Harms 2011; Tsing 2005). While Songdo’s idealized fantasies linked to 
global processes, these were locally reconfigured on the soil of Korea. This thesis has 
thus sought to engage with the fragmented dimensions of global urban history, that urban 
forms, as global as they may present themselves to be, are always situated projects in a 
heterogeneous world, one that turns out to be an “arena of contention” (Tsing 2005) over 
which nobody can predict the outcome.
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